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Abstract 
In this work I defend the thesis that there are three individually attractive and 
mutually supportive elements of equality, namely distributive equality, relational 
equality, and basic equality, all of which should be of our concern, and be 
integrated into an egalitarian conception of justice. To begin with, I argue that 
egalitarian distributive principles that regulate the major institutions of society are 
best seen as grounded in our concerns for fairness in the distribution of benefits 
and burdens, as well as in the procedure which gives rise to distributive outcomes. 
I then argue that the justification of distributive principles may also be regarded 
as a constitutive part of an articulation of the relational ideal of equality, and that 
no egalitarian should forsake distributive equality in light of our commitments to 
distributive fairness and procedural fairness. Finally, I argue that the idea that 
democratic citizens are one another’s equals should be interpreted as suggesting 
that they are all to be governed by egalitarian principles of justice, which have no 
interest in giving differential status or treatment to any of them as far as they have 






Chapter 1. Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity:  
Rawls’s Egalitarianism Revisited 10 
1.1. Moral Arbitrariness and Rawls’s ‘Intuitive’ Argument 10 
1.2. Procedural Fairness, Reciprocity, and the Difference Principle 14 
1.3. The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity  25 
1.4. The Transformation Thesis 30 
Chapter 2. If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You Want to be Free? 39 
2.1. Cohen’s Challenge to the Basic Structure Restriction 39 
2.2. Rawls on the Institutional Division of Labour 43 
2.3. Scheffler on Moral Pluralism and Egalitarian Liberalism 46 
2.4. The Argument from Freedom and Reasonable Pluralism 54 
Chapter 3. Fairness, Luck, and Equality:  
Reflections on Dworkin and Luck Egalitarianism 69 
3.1. Distributive Fairness, Luck, and Equality 70 
3.2. Fairness, Equal Concern, and Respect for Persons 73 
3.3. The Prospects for Luck Egalitarianism 85 
Chapter 4. The Relationalist Critique of Luck Egalitarianism 95 
4.1. The Harshness Objection and the Disrespect Objection 95 
4.2. Rethinking the Relationalist Argument from Equal Respect 107 
4.3. Justifying Claims of Justice 111 
Chapter 5. The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 124 
5.1. What is the Point of Relational Equality? 124 
5.2. Distributing Relational Goods 138 
5.3. Relational Equality and Distribution 151 
5.4. Equality as a Deliberative Practice 162 
Contents 
 vi 
Chapter 6. Justice and Basic Equality 176 
6.1. The Problem of Variation 176 
6.2. The Enhancement Thesis 178 
6.3. The Non-Differentiation Thesis 182 
6.4. Equal Opportunity, Equal Respect, and Reciprocity 190 






In this essay I reflect on several dimensions of the literature on egalitarian 
justice which have been heatedly disputed ever since John Rawls published A 
Theory of Justice half a century ago.1 My main thesis is that egalitarians should 
uphold a conception of justice which includes three individually attractive and 
mutually supportive ideas of equality, namely distributive equality, relational 
equality, and basic equality.  
For a long while Rawls’s favoured conception of justice, ‘justice as fairness’, 
was considered as a paradigmatic distributive view about justice.2 Its two well-
known principles of justice purport to distribute fundamental rights and duties in 
a way that entitles every citizen to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, 
fair equality of opportunity, and a prospect of life that is preferable to that under 
any alternative institutional arrangements if she is one of the least fortunate 
members of society.  
Crudely put, I understand distributive egalitarianism as mainly concerned 
with the grounds on which it is justified to distribute benefits and burdens equally. 
A number of distributive egalitarians have also intensively surveyed the question 
regarding which goods are the relevant ones when we think about distributive 
justice.3 I shall however set that question aside throughout this work, for I believe 
that this inquiry into the ‘metric’ or ‘currency’ of egalitarian justice—namely, the 
attempt to answer the ‘equality of what?’ question—need not be the main focus 
 
1 Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
2 For this assessment, see Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, ch. 1. 
3 See, for example, Sen, ‘Equality of What?’; Sen, Inequality Reexamined; Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, chs. 1, 2, and 6; Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian 
Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, chs. 1, 2, and 4. 
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of the defence of distributive egalitarianism. Instead, I hold that distributive 
egalitarians must begin with the proposition that, for whatever good that arouses 
their distributive concerns, there is a presumption to distribute that good equally. 
I shall also set aside the question whether equality as a state of affairs is intrinsically 
valuable; for I think the thesis that equality is in itself good, or inequality bad, is 
not essential to distributive egalitarianism.4 In my view, what is crucial for the 
defence of a distributive conception of equality is the justification of distributive 
equality; and I hold that the presumption of equality is best justified on the 
grounds that equality is fair when there is no weightier consideration that suggests 
otherwise, and that inequality is unfair and in that respect unjust when it obtains 
for no good reason. 
Thus understood, the egalitarian character of justice as fairness is manifest in 
its distributive principles that not only secure equal basic rights and liberties, but 
also constrain social and economic inequalities, which are permitted only if they 
benefit all members of society, including the least advantaged, provided all who 
have the same talents and willingness have equal chances to obtain advantaged 
social positions. In fact, in spite of the numerous criticisms that have been put 
forward against it, it is my view that justice as fairness is still unrivalled as the most 
plausible distributive egalitarian conception of justice.  
In Chapters 1 and 2 of this work I try to vindicate this claim by engaging 
with two of G. A. Cohen’s influential critiques of justice as fairness.5 These two 
objections run as follows. First, Cohen argues that Rawls is not wholly faithful to 
the rationale behind his theory, which is that the influences of social, natural, and 
fortuitous contingencies are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and their 
differential impact on people’s lives should therefore be neutralized. Second, 
Cohen challenges Rawls to explain why his principles of justice only apply to ‘the 
 
4 Cf. Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority?’. 
5 Rescuing Justice and Equality, pt. 1. 
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basic structure of society’, namely the public system of rules which comprises the 
major social, political, and economic institutions, rather than applying to 
individuals as well. After all, the economic behaviour of these individuals may also 
have a considerable impact on the benefits that members of society, including the 
least advantaged, gain by participating in social cooperation.  
With the help of my interpretative work, I argue that Cohen’s two challenges 
to justice as fairness can be successfully met. According to the interpretation I 
submit in Chapter 1, although Rawls does acknowledge that it is in an intuitive 
sense unfair that distributive shares are strongly influenced by, say, our natural 
talents and social conditions, he does not argue from that fact to the conclusion 
that their effects need to be neutralized in the name of distributive fairness. Instead, 
Rawls is concerned to regulate the basic structure by principles which are fair in a 
procedural sense, for it is one of Rawls’s basic ideas that the fairness of a procedure 
can be transmitted to the outcome arising from it, so that what results from a fair 
procedure will likewise be fair. In contrast to the influential reading advocated by 
Cohen, I suggest that we can make sense of Rawls’s view on this matter only if we 
put its reference to the idea of procedural fairness into perspective.  
In fact, Rawls is well aware of the fact that the principles of justice in justice 
as fairness do not completely eliminate arbitrary inequalities that some people, 
like Cohen, may find intuitively unfair. Although I am inclined to side with 
Rawls’s critics on this point, I believe that he does have a definitive answer to this 
problem, which is to my knowledge hitherto underexplored by his sympathizers 
and opponents alike. On my reading, Rawls’s justification for the principles of 
justice in justice as fairness ultimately appeals to the idea of reciprocity, according 
to which all members of society are to benefit from their participation in a fair 
system of social cooperation. Rawls argues that the acknowledgement of the 
relation of reciprocity between them will have the effect of making these citizens 
consider a society well-ordered by his principles of justice to be just; for he believes 
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that their attitude towards the distribution of natural endowments, as well as other 
contingencies, will be transformed in light of the fact that the society they live in 
is governed by principles which appropriately express the idea of reciprocity. 
With respect to Cohen’s second objection, I argue in Chapter 2 that there is 
a rationale for Rawls to resist applying the principles of justice to individuals, 
which appeals to the idea of freedom. According to my interpretation of justice as 
fairness, although it may be desirable for citizens to have an egalitarian disposition, 
and behave in a way that is most beneficial to the worst off members of society, 
they also have a highest-order interest to form, revise, and rationally pursue their 
own plans of the good life, which are to be regarded as self-authenticating as far 
as they are compatible with their duty to abide by the demands of just institutions; 
for this is what their freedom consists in. If my defence of the Rawlsian position 
is successful, Cohen’s immanent critiques cannot force us to adopt a conception 
of justice which is both reasonable and more egalitarian than justice as fairness. 
Cohen’s critique of justice as fairness is part of a trend which attempts to 
move beyond Rawls, and people have come up with alternative theories of equality 
which in my view are also committed to procedural and distributive fairness in 
their own ways. In Chapter 3 I discuss two of these, namely Ronald Dworkin’s 
‘equality of resources’ and so-called luck egalitarianism, both of which understand 
the idea of distributive equality as fundamentally concerned to neutralize the 
impact of what people cannot be held responsible for, namely luck, but to leave 
things as they are if they result from people’s own genuine choices, for which they 
are themselves to be held responsible.6 I argue that the plausibility of these theories 
hinges on whether they offer cogent interpretations of the ideas of distributive and 
procedural fairness, and I conclude that they are partly successful in fulfilling that 
task. Relatedly, I argue against the view that the choice between candidate theories 
 
6 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue; Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’. 
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of equality or justice depends on whether any of them best interprets either the 
Dworkinian idea of equal concern and respect, or that of basic moral equality, for 
the reason that these notions do not themselves give us enough guidance on how 
they are to be interpreted or conceptualized.  
Now, the view that egalitarian justice is primarily a matter of distributing 
benefits and burdens has been acutely contested in the last two decades. According 
to what is now often termed as the relational egalitarian view, equality is an ideal, 
contrasting with forms of hierarchy, concerning how people are to relate with one 
another in public and private spheres. As Elizabeth Anderson puts it, the point of 
relational equality is negatively speaking to eliminate oppression and domination, 
and positively speaking to create and maintain a society in which democratic 
citizens are related as equals.7 Relational egalitarians reasonably emphasize that the 
relational ideal of equality does have distributive implications, but they are also 
usually keen to stress that it is simply misguided for egalitarians to be concerned 
with distributive questions irrespective of the relational contexts from which they 
arise. Apart from their shared vision of a society of equals, the revolt against the 
distributive conception of equality is also a common enterprise that unites many 
relational egalitarians. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I reflect upon the apparent rift between the distributive 
conception and the relational conception of equality. To begin with, I consider in 
Chapter 4 a number of objections to luck egalitarianism, put forward by Anderson 
among others, which is said to be a distributivist theory that contains most if not 
all of the ingredients that offend the relationalist. I argue that these objections fail, 
for on the one hand the accusation that luck egalitarianism has very implausible 
implications seems to involve exaggeration, and on the other hand it is sensible 
for luck egalitarians to formulate their theory as a pluralist view about justice, 
 
7 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’. 
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which may include whatever principles that help it to be more plausible. I also 
argue, pace Anderson, that luck egalitarianism is not at a disadvantage when it 
comes to the justificatory framework within which its principles are defended; for 
one thing, it need not presuppose any particular view on that issue. 
In Chapter 5 I go on to consider, more generally, the relationalist challenges 
to the distributive view. As I said, I suspect that there is a widespread discontent 
among relational egalitarians with any view that is mostly concerned to articulate 
the idea of distributive equality. I argue that the relationalist’s hostility towards 
distributive egalitarianism is unfounded. It should be noted immediately, for a 
start, that it is actually unclear why egalitarians must choose between distributive 
and relational equality. It is simply very natural to think that egalitarians should 
be committed to both of these, and aim to integrate them into their favoured 
conception of justice. Indeed, I assume that all those who endorse distributive 
equality are also happy to acknowledge one or another relational ideal of equality. 
The same, however, could not be said about relational egalitarians. With few 
exceptions, 8  relational egalitarians characteristically disapprove of the idea of 
distributive equality, and count that rejection as part and parcel of their defence 
of the relational view.  
In other words, there is a curious asymmetry. On the one hand, distributive 
egalitarians never suggest, as far as I know, that the pursuit of an egalitarian society 
is not worthwhile. Although some are more explicit about this than others, they 
all hold that it is consistent and congenial to endorse distributive and relational 
equality altogether; and some of them further hold that to search for the right 
distributive principles is also to articulate some of the constitutive features of an 
egalitarian society. On the other hand, relational egalitarians such as Anderson 
often claim that the very idea of distributive equality is unmotivated, and at any 
 
8 See, for example, Schemmel, ‘Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions’. 
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rate questions about distribution only make sense if they are asked in contexts 
where the distribution of benefits and burdens has an impact on interpersonal 
relationships that should be of concern to egalitarians.  
In view of this asymmetry, I am mainly concerned to defend the distributive 
view against the relationalist critique. I argue, to start with, that egalitarians may 
accommodate the relationalist’s concerns within a distributivist framework which 
includes principles that secure the equal distribution of ‘relational goods’. I argue, 
moreover, that it is a mistake for relational egalitarians to side with the sufficiency 
view about distribution, for there is no reason why they should have no concerns 
for fairness that lend support to distributive egalitarianism. I also argue, finally, 
that Samuel Scheffler’s proposal to articulate relational equality as a deliberative 
practice between those who regard and treat one another as equals does not 
undermine the distributive view; I point out that egalitarian distributive principles 
may still have their roles to play even if one accepts Scheffler’s practice-focused 
account, such as to limit the range of options that may be decided by a deliberative 
practice, or to provide guidance when it involves distributive issues. 
My sympathy, in other words, sides with those who accept the compatibility 
of distributive and relational equality. My belief is that, for whatever other projects 
a theory of egalitarian justice must commit to, it must aim to specify the sense in 
which distributive equality matters. I hold that those who forthrightly forsake a 
commitment to distributive equality fail in this requirement, and that they do not 
really believe in egalitarian justice. By defusing the challenges the relationalist puts 
forward to distributive egalitarianism, I hope to gesture towards the way in which 
distributive and relational equality can be reconciled. 
As I would like to put it, distributive equality and relational equality are two 
elements that should be accommodated within an egalitarian conception of justice. 
There is also a third element, namely basic equality, that has drawn much interest 
in recent years. Briefly put, according to the principle of basic equality, there is a 
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range of individual beings who are to be regarded and treated as equals in virtue 
of some properties they possess. It is fair to say that this principle is widely 
accepted, but there is one serious problem that any account of basic equality must 
encounter, namely that the properties which presumably ground the basic status 
of any individual being are most likely to be scalar ones that vary in degrees. No 
two persons are the same. No matter which morally significant and empirically 
verifiable property is chosen to be the base property of basic equality, say the 
capacity for being sentient, intelligent, self-conscious, rational, or autonomous, it 
is plain that we shall find variations not only among humans and other animals, 
but also among human beings themselves.  
In Chapter 6, I contend that there is an account of basic political equality 
which can be justified as an integral part of justice as fairness, for the latter includes 
principles which appropriately deal with all sorts of variations among citizens in a 
liberal democratic society. According to this Rawlsian account of basic political 
equality, the fact that there are variations among democratic citizens should not 
threaten to undermine their basic equality in the first place, for the principles of 
justice in justice as fairness are exactly tasked to cope with various contingencies 
that give rise to interpersonal variations.  
The essential feature of the Rawlsian account of basic political equality is that 
its justification of basic equality between democratic citizens is part and parcel of 
the defence of the conception of egalitarian justice within which it is embedded. 
That is, its plausibility depends on the theory of justice in which it is integrated, 
not the other way round; and it does not ground basic equality in one or another 
moral ideal, such as respect for persons. What is crucial, on this view, is a matter 
of whether a set of elements, including an account of basic political equality under 
consideration and principles that cope with interpersonal variations, cohere well 
with one another in a conception of justice which is preferable to its alternatives. 
To put it otherwise, to say that democratic citizens are one another’s equals just 
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is to say that they are entitled to be regarded and treated indiscriminately in 
accordance with some reasonable principles of justice. 
My defence of the Rawlsian account of basic equality means to illustrate a 
general point, already hinted at in Chapter 3, namely that all theories of justice 
have their ways to account for the idea of basic equality, which are to be recovered 
from the principles they include; but these interpretations of that idea can only be 
as plausible as the theories themselves, no more and no less. This implies that the 
charge of violating the principle of basic equality does not have any independent 
force against any particular egalitarian theory of justice. It is merely a roundabout 
way to say that the theory itself is implausible. 
10 
Chapter 1.  
Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity: 
Rawls’s Egalitarianism Revisited 
1.1. Moral Arbitrariness and Rawls’s ‘Intuitive’ Argument 
Rawls argues that guaranteeing formal equality of opportunity, which gives 
everyone the same legal rights to compete for all advantaged social positions, is 
not sufficient for a social system to be just, for it allows people’s chances to obtain 
positions and offices to be too significantly influenced by contingent factors for 
which they are not responsible: 
[S]ince there is no effort to preserve an equality, or similarity, of social 
conditions … the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is strongly 
influenced by natural and social contingencies. … Intuitively, the most obvious 
injustice of the system … is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly 
influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.1 
In view of the deficiency of formal equality of opportunity, Rawls favours the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, which requires that those who have 
similar talents and willingness to pursue offices and positions have equal chances 
of obtaining them. 
As Rawls also notes, however, the promise of fair opportunity still falls short 
of the ideal of egalitarian justice: ‘For one thing, even if it works to perfection in 
eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it still permits the distribution 
of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and 
 
1 A Theory of Justice, 72/62–63 rev. 
Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity 
 11 
talents.’2 To make good on this lack, Rawls claims that the principles which 
regulate social and economic inequalities have to counteract not only arbitrary 
inequalities that arise from social contingencies, but also those resulting from the 
distribution of natural endowments. He thereby proposes to supplement the 
principle of fair opportunity with the difference principle, according to which an 
inequality are justified if and only if it is most beneficial to the worst off members 
of society. According to Rawls, the difference principle expresses the idea of 
reciprocity, according to which all who abide by the fair terms of social cooperation 
are to benefit from their participation. 
But according to a popular reading of Rawls’s so-called ‘intuitive argument’, 
the central aim of justice is to counteract the morally arbitrary influence of social 
and natural contingencies.3 I shall call this idea the moral arbitrariness rationale, 
which states that it is unjust to permit distributive shares to be improperly 
influenced by morally arbitrary factors, because it is unfair for some people to be 
worse off than others for no good reason. Indeed, Thomas Nagel writes: ‘It is the 
development of such a sense of unfairness which provides the most effective 
support for equality as a social ideal.’4 As the thought goes, to condone arbitrary 
inequalities is to fail in the requirement of equal treatment in a substantive sense. 
On this interpretation of Rawls’s argument, then, it is the moral arbitrariness 
rationale that motivates him to endorse both the principle of fair opportunity and 
the difference principle. In particular, the difference principle is justified because, 
in line with the concern that motivates him to endorse fair equality of opportunity, 
it helps to further counteract the effects of the natural contingencies. 
Cohen objects, however, that Rawls’s argument, thus understood, is not valid, 
and that the difference principle ‘does not establish the justice of the inequalities 
 
2 Ibid., 73–74/63–64 rev. 
3 See Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, ch. 3. Cf. Scheffler, ‘What is 
Egalitarianism?’; Freeman, ‘Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism’. 
4 Equality and Partiality, 106. 
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that Rawls thinks are just.’5 Based on Brian Barry’s ‘two-stage’ reconstruction of 
Rawls’s argument, which Cohen dubs ‘the Pareto argument for inequality’, he 
argues that the key premise of the second part of this argument, which purports 
to show why inequalities permitted by the difference principle are justified, 
contradicts the moral arbitrariness rationale that underlies the presumption of 
equality established in the first part of the argument. Now, we may state the Pareto 
argument as follows:6 
The first stage: from equal opportunity to equality 
(1) Social and economic inequalities are to a great but indeterminate extent 
caused by natural, social, and fortuitous contingencies which are morally 
arbitrary. 
(2) Insofar as morally arbitrary factors have an impact on people’s chances 
of obtaining advantaged social positions, their differential influences 
should be neutralized in the name of equality of opportunity. 
(3) From (1) and (2), it follows that a presumption of equal distribution, as 
a necessary and sufficient condition for equality of opportunity, is 
justified. 
The second stage: from equality to the difference principle 
(4) Compared to any presumably just equal distribution, there typically exist 
strongly Pareto-superior inequalities which are advantageous to everyone, 
including the least advantaged members of society. 
(5) It is irrational for the least advantaged to prefer an equal distribution to 
a strongly Pareto-superior distribution which is most beneficial to them. 
(6) From (3), (4) and (5), it follows that the difference principle, according 
to which social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, is justified. 
 
5 Rescuing Justice and Equality, 88. 
6 See Barry, Theories of Justice, 217–234; Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 89. 
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Assuming the truth of the factual premises (1) and (4), the nub of Cohen’s 
critique of the Pareto argument is that there exist two potentially conflicting ideas, 
which respectively lend support to the normative premises (2) and (5). As I said, 
when Rawls tries to make the case for fair equality of opportunity, that suggestion 
is often taken to imply that all arbitrary inequalities are in an intuitive sense 
unacceptable in light of the moral arbitrariness rationale. But the difference 
principle, which expresses the idea of reciprocity according to Rawls, indicates on 
the contrary that an inequality which has arbitrary causes is acceptable when it is 
most advantageous to the least fortunate, even if it benefits others even more for 
no good reason. 
Cohen is correct to point out that the apparent inconsistency between the 
normative premises of the Pareto argument is disturbing. For a start, if it is true 
that Rawls’s justification for the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle decisively hinges on the moral arbitrariness rationale, then any 
institutional arrangements that do not fully neutralize the differential impact of 
contingent factors may be plausibly regarded as less than perfectly just. Moreover, 
and more specifically, it is not clear how the difference principle can be justified, 
for it appears to permit inequalities which are clearly condemned by the moral 
arbitrariness rationale. Furthermore, it is also no longer clear whether Rawls’s view 
is coherent, if it is motivated by two conflicting ideas, according to which one 
seems to indicate, in Cohen’s words, ‘that accidental inequality is unjust’,7 and 
another that inequality is to be preferred when it is to the advantageous to the 
least well off. 
To engage with Cohen’s critique, my main aim in this chapter is to offer a 
coherent interpretation of Rawls’s egalitarian conception of justice. To begin with, 
against the grain of the influential interpretation, according to which Rawls’s 
 
7 Rescuing Justice and Equality, 8. 
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argument is crucially premised on the claim that arbitrary inequalities are unfair 
in an ordinary, intuitive, sense, I argue that it instead makes essential reference to 
a procedural notion of fairness, which helps it to justify a presumption of equal 
distribution, as well as the difference principle that permits inequalities when the 
requirement of reciprocity is appropriately satisfied. That is to say, in contrast to 
Cohen’s emphasis of the central importance of the moral arbitrariness rationale, I 
suggest that this rationale in fact plays a lesser role in Rawls’s argument.  
Moreover, I argue that Rawls’s argument for the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, even though it makes reference to the moral arbitrariness rationale, 
does not ever purport to arrive at the conclusion that the differential impact of 
arbitrary factors on people’s lives should be wholly neutralized. As is illustrated by 
his claim that it is necessary to reconcile the principle of fair opportunity with the 
institution of family, Rawls explicitly acknowledges that it is practically impossible 
to eliminate all arbitrary inequalities. But Rawls believes that democratic citizens 
can make peace with arbitrary inequalities when they are appropriately regulated 
by the principles of justice, especially the difference principle; for they will then 
recognize that they are related in a reciprocal cooperative venture which benefits 
everyone. This, I suggest, is Rawls’s considered response to the claim that arbitrary 
inequalities are always unfair and for that matter unjust: he claims that people’s 
attitude towards social, natural, and fortuitous contingencies and the inequalities 
they give rise to will be transformed in light of their recognition of the relation of 
reciprocity between them.  
1.2. Procedural Fairness, Reciprocity, and the Difference Principle 
To explicate what I consider to be a coherent interpretation of Rawls’s view, 
a natural place to start with is his ‘official’ argument that draws upon the idea of 
the social contract. Rawls postulates a hypothetical scenario, which he calls ‘the 
Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity 
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original position’, where mutually disinterested parties—in the sense that they 
only care about the realization of their own conceptions of the good—are tasked 
with reaching an agreement in respect of the principles of justice. The role of these 
principles is to regulate the major social, political, and economic institutions that 
constitute the basic structure of society, and they have the function of determining 
the distribution of ‘social primary goods’, which Rawls assumes are things that 
everybody needs whatever else one may need to lead a good life and to act as a 
just citizen. These include the basic rights and liberties; freedom of movement 
and choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of 
responsibility; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect.8  
The defining feature of the original position is that the parties in this initial 
situation are prevented by ‘the veil of ignorance’ from having information about 
their own natural talents, social backgrounds, views about the good life, and the 
particular circumstances of the society they live in. According to Rawls, situating 
the parties behind the veil of ignorance  
ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles 
by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. 
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his 
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or 
bargain.9 
The passage illustrates that it is essential to Rawls’s argument from the 
original position that there is a fair initial situation for the parties to deliberate 
about the principles of justice, for when that condition is satisfied the agreement 
the parties arrive at should also be fair. As Rawls puts it, the name of his theory, 
 
8 See Rawls, Theory, 62/54 rev.; Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 57–61. 
9 Theory, 12/11 rev. 
Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity 
 16 
justice as fairness, ‘conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an 
initial situation that is fair.’10 
It is very important to note that the notion of fairness that Rawls refers to in 
his characterization of the original position is different from the intuitive sense of 
fairness I alluded to above. The notion of fairness which I mentioned to illustrate 
the moral arbitrariness rationale appears to be primarily concerned with a property 
of states of affairs. It is typically instantiated in a distribution where some are 
worse off than others for no good reason—although it may also be appealed to 
when there are considerations that count against an equal distribution. As we have 
seen, Rawls suggests that a social scheme that merely secures formal equality of 
opportunity appears unfair in this intuitive sense, because it is indifferent to 
whether there is a level playing field, even if no one is formally forbidden from 
competing for advantaged social positions. For want of a better term, I shall refer 
to this idea as distributive fairness. 
By contrast, the idea of fairness that Rawls makes use of in the argument from 
the original position is essentially a property of procedures. I find it congenial to 
call it procedural fairness, even though the term Rawls himself prefers is ‘pure 
procedural justice’.11 When the idea of procedural fairness is used to characterize 
the conditions of the reasoning in the original position, Rawls suggests that the 
agreement reached in the original position is fair in the sense that the agreement 
honours each party’s equal claim to as great as possible a bundle of primary goods. 
As we will see presently, Rawls argues that the commitment to procedural fairness 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 I think the distinction between these two senses of fairness in the text roughly corresponds to 
Rawls’s distinction between ‘pure procedural justice’ and ‘imperfect procedural justice’. I cannot 
pursue this topic further, but I do want to note one thing: Rawls appears to hold that the idea of 
imperfect procedural justice, which assumes that there are standards with respect to the correctness 
of distributive outcomes independent of the procedures that give rise to them, hardly has any 
application with respect to fundamentals of distributive justice, except for the case of the justice 
of a constitution. See ibid., 84–90, 221–228/74–78, 194–200 rev. Cf. Nussbaum, Frontiers of 
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 81–84. 
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implies a presumption of equal distribution of primary goods. But he also argues 
that it is procedurally fair for the parties in the original position to agree to the 
difference principle which permits an inequality in holdings. 
Now, when Rawls proposes to replace formal equality of opportunity with 
fair equality of opportunity, the latter is favoured as fair in the procedural sense, 
or so I argue. As Rawls puts it, ‘the role of the principle of fair opportunity is to 
insure that the system of cooperation is one of pure procedural justice.’12 On my 
interpretation, Rawls suggests that the distributive unfairness in formal equality 
of opportunity will be duly mitigated if there exist fair procedures to be followed, 
so that those who have the same talents and willingness will have equal chances 
to pursue advantaged offices and positions. As it is clear that a procedurally fair 
distribution of opportunities is consistent with unequal outcomes, we should keep 
in mind that the pursuit of procedural fairness does not necessarily imply that all 
who are fairly treated will end up in similar situations. 
But as I shall further explain below, Rawls in fact thinks that it is practically 
impossible to fully realize the ideal of procedural fairness, and the principle of fair 
opportunity can only guarantee procedural fairness to a reasonable extent; this is 
indeed one important reason why Rawls has to supplement it with the difference 
principle. As an illustration, we may notice that Rawls does not fully subscribe to 
what he calls ‘the principle of redress’, which ‘holds that in order to treat all 
persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must … 
redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality.’13 Instead, he suggests 
that ‘although the difference principle is not the same as that of redress, it does 
achieve some of the intent of the latter principle.’14 I shall not delve into the 
question whether Rawls has good reason to leave the principle of redress aside; 
 
12 Theory, 87/76 rev. 
13 Ibid., 100–101/86 rev. 
14 Ibid., 101/87 rev. 
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here I allude to his remark merely to support one interpretive claim: namely, that 
although he aims to secure procedural fairness in the distribution of opportunities 
by the principle of fair opportunity, Rawls does not propose to neutralize all 
arbitrary advantages pertaining to people’s chances to obtain advantaged positions 
and offices.  
With these preliminaries in mind, let us turn to Rawls’s argument: 
Now consider the point of view of anyone in the original position. There is no 
way for him to win special advantages for himself. Nor, on the other hand, are 
there grounds for his acquiescing in special disadvantages. Since it is not 
reasonable for him to expect more than an equal share in the division of social 
primary goods, and since it is not rational for him to agree to less, the sensible 
thing is to acknowledge as the first step a principle of justice requiring an equal 
distribution. Indeed, this principle is so obvious given the symmetry of the 
parties that it would occur to everyone immediately.15 
Rawls claims that a principle of equal distribution is fair to all the parties in 
the original position because they are fairly situated when they deliberate. In light 
of the informational restrictions under the veil of ignorance, no party is able to 
secure an agreement that favours only himself. Starting from the assumption— 
which seems fair in the distributive sense—that each of the parties in the original 
position has an equal claim to ask for a largest possible bundle of social primary 
goods, a presumption of equal distribution of all social primary goods, or what 
Rawls calls ‘the benchmark of equality’, is justified on the ground that from any 
party’s standpoint it represents a rational choice. Now, we may think that justice 
as fairness is an egalitarian conception of justice because it makes a prima facie 
case for distributive equality. 
However, Rawls hastens to add the following remarks: 
 
15 Ibid., 150–151/130 rev. I cite the revised text, which is slightly different from the original 
edition.  
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But … there is no reason why this initial acknowledgement [of a principle of 
justice requiring an equal distribution of all social primary goods] should be final. 
Society should take into account economic efficiency and the requirements of 
organization and technology. If there are inequalities in income and wealth, and 
differences in authority and degrees of responsibility, that work to make 
everyone better off in comparison with the benchmark of equality, why not 
permit them? … Thus the basic structure should allow these inequalities so long 
as these improve everyone’s situation, including that of the least advantaged … 
Because the parties start from an equal division of all social primary goods, those 
who benefit least have, so to speak, a veto. Thus we arrive at the difference 
principle.16 
As the passage indicates, Rawls supposes there are considerations that justify 
departures from the benchmark of equality. For instance, he thinks it is most 
likely that the basic structure of society has to include market mechanisms that 
help to allocate goods and services efficiently, even though their proper 
functionings may inevitably give rise to social and economic inequalities.17 On 
Rawls’s view, no one can reasonably object to inequalities when they improve 
everyone’s condition. Indeed, he claims that a principle that enjoins ‘the equal 
distribution of all primary goods [is] irrational, since it does not permit society to 
meet certain essential requirements of social organization, and to take advantage 
of considerations of efficiency, and much else.’18 Rawls therefore contends that 
the reasoning that initially favours a principle of equal distribution in the original 
position should ultimately settle on the difference principle, which permits social 
and economic inequalities when they are most beneficial to the least advantaged 
members of society, as compared to the benchmark of equality. 
According to Rawls, the original position is a ‘device of representation’ which 
models our considered conviction that ‘the fact that we occupy a particular social 
 
16 Ibid., 151/130–131 rev. I cite the revised text, which is different from the original edition.  
17 Ibid., 270–274/239–242 rev. 
18 Political Liberalism, 329; emphasis added. 
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position is not a good reason for us to accept, or to expect others to accept, a 
conception of justice that favors those in this position.’19 By extending ‘the same 
idea … to other cases’, the veil of ignorance imposes ‘appropriate restrictions on 
what are to count as good reasons.’20 On my interpretation, what Rawls suggests 
is that we have good reasons to accept a distribution when and only when it can 
be delineated as resulting from a fair procedure, and the device of the original 
position, which represents a procedurally fair initial situation, helps us to specify 
these reasons.21 However, it appears that we can also identify these reasons in a 
simpler way, as Rawls sometimes states his argument without referring to the 
original position: 
Imagine, then, a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the social primary 
goods are equally distributed: everyone has similar rights and duties, and income 
and wealth are evenly shared. This state of affairs provides a benchmark for 
judging improvements. If certain inequalities of wealth and organizational 
powers would make everyone better off than in this hypothetical starting 
situation, then they accord with the general conception.22 
What Rawls alludes to as ‘the general conception’ of justice is the following: 
‘All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of 
 
19 ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, 401. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See also Rawls, Theory, 183/159 rev.: ‘The form of the argument for the two principles is that 
the balance of reasons favors them … Thus the agreement of the parties depends on weighing 
various considerations. … Yet … when everything is tallied up, it may be clear where the balance 
of reasons lies. If so, then to the extent that the original position embodies reasonable conditions 
used in the justification of principles in everyday life, the claim that one would agree to the 
principles of justice is perfectly credible.’ (Here I cite the revised text, which is different from the 
original edition.) Cf. Cohen, ‘The Original Position and Scanlon’s Contractualism’. 
22 Theory, 62/54–55 rev. See also Rawls, Political Liberalism, 281–282, for a passage which may 
make one uncertain whether or not a structurally similar argument stated there is addressed from 
within the standpoint of the original position. Cohen says it is not, for Rawls appears to be merely 
‘reviewing “intuitive considerations”’ (Rescuing Justice and Equality, 164 n. 33). This textual 
evidence is however not decisive, since Rawls also writes that he is ‘presenting some intuitive 
remarks’ in section 26 of Theory (150/130 rev.), where he clearly is addressing the argument from 
the original position. 
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self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, 
or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.’23 Justice as fairness, by contrast, 
is a ‘special conception’ of justice, consisting of the two principles of justice and a 
couple of priority rules which arrange them in a strict order. On one formulation, 
these principles of justice are stated by Rawls as the following:  
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of 
the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).24 
According to the priority rules in justice as fairness, the principle of equal 
liberties (a) has an absolute priority over the second principle (b) that regulates 
social and economic inequalities; and the principle of fair opportunity has a 
similar priority over the difference principle. The basic structure of society is to 
be arranged to satisfy the principle of equal liberties first, and then the principle 
of fair opportunity, and then finally the difference principle; and it should never 
be the case that an interest guaranteed by a higher-order principle is sacrificed for 
the sake of an interest guaranteed by a lower-order principle. 
Now, I shall summarize Rawls’s argument for the difference principle as 
involving the following claims: 
(A) A distribution is justified if and only if it is preferable to an appropriate 
benchmark of comparison; 
 
23 Theory, 62/54 rev. Rawls goes on to add: ‘Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to 
the benefit of all.’ 
24 Restatement, 42–43. 
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(B) A distribution is an appropriate benchmark of comparison if and only if 
it is an equal distribution; 
(C) An unequal distribution is preferable to an appropriate benchmark of 
equality if and only if it is to everyone’s advantage.25 
As they are formulated, (A) is the general premise of Rawls’s argument, and 
(B) illustrates the initial acknowledgement of the benchmark of equality in that 
argument, which is defended on the ground that all those who have an equal claim 
to benefits would agree that a principle of equal distribution is fair. Our main 
question is how to defend (C). From what we gather from Rawls’s remarks, he 
appears to suggest that considerations of efficiency, along with other institutional 
demands, make it the case that inequalities permitted by the difference principle 
are preferable to a Pareto-inferior benchmark of equality. But one might wonder 
whether Rawls’s defence of the difference principle is fully consistent with his 
egalitarian commitments. The worry is: if Rawls’s argument initially establishes 
that a presumption of equality is fair, and therefore just, to those who are fairly 
situated, then how could the difference principle, which permits inequalities, also 
be acknowledged as fair and just? How can Rawls hold that an equal distribution 
and an unequal distribution are both justifiable to those who have an equal claim 
to a largest possible bundle of primary goods? 
But I think it is not difficult to make sense of Rawls’s argument if we remind 
ourselves that the benchmark of equality and the inequality permitted by the 
difference principle are both claimed to be fair in the procedural sense. Assuming 
that everyone has an equal claim to benefit from a fair system of social cooperation, 
 
25 Strictly speaking, Rawls appears to suggest that a distribution that satisfies (A) alongside (B) and 
(C) is only ‘just throughout, but not the best just arrangement’, whereas a distribution is ‘perfectly 
just’ if it satisfies all of these and is most beneficial to the worst off. So a more accurate summary 
of Rawls’s claims would be that a distribution is justified if and only if it is most preferable, from 
the standpoint of the worst off members of society, as compared to an appropriate benchmark of 
equality. See Theory, 78–79/68 rev. I assume that a just throughout arrangement is still justified, 
but there may exist complications that need not deter us at this stage.  
Moral Arbitrariness, Procedural Fairness, and Reciprocity 
 23 
procedural fairness requires only that no one’s claim be given lesser weight; it does 
not assume that a fair bargaining procedure must give rise to a definite outcome. 
As Rawls explains, it presupposes ‘no independent criterion for the right result: 
instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct 
or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.’26 
The emphasis on procedural fairness, I note, is what distinguishes my reading 
of Rawls’s argument from Cohen’s interpretation, which is substantiated as the 
Pareto argument stated above. According to the latter, what ultimately motivates 
Rawls to acknowledge a presumption of equality as an appropriate benchmark of 
comparison is a sense of distributive unfairness pertaining to any inequalities that 
have morally arbitrary causes. If this way of understanding Rawls’s argument were 
correct, it would be plausible for Cohen to claim that the difference principle itself 
contradicts the moral arbitrariness rationale in light of the fact that it does permit 
arbitrary inequalities.27 My reading, by contrast, implies no such contradiction. 
As I have tried to explain, Rawls’s egalitarianism is coherent when it is understood 
as a theory that consistently draws upon the idea of procedural fairness. 
Now, I think it is even more important to see that we can only make sense of 
Rawls’s egalitarianism if we put the idea of reciprocity into perspective. I have said 
that one reason why justice as fairness is an egalitarian theory of justice is that it 
contains an argument for a presumption of equal distribution. But it is egalitarian 
in a deeper sense—it acknowledges that everyone has an equal claim to benefit 
from their participation in social cooperation. This is why Rawls suggests that ‘the 
difference principle expresses a conception of reciprocity.’28 As he articulates that 
idea, ‘all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and 
procedure require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable 
 
26 Theory, 86/75 rev. 
27 See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 156–161. 
28 Theory, 102/88 rev. 
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benchmark of comparison.’29 Under the aegis of reciprocity, each citizen’s claim 
to primary goods, which enable him to pursue his conception of the good, is to 
be given an equal weight. Rawls therefore suggests that ‘each representative man 
can accept the basic structure as designed to advance his interests. The social order 
can be justified to everyone, and in particular to those who are least favored; and 
in this sense it is egalitarian.’30 
According to my interpretation, Rawls’s remark implies that the justification 
of the difference principle, which permits social and economic inequalities that 
advance everyone’s interests, is ultimately premised on the claim that it is an 
expression of the idea of reciprocity.  
Thus understood, the principle of reciprocity defines the basic ground of the 
legitimate entitlement of a free and equal democratic citizen: as a member who 
participates together with others in a system of social cooperation, and complies 
with its fair terms, she is entitled to benefit from her participation insofar as others 
also gain. As Rawls puts it, ‘reciprocity is a relation between citizens expressed by 
principles of justice that regulate a social world in which everyone benefits judged 
with respect to an appropriate benchmark of equality’.31 Alternatively put, in a 
society suitably regulated by the difference principle, where all citizens benefit 
from their participation in social cooperation, no one, including the least 
advantaged, can have a legitimate complaint. 
But let me also note that Cohen might challenge Rawls’s egalitarianism at 
this deeper level, and ask why an unequal distribution is always preferable to an 
appropriate benchmark of equality whenever it benefits everyone; that is, he might 
insistently ask whether the idea of reciprocity is appropriate to define the relation 
 
29 Political Liberalism, 16. 
30 Theory, 102–103. The passage is removed from the revised edition. 
31 Political Liberalism, 17. 
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between the better off and the worse off, especially when distributive fairness is 
taken into account. I will come back to this issue at the end of this chapter. 
1.3. The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity 
I have argued that the ideas of procedural fairness and reciprocity should be 
in the foreground of a plausible interpretation of Rawls’s egalitarian conception 
of justice. In contrast with Cohen’s reading, I have tried to motivate the view on 
which Rawls’s acknowledgement of the problem of moral arbitrariness influences, 
which besieges a social scheme that only secures formal equality of opportunity, 
is not to be taken to imply that all arbitrary advantages are to be neutralized. In 
particular, I claimed that Rawls’s endorsement of fair equality of opportunity is 
defended on the ground of procedural fairness, not distributive fairness. 
But one might suspect that my interpretive claims contradict what is implied 
by Rawls’s comment that a social system that guarantees fair opportunity ‘still 
appears defective. For … it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to 
be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents.’32 That is, it 
might appear to some that Rawls must be committed to the view that distributive 
unfairness persists unless all arbitrary advantages are eliminated.33 They would 
think that this is the major lesson to be learned from Rawls’s comment that it is 
unjust to permit ‘distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors 
so arbitrary from a moral point of view.’34  
But I think one can easily see that there is no inconsistency involved if Rawls 
holds that the distribution of income and wealth should not be determined by the 
distribution of natural talents, as well as that distributive shares can sometimes be 
 
32 Theory, 73–74/64 rev. 
33 See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 166. 
34 Theory, 72/62–63 rev 
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properly influenced by arbitrary factors so long as they are not determined by them. 
As I shall explain in the following, Rawls consistently holds that a distribution is 
not strictly determined by arbitrary factors, and their influences upon it are not 
improper, when it results from a reasonably fair procedure; that is to say, he holds 
the view that inequalities influenced by morally arbitrary factors are justified when 
they are appropriately regulated by the principles of justice. 
To begin with, Rawls’s endorsement of procedural fairness is accompanied 
by a cautious note: whilst this idea can be nicely illustrated with the help of the 
original position as a device of representation, where it is assumed that the parties 
are not privileged by their social and natural endowments in the process of their 
reaching an agreement, in reality it is practically impossible to level the playing 
field. In line with his lack of enthusiasm about the principle of redress, which I 
mentioned in passing above, Rawls thinks that fair equality of opportunity can 
never be fully realized as a political ideal: 
[T]he principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least 
as long as some form of the family exists. The extent to which natural capacities 
develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class 
attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving 
in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social 
circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement 
and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a 
principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the 
natural lottery itself.35 
Rawls’s idea appears to be that the constitution of our selves is largely the 
product of our social and cultural circumstances, as they are epitomized by the 
institution of family, which inevitably bestow advantages to some over others, and 
 
35 Ibid., 74/64 rev. 
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that their existence thereby gives rise to insurmountable practical difficulties in 
realizing fair equality of opportunity.  
But Cohen might point out that acknowledging this fact merely indicates the 
practical necessity of reconciling our commitment to fair opportunity with the 
need to maintain the institution of family. This observation would nonetheless be 
consistent with claiming that if Rawls were faithful to his own view about the 
moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery, he would have a pro tanto reason to 
reconsider the legitimacy of the family in the name of fair opportunity. In fact, 
Rawls himself is well aware of this challenge: 
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to view 
persons independently from the influences of their social position. But how far 
should this tendency be carried? It seems that even when fair opportunity … is 
satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals. Is the 
family to be abolished then? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea 
of equal opportunity inclines in this direction.36 
Rawls nonetheless maintains that the family is not to be abolished on the 
ground that it plays an indispensable role in the reproduction and cultivation of 
the cooperative members of society, which he suggests are ‘necessities [that] limit 
all arrangements of the basic structure, including efforts to achieve fair equality of 
opportunity.’37 Since the family is necessary for a political society to exist over 
time, insofar as there is no adequate replacement for it, the preservation of this 
institution implies constraints on how principles of justice are to be conceived, in 
that their implementation should never compromise its essential functionings. 
Cohen might press his challenge further, however, and insist that Rawls’s 
remarks with regard to the case of family still by no means undermine the point 
that we have a reason to abolish the family, but, again, only indicate that all things 
 
36 Ibid., 511/448 rev. See also ibid., 299–301/264–265 rev. 
37 Restatement, 163. 
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considered we need to reconcile fair equality of opportunity with the family, and 
this is something that Cohen would have no objections to. Nonetheless, he would 
very much want Rawls to admit that the differential impact of the family on 
people’s lives should still be condemned as morally arbitrary, and be neutralized 
if feasible. That is to say, notwithstanding the vital role the family plays in the 
sustenance of a political society, Cohen would maintain that the normative force 
of our concern for distributive fairness, which is said to motivate the principle of 
fair opportunity and a general commitment to distributive egalitarianism, should 
remain intact in the face of that fact. On Cohen’s view, the distributive unfairness 
in arbitrary inequality persists unless the differential impact of luck on people’s 
lives is wholly neutralized.  
Now, one might respond to Cohen’s challenge by suggesting that we are able 
to distinguish between two senses of a cause being morally arbitrary, and Cohen 
is therefore incorrect to say that all accidental inequalities are unfair and for that 
matter unjust. On the one hand, we might say there is an invidious sense of moral 
arbitrariness, according to which what is morally arbitrary is morally objectionable. 
For instance, if the tuition fee of a public university is set so high that only 
candidates who are from wealthy families can afford to pay, those who are not so 
may legitimately complain that they are in effect arbitrarily disadvantaged by an 
unwritten rule that draws upon irrelevant considerations.38  
On the other hand, to cite T. M. Scanlon, we might allude to another sense 
of moral arbitrariness, according to which ‘to say that a characteristic is arbitrary 
from a moral point of view is just to say that it does not, in itself, justify special 
rewards.’39 As Nagel puts it, if inequalities ‘were arbitrary only in the sense that 
there were no reasons for or against them, they would require no justification’.40 
 
38 See Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’, 105–112. 
39 Why Does Inequality Matter?, 46; emphasis in original. 
40 ‘Equality’, 119. 
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But Nagel also notes, correctly in my view, that Rawls appears to hold that 
‘undeserved inequalities are morally arbitrary in an invidious sense, unless 
otherwise justified.’41 On this reading, Rawls assumes that arbitrary inequalities 
always need to be justified, and there is a presumption against them. 
Now, one might want to challenge that assumption itself, and more generally 
the view that there is always a reason to neutralize any differential impact of luck, 
broadly understood as consisting of all factors for which those who are affected 
should not be held responsible.42  
I shall discuss one such rebuttal put forward by Andrew Mason. Against ‘the 
neutralization approach’, Mason argues that if it is in all instances unfair when 
one has an arbitrary advantage, then we would have reason to regard it as unfair, 
and to neutralize its effects, when parents confer advantage on their children by 
reading stories to them, whilst other kids, no less deserving, do not benefit from 
their parents doing so. Mason claims that this implication of the neutralization 
approach ‘is so at odds with our ordinary moral experience’, for the reason that 
we do not consider the case of parents giving attention to their children by reading 
them stories as having anything to do with justice.43 Since Mason thinks there is 
absolutely no reason of justice that counts against parents favouring their own 
children by reading stories to them, he rejects the neutralization approach because 
it entails such a reason. He instead favours what he calls ‘the mitigation approach’, 
which does not find fault with luck as a matter of principle, but only aims to limit 
its impact when there are context-dependent considerations that count in favour 
of doing so.  
 
41 Ibid. 
42 For this understanding of luck, see Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, 107–109. 
43 Mason, Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian 
Thought, 99; see also Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 237. Cf. Segall, Equality and Opportunity, 
159. 
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But as someone who thinks it is obviously unfair that only some but not all 
children benefit from their parents’ stories, I am unmoved by Mason’s argument 
against the neutralization approach. It is of course true that many parents feel no 
moral unease when they benefit their children in minute ways, but it seems that 
the best explanation is simply that all things considered there are countervailing 
reasons that justify their doing so. Mason’s claim that there is no reason to object 
to parents benefitting their children by reading stories to them implies that there 
are arbitrary inequalities which need no justification. I resist the conclusion of 
Mason’s argument because I reject its premise.  
1.4. The Transformation Thesis 
One may hold, however, that arbitrary inequalities always need to be justified, 
and also that they are justified when suitable conditions are satisfied, without 
denying that there always exists a reason of distributive fairness to object to any 
arbitrary inequalities. For it is consistent to hold that there is such a reason, and 
that the balance of reasons decisively favour an unequal distribution, which may 
or may not have arbitrary causes, over an equal distribution.  
This, I believe, is Rawls’s position. As I will now start to explain, Rawls’s 
justification of the difference principle, which permits inequalities when they are 
most beneficial to the least fortunate, ultimately hinges on what I shall call the 
transformation thesis, according to which citizens in a democratic society will find 
arbitrary inequalities much less objectionable when (and perhaps only when) there 
is a relation of reciprocity between them.  
To illustrate the transformation thesis, it may be helpful to return to Cohen’s 
critique. As we have seen, Cohen would insistently press on the point that if the 
full realization of fair equality of opportunity requires the neutralization of all 
arbitrary inequalities, distributive unfairness should persist whenever the ideal of 
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equality of opportunity is compromised, notwithstanding the need to reconcile 
fair opportunity with the family. 
For what it is worth, Rawls does not deny that it might seem regrettable that 
there are limits of the consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity. 
But he maintains that ‘within the context of [justice as fairness] as a whole, there 
is much less urgency’: 
The acknowledgement of the difference principle redefines the grounds for social 
inequalities … We are more ready to dwell upon our good fortune now that these 
differences are made to work to our advantage, rather than to be downcast by 
how much better off we might have been had we had an equal chance along with 
others if only all social barriers had been removed. [Justice as fairness], should it 
be truly effective and publicly recognized as such, seems more likely than its 
rivals to transform our perspective on the social world and to reconcile us to the 
dispositions of the natural order and the conditions of human life.44 
In this important passage Rawls suggests that the reconciliation between the 
more and the less fortunate in a social world is realistically possible when we 
‘transform our perspective’ towards the natural lottery, and this transformation is 
realistically possible because the difference principle ‘redefines the grounds of 
social inequalities’. Assuming that all members of society, including the least 
advantaged, benefit from inequalities permitted by the difference principle, Rawls 
indicates ‘that the difference principle represents an agreement to regard the 
distribution of native endowments as a common asset and to share in the benefits 
of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.’45 As he goes on to elaborate:  
We use the phrase ‘common asset’ to express a certain attitude, or point of view, 
toward the natural fact of the distribution of endowments. Consider the question: 
Is it possible for persons as free and equal not to view it a misfortune (though 
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not an injustice) that some are by nature better endowed than others? Is there 
any political principle mutually acceptable to citizens as free and equal to guide 
society in its use of the distribution of native endowments? Is it possible for the 
more and the less advantaged to be reconciled to a common principle? … 
Here it is crucial that the difference principle includes an idea of reciprocity: 
the better endowed … are encouraged to acquire still further benefits … on 
condition that they train their native endowments and use them in ways that 
contribute to the good of the less endowed.46 
Reciprocity, as Rawls also puts it, is ‘a tendency to answer in kind’, and ‘this 
tendency is a deep psychological fact. Without it our nature would be very 
different and fruitful social cooperation fragile if not impossible.’47 According to 
the transformation thesis, justice as fairness is our best hope to transform our 
attitude towards the natural lottery and other contingencies, because it includes 
the difference principle, which expresses our natural tendency to cooperate with 
others in a reciprocal relationship.  
But now one might object, as an internal critique, that Rawls could not 
consistently appeal to the idea of reciprocity, because that would contradict his 
other egalitarian commitments. To start with, it may be pointed out that justice 
as fairness strictly prescribes an equal distribution of the basic rights and liberties, 
as well as freedom of movement and choice of occupation, so that ‘all the liberties 
of equal citizenship must be the same for each member of society.’48 As I shall 
further explore this topic in the next chapter, Rawls appears to hold that a strong 
case can be made with regard to the equal distribution of the basic rights and 
liberties, because they are of a highest importance for free and equal citizens to 
plan, to revise, and rationally to pursue their good lives, and this fact also justifies 
their primacy. As Rawls puts it, ‘free persons conceive of themselves as beings who 
 
46 Ibid., 76. See also ibid., 124. 
47 Theory, 494–495/433 rev. 
48 Ibid., 204/178 rev. 
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can revise and alter their final ends and give first priority to preserving their liberty 
in these matters.’49  
One might take it that, by the same token, the priority of the principle of fair 
opportunity over the difference principle is also justified on the ground that the 
former is concerned with the distribution of goods which are of use to more 
important ends, and therefore the concern for distributive fairness in equality of 
opportunity cannot be mitigated by considerations of reciprocity, which appear 
to be primarily expressed by the difference principle. To support their conclusion, 
they might quote from Rawls himself: 
[The principle of fair opportunity] expresses the conviction that if some places 
were not open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling 
unjustly treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those who 
were allowed to hold them. They would be justified in their complaint not only 
because they were excluded from certain external rewards of office but because 
they were debarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes from a 
skillful and devoted exercise of social duties. They would be deprived of one of 
the main forms of human good.50 
As the objection goes, the transformation thesis is indefensible for the reason 
that Rawls cannot appeal to reciprocity to make good on the loss in distributive 
fairness with respect to equality of opportunity, which is concerned to secure the 
important good of self-realization for all from an impartial point of view, even if 
those who are arbitrarily disadvantaged are compensated for by means of other 
less important goods. 
I would however contend that this objection is misled by a superficial reading 
of Rawls’s view. It is true that Rawls regards some goods as more important than 
others, and it also seems true that according to him the more important a good is 
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the stronger requirement there is to distribute that good equally. But Rawls never 
implies the impossible view that a society must be condemned as unfair and 
therefore unjust if its citizens cannot enjoy any goods, however important they 
are, equally in a substantive sense. For it must be acknowledged that the worth of 
a good significantly depends on whether there exist appropriate conditions for its 
enjoyment, and this observation applies to the basic liberties as well as other goods. 
Indeed, Rawls effectively admits that it is the difference principle which regulates 
the inequalities in the enjoyment of the basic liberties: 
In justice as fairness … the equal basic liberties are the same for each citizen and 
the question of how to compensate for a lesser liberty does not arise. But the 
worth, or usefulness, of liberty is not the same for everyone. As the difference 
principle permits, some citizens have, for example, greater income and wealth 
and therefore greater means of achieving their ends. When this principle is 
satisfied, however, this lesser worth of liberty is compensated for in this sense: 
the all-purpose means available to the least advantaged members of society to 
achieve their ends would be even less were social and economic inequalities, as 
measured by the index of primary goods, different from what they are. The basic 
structure of society is arranged so that it maximizes the primary goods available 
to the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic liberties enjoyed by 
everyone.51 
As Samuel Freeman explains, when Rawls distinguishes between the basic 
liberties and their worth, ‘Generally Rawls sees liberty as a normative notion, 
mainly specified in legal and constitutional terms by a certain structure of 
institutions, or system of rules that define rights and duties.’52 But even if the basic 
liberties are said to be distributed equally in an institutional sense according to 
the first principle of justice in justice as fairness, the fact remains that their worth 
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is not so.53 One may therefore suspect that not much distribution of values is done 
by that principle, and that what ultimately justifies the unequal distribution of 
the worth of these liberties is the claim that the difference principle secures their 
greatest value for the worst off members of society. 
To be sure, Rawls does not contradict himself when he suggests, on the one 
hand, that the basic rights and liberties are to be given first priority, and on the 
other hand that in the case where an equal distribution of their value is practically 
impossible we should prefer a distribution that benefits the least advantaged most. 
It follows that the sensible claim that the strength of the requirement of equal 
distribution corresponds to the importance of the goods does not imply the falsity 
of the transformation thesis.  
Indeed, Rawls consistently suggests that whenever it is infeasible to distribute 
the value of a primary good equally, that inequality can only be justified if it 
benefits all in an appropriate way, with special reference to the least advantaged.54 
In the case of fair equality of opportunity, although justice as fairness does forbid 
restrictions on fair opportunity in exchange for gains in income and wealth, Rawls 
implies that they can be justified if ‘a wider range of more desirable alternatives is 
open to [the disadvantaged] than otherwise would be the case.’55 At any rate, the 
priority of the principle of fair opportunity does not imply that the difference 
principle is superfluous. On the contrary, Rawls says that ‘following the difference 
principle and the priority rules … reduces the urgency to achieve perfect equality 
of opportunity.’56 As is true of the case of the basic liberties, the priority of the 
 
53 See Daniels, ‘Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty’. 
54 With the exception of the case of the political liberties, the ‘fair value’ of which according to 
Rawls must be guaranteed to all by the first principle of justice. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
327–329. 
55 Theory, 301/265 rev. 
56 Ibid. 
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principle of fair opportunity over the difference principle does not threaten the 
unity of justice as fairness. 
In this chapter my primary aim is to argue for the coherence of Rawls’s 
distributive egalitarianism, which I suggest is defended by an argument which 
draws upon the ideas of procedural fairness reciprocity. As I have tried to show, it 
is these twin commitments to procedural fairness and reciprocity that shape the 
egalitarian character of justice as fairness at the deepest level. I acknowledge that 
Rawls’s view is also motivated by a concern for distributive fairness, but on my 
interpretation he does not thereby draw the conclusion that all morally arbitrary 
inequalities are antithetical to the reciprocal relationship between citizens in a 
democratic society. Instead, Rawls suggests that these inequalities will be regarded 
as much less objectionable when the difference principle is taken into account, for 
then their attitude towards the natural lottery and other contingencies will be 
transformed in a way that makes the reconciliation between the better off and the 
worse off realistically possible. 
Now, it may be worthwhile for us to return to Cohen’s critique of the Pareto 
argument. As we know, Cohen argues that this reconstructed version of Rawls’s  
argument is faulty on the ground that there is no satisfactory way to reconcile the 
following two claims: 
(2) Insofar as morally arbitrary factors have an impact on people’s chances 
of obtaining advantaged social positions, their differential influences 
should be neutralized in the name of fair equality of opportunity. 
(5) It is irrational for the least advantaged to prefer an equal distribution to 
a strongly Pareto-superior distribution which is most beneficial to them. 
Cohen argues that these two are incompatible, because (2) implies that all 
inequalities influenced by arbitrary causes are to be condemned as unfair and in 
that respect unjust, whereas (5) does not.  
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In response, the above discussion suggests that Rawls simply does not accept 
(2), because it goes beyond the extent to which the principle of fair opportunity 
can plausibly appeal to the idea of procedural fairness; and his appeal to the moral 
arbitrariness rationale is also more nuanced than one that would support (2). In 
contrast, I have also argued that Rawls does accept (5) in light of his commitment 
to the ideal of reciprocity, and hold that our concerns for fairness are appropriately 
instantiated by the principle of fair equality alongside the difference principle. 
Despite my contention that Rawls’s egalitarianism is coherent, it is now time 
to note that I am much less confident about its plausibility. For if we take the idea 
of distributive fairness seriously, as I think we have no reason not to, Cohen seems 
to be correct when he says that arbitrary inequality ‘is unfair, and therefore, pro 
tanto, unjust, and that nothing can remove that particular injustice.’57 By contrast, 
according to the transformation thesis, citizens will be able to live with that 
unfairness in a democratic society where the principles of justice, in particular the 
difference principle, are honoured; that is to say, if they were members of a society 
well-ordered by Rawls’s two principles, none of them would be envious of others’ 
superior holdings, or feel resentment or indignation, even when they recognized 
that nothing but luck caused the inequalities between them.58  
I have to admit that the moral psychology suggested by the transformation 
thesis is beyond my imagination. Following Nagel, I believe that sometimes we 
have ‘a reason to reject a Pareto-superior alternative because the inequality it 
permits is too great to be outweighed by other advantages. Such a criterion might 
imply that some socioeconomic inequalities are unfair even though they satisfy 
the difference principle.’59 To make the point in terms of a revised version of the 
argument from the original position, where the parties are assumed to be sensitive 
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to interpersonal comparison of holdings, we might argue that those who benefit 
least may sometimes have a decisive reason of distributive fairness to veto against 
permitting inequalities that exceed a certain threshold. 
But much may of course hinge on the magnitude of the inequalities that will 
be permitted by the difference principle, provided the principles of equal liberties 
and fair opportunity are also satisfied. In any case, we may want to remind 
ourselves of Rawls’s passing remark that ‘when the greater potential benefits to 
the more advantaged are significant, there will surely be some way to improve the 
situation of the less advantaged as well.’60  
On that note, provided that the advantages not enjoyed by the better off must 
ultimately be converted into the benefit of the worse off, it could well be the case 
that there is not much practical difference between regulating the basic structure 
by the difference principle, and regulating it by that principle alongside a principle 
which further reduces inequalities between the better off and the worse off in the 
name of distributive fairness. 
 
60 Theory, 72 rev. This sentence is added in the revised edition. 
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Chapter 2. 
If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You Want to be Free? 
In the last chapter I argued that justice as fairness can plausibly be interpreted 
as being defended on the grounds of procedural fairness and reciprocity. In this 
chapter I cope with Cohen’s another argument against justice as fairness. Cohen 
objects that Rawls’s theory is too restrictive with respect to the subjects to which 
principles of justice apply. According to Rawls, the principles of justice in justice 
as fairness should primarily apply to the basic structure of society; Cohen suggests, 
however, that justice as fairness should further include principles which provide 
guidance for personal conduct, for justice will be furthered when individuals also 
see to justice themselves by making economic choices that help to achieve its 
goals.1 After considering Scheffler’s reply to Cohen, which is premised on a sharp 
distinction between the norms and values of personal life and political morality 
that I argue to be unhelpful, I go on to argue that Cohen’s objection to justice as 
fairness can be successfully met, for the reason that Rawls’s political conception 
of justice plausibly assumes the priority of liberty over equality. 
2.1. Cohen’s Challenge to the Basic Structure Restriction 
According to Rawls, the primary subject of the principles of justice in justice 
as fairness is the basic structure of society, the way in which the major social, 
 
1 See Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chs. 1, 3, 5. Apart from Scheffler’s work that I discuss 
below, other illuminating responses to Cohen’s argument include Estlund, ‘Liberalism, Equality, 
and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’; Williams, ‘Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity’; 
Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’; Cohen, ‘Taking 
People as They Are?’; Tan, ‘Justice and Personal Pursuits’; Titelbaum, ‘What Would a Rawlsian 
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political, and economic institutions are arranged as a public system of rules for 
social cooperation between free and equal citizens. By maintaining that these 
principles primarily apply to the basic structure, Rawls means to suggest that they 
are not ones which directly ‘apply to individuals and their actions in particular 
circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects and must 
be discussed separately.’2 According to Rawls, individuals do have the natural duty 
to support just institutions, and to create them if they do not exist, but otherwise 
individuals are not expected to follow the same set of principles that regulate the 
basic structure, which would be ‘well-ordered’ when it is suitably regulated by the 
principles of justice. 
Now, Cohen puts forward a challenge to ‘the basic structure restriction’, 
namely Rawls’s suggestion that the principles of justice should only be alluded to 
evaluate and regulate the basic structure, instead of also guiding the conduct of 
individuals. Cohen’s worry appears to have some important implications, which 
would become more apparent if it is recalled that the difference principle requires 
that major institutions be arranged in a way that is most beneficial to the least 
advantaged. Cohen invites us to wonder why it is not similarly demanded that 
individuals should act to contribute to the advantage of the worst off. This may 
involve some self-sacrificing acts on the part of the better off, or at least they may 
be expected to refrain from taking advantage of the incentives so as to maximize 
their own income and wealth. It seems very plausible to assume that if they do so 
the worst off would be even better off than when the latter only benefits from 
institutional arrangements that comply with Rawls’s principles. At any rate, there 
is an ethical question to be asked about the principles which are to be applied to 
individual conduct irrespective of the empirical assumptions. 
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Since Rawls never explicitly suggests that individuals should also pursue 
egalitarian justice through their personal conduct, Cohen infers that Rawls’s view 
is unduly concessive to people’s selfish maximizing behaviour. In particular, he 
objects that there is one very implausible implication of justice as fairness, namely 
that those who are ‘talented’—in the sense that their abilities are favoured by the 
market—may have greater leverage to maximize their self-interest. Unlike those 
who do not have a wide range of options, the talented may for instance opt to 
refrain from working as productively as they can when they face with a policy that 
taxes a higher ratio of their income, even though they would still fare much better 
off than the untalented if they were to work just as hard under that policy. 
Cohen therefore complains that justice as fairness is ludicrously permissive of 
the talented, for Rawls appears to suggest that there is nothing we can say, from 
the standpoint of institutional justice, about those who are talented and have no 
regard for the less fortunate, so long as they abide by the rules and procedures that 
regulate the basic structure.  
Indeed, in a characteristic passage, Rawls writes: ‘The function of unequal 
distributive shares is to cover the costs of training and education, to attract 
individuals to places and associations where they are most needed from a social 
point of view, and so on.’3 Rawls’s remark appears to imply not only that there is 
nothing unjust for individuals to benefit from inequalities, but that for a society 
to function properly it is necessary that they do so; and he seems more than willing 
to let market forces drive people to pursue their self-interest, as he goes on to 
suggest that ‘Variations in wages and income and the prerequisites of position are 
simply to influence these choices so that the end result accords with efficiency and 
justice.’4 As it seems, justice as fairness makes no attempt to induce people to see 
to justice themselves with appropriate principles for individuals, and they are 
 
3 Ibid., 315/277 rev. 
4 Ibid. 
If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You Want to be Free? 
 42 
further encouraged to act from self-interest so long as they do not flout the 
publicly recognized rules and procedures. 
As Cohen puts the charge plainly, he thinks it is ‘absurd’ to leave the task of 
realizing egalitarian justice solely to the institutions that constitute the basic 
structure, and to exempt individuals from relevant responsibilities.5 On his view, 
the discontinuity between the difference principle’s demands on institutions and 
the lack of any corresponding requirement on personal conduct is striking. He 
thereby concludes that justice as fairness is deeply defective, for it falsely assumes 
that justice is merely a virtue of institutions. A genuine egalitarian ideal of justice, 
according to Cohen, must go beyond the principles for institutional arrangements, 
and inform individual conduct as well. He proposes that individuals should also 
be guided by an ‘egalitarian ethos’, which should parallel the principles that apply 
to the basic structure of society in an appropriate way. 
In sum, Cohen addresses the important question whether Rawls is correct to 
focus only on the principles that regulate the basic structure, without paying due 
regard to the norms of justice that should guide individual conduct. The charge 
that justice as fairness does not properly investigate the whole range of the subjects 
of justice is particularly acute under the sensible assumption that individuals can 
also contribute to the justice of society by motivating themselves to benefit the 
less advantaged maximally with self-sacrificing acts. In any case, apart from the 
principles which are used to evaluate and regulate the basic structure, it is not clear 
why justice as fairness does not articulate the corresponding ethos that specifies 
how people should act in order for justice to prevail.  
Relatedly, there is a further question about the extent to which people’s self-
regarding behaviour may accord with the difference principle, which ties the 
justifiability of social and economic inequalities to the maximal expectations of 
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the worst off members of society. Indeed, Cohen worries that justice as fairness is 
not internally consistent, for it is too permissive towards individual conduct, and 
that makes the application of the difference principle subject to constraints that 
have nothing to do with egalitarian justice. According to Cohen, it is therefore 
urgent to ponder over the possibility of an egalitarian ethos, which will have the 
effect of motivating individuals to seek justice in their personal conduct. 
2.2. Rawls on the Institutional Division of Labour 
Before we try to answer the question whether Rawls is correct to say that the 
principles of justice primarily apply to the basic structure, and not to individuals, 
there is a prior question worth asking: namely, whether there is even a need to 
specify principles that particularly regulate the basic structure; or in other words 
whether we must try to identity some special principles which are appropriate for 
institutions, no matter whether they also apply to individuals. 
Rawls gives two reasons why he focuses on principles for the basic structure. 
First, Rawls claims that the major institutions of a society have pervasive and 
profound influences on people who live under it. In particular, he emphasizes that 
they play a crucial role in the formation of citizens’ characters: there is a dimension 
of education and cultivation, which are indispensable for citizens to recognise the 
fundamental ideas of justice themselves so as to act justly. 
Second, Rawls suggests that ‘background justice’ can only be secured if the 
basic structure is regulated by the principles of justice. By contrast, seemingly free 
and fair transactions between individuals and associations are not by themselves 
sufficient to guarantee that over time the conditions under which they take place 
are fair and just. For however free and fair they may seem ‘when viewed locally 
and apart from background institutions’, Rawls maintains that ‘the accumulated 
results’ of these ‘are likely over an extended period to undermine the background 
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conditions required for free and fair agreements.’6 Indeed, Rawls claims that ‘The 
way in which we think about fairness in everyday life ill prepares us for the great 
shift in perspective required for considering the justice of the basic structure 
itself.’7 Rawls’s point is that the case of background justice is significantly different 
from small-scale interpersonal interactions, so it is inadequate to appeal to an 
intuitive notion of fairness. Instead, background justice can only be secured by 
regulating the basic structure with principles which are identified independently 
of the rules and procedures that apply to individuals and associations. 
In my view, these observations plausibly establish that we must try to identify 
the sui generis principles that specifically apply to the basic structure. Given that 
there also exist other norms appropriate for individuals and their personal 
relations—say, an ideal of friendship—and associations such as churches and 
universities, Rawls indicates that this conclusion amounts to an ‘institutional 
division of labour’ between principles that regulate the basic structure and other 
principles that apply to individuals and associations.8 According to Rawls, this 
institutional division of labour suitably represents the special status of the 
principles for the regulation of the major institutions which are needed to secure 
background justice. In contrast, seemingly free and fair transactions become 
genuinely so only when background justice is established in a well-ordered society, 
and ‘individuals and associations are then left free to advance their (permissible) 
ends within the framework of the basic structure, secure in the knowledge that 
elsewhere in the social system the regulations necessary to preserve background 
justice are in force.’9 
Rawls further indicates that principles for ‘local justice’ that regulate the 
transactions between individuals and associations, and principles for international 
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justice, which are to be included in what he calls ‘the law of peoples’,10 are only to 
be considered after the issues concerning the basic structure are settled. He argues 
that in justice as fairness there is an ‘appropriate sequence of kinds of subjects’, 
and the principles for other subjects are all constrained by and presuppose the 
principles of justice that apply to the basic structure of a domestic society.11 As 
Freeman puts it, Rawls means to suggest ‘that principles of justice for the basic 
structure have a kind of methodological and regulative primacy over other principles 
of justice.’12 Among other things, this nicely explains why Rawls thinks there is a 
natural duty to support just institutions, since ‘a person’s obligations and duties 
presuppose a moral conception of institutions and therefore that the content of 
just institutions must be defined before the requirements for individuals can be 
set out.’13 
But to establish the primacy of the basic structure is not enough to address 
Cohen’s worry, which presses on the question why individuals are not required to 
do more than supporting just institutions. Why are they permitted to be driven 
only by self-interest in their personal pursuits, even though they are required to 
acknowledge and abide by the principles of justice that regulate the basic structure? 
To respond to Cohen’s challenge, it is necessary to show that there is a rationale 
behind the basic structure restriction, or Rawls’s exclusive focus on the principles 
for institutions. It is not enough to say that background justice can only be secured 
by applying special principles to the basic structure, which also happens to have 
pervasive impact on individuals. It needs to be shown that it is unreasonable to 
require other subjects to be also appropriately guided by these principles. 
Indeed, it seems natural to suggest that the considerations that justify certain 
institutional arrangements should also inform our conduct in personal life. For 
 
10 See Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
11 Political Liberalism, 261–262. See also Theory, 108–110/93–95 rev., and Restatement, 11–12. 
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instance, if people think that the worth of their political liberty is lessened when 
there are political parties whose power dominates others in virtue of their financial 
advantage, then they might think, on the one hand, that there should be relevant 
regulations that limit the financial support a party may receive; and they might 
also think, on the other hand, that they should not themselves donate to a party 
whose financial advantage already exceeds an acceptable range. Similarly, one 
might argue that if people accept the difference principle on the grounds that the 
distribution of natural talents is arbitrary from a moral point of view, and that 
inequalities are only justified when they are most beneficial to the worst off, then 
they should also think that they are not to expect higher pay even if they happen 
to be talented, and that they are so entitled only when their asking for more is 
indispensable for the worst off’s advantage.14 This then implies that they should 
have reasons not to bargain for more simply out of self-interest unless the worst 
off would benefit from their doing so. 
2.3. Scheffler on Moral Pluralism and Egalitarian Liberalism 
It appears that the kind of answer to Cohen’s challenge we are looking for 
should show that things look different from an institutional point of view and a 
personal point of view, despite the fact that institutional arrangements must also 
be justifiable from the perspective of those who live under them.15 I will now start 
to reflect on a proposal from Scheffler, who aims to explicate ‘the division of moral 
labour’ between principles that specifically apply to the basic structure of society 
and those others that apply to individual conduct. 
Scheffler starts with the observation that there is a genuine tension between 
‘the values of personal life’ and ‘the values of political morality’. This is manifest, 
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for example, when we are called upon to alleviate the plight of the poor. On the 
one hand, although some people may acknowledge that they have a responsibility 
to contribute, Scheffler suggests that many of ‘the predominant values and norms 
of our culture do not in fact require them to do so.’16 Instead, Scheffler indicates 
that there are what he calls ‘limiting’ norms and values, which advise us to focus 
on those with whom we have personal relationships and interactions; and their 
demands are often largely contingent on our own previous doings, abilities, and 
ideas of the good life. One notable implication of the prevalent norms of our 
culture is therefore that ‘it is legitimate, at least within certain broad limits, to pass 
up opportunities to assist those who are suffering in order to pursue one’s own 
aims and aspirations’.17 As Scheffler elegantly summarizes his point, ‘the world of 
individual responsibility is much smaller than the world as a whole.’18  
On the other hand Scheffler thinks that there also exist values and norms of 
political morality, including justice, fairness, equality, and much else, ‘which have, 
and are understood to have, implications that transcend the arena of small-scale 
interpersonal relations, and which reflect an expansive understanding of the 
proper scope of moral concern.’19 Apparently, then, there is a problem: how could 
we reconcile the norms and values of personal life and political morality? Must we 
think that there is no principled way to do this, and that it is just a tragic fact of 
human life? 
Now, Scheffler claims that we should not try to evade that problem, and take 
value pluralism seriously. According to a prominent version of this thesis, made 
familiar by Isaiah Berlin, ‘Everything is what it is: Liberty is liberty, not equality 
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or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience.’20 The 
existence of a plurality of values, according to Berlin, implies the impossibility of 
a perfect harmony between them and their joint realization. 
But by value pluralism Scheffler appears to emphasize more specifically that, 
first, there exist two sets of values and norms, namely those of personal life and 
political morality; and second, each of these sets of values cannot be reduced to 
one another, and therefore ‘it is a mistake to treat either set of values as having 
merely derivative significance’, since that would be ‘to understate the importance 
and mutual independence of these values.’21  
Scheffler suggests that what we can aim for, perhaps optimistically, is a theory 
that does justice to both of the values of personal life and political morality. This 
would be a theory which accepts moral pluralism in Scheffler’s sense, and he 
interprets egalitarian liberalism as such a theory: according to Scheffler, egalitarian 
liberalism ‘supposes that we can design our social world in such a way as to 
accommodate the most important of those values and to reconcile the conflicting 
tendencies to which they give rise.’22 This is to be done by finding both the right 
subjects which are suitable to promote or honour the relevant values, and the right 
principles which apply to them. Scheffler coins this manoeuvre as the division of 
moral labour.  
Scheffler also proposes to understand Rawls as such an egalitarian liberal, for 
Rawls is explicit that different principles should apply to their own proper subjects, 
and ‘The first principles of justice as fairness are plainly not suitable for a general 
theory.’23 They are to be contrasted with the principle of utility, as is conceived 
by utilitarianism, which ‘applies equally to all social forms and to the actions of 
 
20 ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 172. See also Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value 
Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, 29–35. 
21 ‘The Division of Moral Labour’, 112–113. 
22 Ibid., 128. 
23 Political Liberalism, 261. 
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individuals; in addition, the assessment of character and dispositional traits, as 
well as the social practice of praising and blaming, are to be guided by it.’24 
Understanding Rawls as an egalitarian liberal who is deeply concerned by the need 
for a division of moral labour between different principles for respective subjects, 
Scheffler writes: 
In effect, then, Rawls endorses a form of pluralism about moral values and 
principles. Social institutions should be regulated by his principles of justice, but 
other groups and individual agents should in general be guided by other 
principles and may legitimately aim to realize other values and ideals.25 
Indeed, Scheffler interprets Rawls’s view as actually employing two ideas of 
division of labour; and rather surprisingly, Scheffler claims that Rawls’s idea of 
the institutional division of labour—defended on the grounds that the principles 
for the basic structure are indispensable in view of its pervasive and profound 
influence, and further play a special role in securing background justice—is in fact 
only of secondary importance to his theory. What really is crucial to justice as 
fairness, argues Scheffler, is the notion of the division of moral labour, motivated 
by the doctrine of value pluralism: the suggestion that justice should primarily be 
concerned with issues that arise out of large-scale societal contexts makes most 
sense, according to Scheffler, on the assumption that different values and norms, 
suitable for particular subjects, are paramount in different contexts. We may even 
think that the plausibility of the institutional division of labour in justice as 
fairness is premised on the fact that it properly expresses the idea of the division 
of moral labour. For it may be said that it is because justice is inherently a social 
and political virtue that it can only be secured by a system of major institutions. 
 
24 Ibid., 260. 
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Now, in response to Cohen, Scheffler claims that it is a fundamental mistake 
to think of the division of moral labour in egalitarian liberalism as motivated by 
the need to deal with selfish behaviours. The crucial question, on Scheffler’s view, 
is whether egalitarian liberalism can plausibly accommodate two heterogeneous 
sets of values, not whether there is a way to suppress the acquisitiveness manifested 
in our personal lives. For according to Scheffler’s moral pluralism, we must not 
lose sight of the fact that there exist different norms and principles which apply 
to institutions and individuals respectively. In other words, he means to suggest 
that we must look at those limiting norms that guide personal life when we try to 
assess individual conduct, not principles of justice that apply to the basic structure. 
If we side with Scheffler in thinking that people should be primarily guided by 
the limiting norms and values in their daily life, then we should not be troubled 
by the fact that they have personal pursuits which have nothing to do with the 
values that inform political morality. 
Our inquiry started with Rawls’s claim that the principles of justice in justice 
as fairness apply primarily to the basic structure of society, not to individuals and 
associations. We then introduced Cohen’s challenge, which makes the point that 
individual conduct may also have significant impact on the justice of a society; as 
this line of thought goes, it is not clear why justice as fairness is not also concerned 
with the norms that regulate individual behaviour, and Cohen thereby claims that 
this feature of Rawls’s conception of justice makes it deeply implausible. We now 
see that Scheffler answers to Cohen’s query by foregrounding the alleged truth of 
value pluralism and the accompanying idea of the division of moral labour in 
egalitarian liberalism, which Scheffler suggests is epitomized by justice as fairness. 
On Scheffler’s view, the truth of moral pluralism implies that individual conduct, 
whether or not driven by maximizing incentives, should only be directly guided 
by the limiting norms, which are appropriate to be appealed to in small-scale 
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interpersonal contexts, and which leave much leeway for a diversity of personal 
pursuits. I believe, however, that Scheffler’s response to Cohen is unsuccessful. 
Now, the first thing to note is that Cohen need not, and does not, reject value 
pluralism. Indeed, he labels himself as a ‘radical pluralist’, who thinks that there 
are a multitude of fundamental moral principles, and that there is no principled 
way to resolve their conflicts should they arise. The best thing to do, according to 
Cohen, is simply to test our intuitions in various real or hypothesized scenarios.26 
Secondly, Cohen would also agree with Scheffler that there are norms which 
permit us to pursue our own personal goals. As Cohen puts it, he wants to make 
room for what Scheffler elsewhere calls ‘agent-centred prerogatives’.27 That is, 
Cohen does not want to deny that ‘every person has a right to pursue self-interest 
to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they need be 
for badly off people).’28 In response to his critics,29 Cohen further concedes that 
the personal prerogatives should not be narrowly understood as only including a 
right to pursue self-interest, but also extend to, for example, the priority a person 
may confer to other-regarding concerns.30 Presumably, the prerogatives people 
enjoy help them to realize values other than those central to political morality. 
In light of these two observations, it is clear that Cohen does not deny the 
plurality of values and the existence of the limiting norms, as Scheffler calls them, 
and he thinks it involves some intuitive weighing of norms and values to obtain 
the right verdict about individual responsibility in specific circumstances. He 
would also agree with Scheffler that whether one is justified to act out of self-
interest significantly depends on whether one has a prerogative acknowledged by 
the limiting norms.  
 
26 Rescuing Justice and Equality, 4–5. 
27 See Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism. 
28 Rescuing Justice and Equality, 61; italics omitted. 
29 See Estlund, ‘Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls’. 
30 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 390. 
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But now it is worth commenting on a puzzling feature of Scheffler’s view, 
namely that it is entailed by his moral pluralism that principles which directly 
apply to individuals are indifferent to the norms and values of political morality, 
such as justice and equality; for the limiting norms should not be concerned about 
whether individuals contribute to the goals and purposes of egalitarian justice as 
far as they comply with the demands of justice. It also follows from Schefflerian 
moral pluralism that norms of justice should not be concerned with individuals’ 
personal pursuits either, insofar as they do not offend against them, for these 
norms are supposed to be primarily honoured in large-scale societal contexts. As 
we have seen, these commitments follow from Scheffler’s claim that norms and 
values of personal life and political morality are mutually independent. It is not 
only that individuals cannot do what institutions do, or that institutions can fulfil 
relevant tasks all by themselves.31 What Scheffler suggests is that even when they 
do the same things, or when their acts have similar effects, these acts must be 
interpreted in different lights by the respective sets of norms that suit them; for 
according to Scheffler we must do justice to the fact that the basic structure and 
individuals are essentially governed by different sets of norms and values. 
Now, it is true that an act can be variously described, and it is also true that 
even when acts have same effect they can still be distinguished from one another, 
but it is unclear why norms of justice should be indifferent to individual conduct 
in the way Scheffler suggests. Suppose justice has the demand that institutions 
should alleviate serious domestic poverty, and apart from paying my taxes to 
support these institutions, I want to further contribute to the cause by giving away 
part of my after-tax income. Scheffler’s view seems to imply that my contribution 
is essentially irrelevant to whether justice prevails in my society, for whether it 
does so only depends on whether the basic structure is well-ordered—and it would 
 
31 Cf. Porter, ‘The Division of Moral Labour and the Basic Structure Restriction’. 
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be the case even if the majority of the members of our society willingly see to 
justice themselves. It might be said that what I do is only charity, not justice; or 
that what I do is to pursue ‘personal justice’, not ‘social justice’. The point is, of 
course, not about the terms we use to describe my act. What should puzzle us is 
why egalitarian liberals have to commit to such a sharp discontinuity between 
norms and values of personal life and political morality.  
Cohen may therefore plausibly reject Schefflerian moral pluralism. To begin 
with, Cohen should object to Scheffler’s idea of the division of moral labour, 
which according to Scheffler gives shape to egalitarian liberalism. For there is no 
good reason to think that political values should be exclusively promoted or 
honoured by a certain subject, especially when there are other candidates who are 
also perfectly capable of doing so; and Cohen should insist that considerations 
that count in favour of a principle for the basic structure should also count in 
favour of a similar principle that guides individual conduct. Indeed, Cohen’s 
objection to justice as fairness is premised on the idea that individuals can and 
should also be guided by an egalitarian ethos, which appropriately correspond to 
the principles of justice that regulate the basic structure.  
Relatedly, Cohen should also object to the idea that a political morality is 
indifferent to whether or not individuals are properly moved by the values and 
norms of justice and equality in their personal lives. For it seems plain that a 
society is more just if its members are willing to honour political values themselves 
directly in their personal conduct, as compared to a society in which people only 
respect the limiting norms. Given that individuals can also in their own way help 
to further justice and equality—for example, the talented may choose to work as 
hard as they can simply for the sake of improving the circumstances of the worse 
off—in contrast to Schefflerian moral pluralism, which is implausible because it 
implies that only the limiting norms apply to individuals, a reasonable conception 
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of justice should not imply that their deeds have no bearing on whether their 
society is just.  
In my view, Schefflerian moral pluralism is worthy of consideration because 
it promises to show why individuals need not see to justice themselves, and can 
justifiably leave that task to the basic structure of society. The heart of Scheffler’s 
view is the assumption that there are two sets of mutually independent values and 
norms. This assumption helps him to motivate a response to Cohen’s objection 
to justice as fairness, which suggests that it is appropriate for individuals to be 
subject only to the limiting norms. I have argued, however, that Cohen’s charge 
against justice as fairness holds in the face of Scheffler’s argument from moral 
pluralism, for it appears that there is no clear motivation for a sharp distinction 
between the principles and norms of personal life and those of political morality. 
In the next section I will explore another response to Cohen’s objection. But 
before I proceed to explicate the argument that I find persuasive, I want to briefly 
consider some remarks Cohen makes regarding the relation between the personal 
prerogatives and the difference principle.  
2.4. The Argument from Freedom and Reasonable Pluralism 
On Cohen’s view, prerogatives may justify some inequalities. Suppose I want 
to make a decent amount of money, that is, much more than what the worst off 
members of my society have, because I want to save money for my son’s good but 
expensive education. Cohen would agree that I am entitled to bargain for a higher 
pay with my employer, even though that leads to an increase in inequality between 
members of my society if I succeed. 
However, Cohen also writes: ‘The prerogative justification is a quite different 
justification of inequality from the difference-principle one, and the inequalities 
that it justifies will coincide only by accident with those that the difference 
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principle would license’.32 After reflecting upon the justification of inequality that 
alludes to the personal prerogatives, which he accepts, Cohen maintains: ‘The 
important point … is that the prerogative justification of inequality is different 
from the Rawlsian.’33 
Cohen is correct. According to the difference principle, social and economic 
inequalities are justified when they result from institutional arrangements which 
are expected to be most beneficial to the worst off members of society. It is clear 
that the notion of prerogatives plays no explicit role in Rawls’s argument for the 
difference principle. Instead, as we discussed in the last chapter, inequalities are 
permitted by the difference principle under the assumption that they are both 
ineliminable and practically necessary from a social point of view—‘Society 
should take into account economic efficiency and the requirements of 
organization and technology.’34 At any rate, the difference principle itself by no 
means suggests that inequalities are justified only when, say, the talented, who are 
also very likely to be the better off members of a society, have immunity from the 
demands of egalitarian justice. That is to say, the difference principle itself does 
not imply that people are justified in pursuing their ends, whether or not they are 
motivated by self-interest, only when these personal pursuits are permitted by 
what Scheffler calls the limiting norms.  
In a sense, this is no surprise, for Rawls makes it very clear that his principles 
of justice do not apply to individuals and associations. However, given Cohen’s 
claim that individuals can also see to justice themselves, there is a pressure on 
Rawls to explicate the principles which are to guide them. If these principles are 
available, one might have a clue to explain why Cohen is incorrect to expect that 
principles for individuals should be largely congruent with those applying to 
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institutions. But what seems puzzling is the fact that Rawls appears to hold that 
his theory of justice need not offer such an explication. 
Now, is there a credible explanation of this lack? As we have seen, Scheffler 
interprets Rawls’s view as implicitly endorsing the claim that people have a right 
to freely pursue their own ways of living so long as they are allowed by the limiting 
norms. Cohen, on the contrary, argues that although considerations deriving from 
the limiting norms have some weight, they are not decisive. In fact, it is perfectly 
conceivable that there may be individuals who do not appeal to their prerogatives, 
and accept the self-sacrifice needed to further egalitarian justice. According to 
what Cohen calls ‘the ethical solution’, individuals may freely follow the guidance 
appropriately drawn from the principles that apply to the basic structure.35 There 
is apparently nothing contradictory for an individual, guided by an egalitarian 
ethos, freely sacrifices her interests for the just cause. Again, assuming that justice 
would be furthered when individuals freely follow the guidance of an egalitarian 
ethos, a feasible ethical solution may well be what is needed for the creation and 
maintenance of a just society. 
This is, however, not Rawls’s view. For him a society is not necessarily more 
just when its members imitate what the institutions aim at, and anyway he does 
not expect them to do so. I believe that his main reason for holding this view lies 
in his account of freedom. 
According to Rawls, citizens in a well-ordered society are free and equal. They 
are equal in that they have the sufficient minimum degree of two moral powers—
the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good—
to participate in social cooperation over a complete life. They are free because, 
first, they view themselves as having the moral power to have a conception of the 
good: to form, revise, and rationally to pursue a good life. ‘As free persons, citizens 
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claim the right to view their persons as independent from and not identified with 
any particular such conception with its scheme of final ends.’36 Second, they 
consider themselves to be ‘self- authenticating sources of valid claims’. This means 
that ‘they regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions 
so as to advance their conceptions of the good’.37 Most importantly, the claims 
made by citizens are regarded ‘as having weight of their own apart from being 
derived from duties and obligations owed to society.’38 Lastly, citizens are free in 
that they are regarded as capable of taking responsibility for their final ends. 
The claim that citizens are free in a liberal democratic society appropriately 
regulated by the principles of justice is crucial if we want to understand why Rawls 
is not worried about the question that troubles Cohen. According to Rawls, the 
freedom of citizens in a well-ordered society implies that within the confines of 
the basic structure they are entitled to lead their lives in their own ways. As Jon 
Mandle puts it, since they conceive of themselves as self-authenticating sources of 
valid claims, citizens ‘need not offer public justifications for the value that they 
attach to their ends … their simple assertion that they value them is sufficient’.39 
Alternatively put, Rawls’s point is that, from the viewpoint of justice, the question 
about whether a citizen’s way of life is worth living does not even arise so long as 
they fully understand and abide by the principles of justice that regulate the basic 
structure. It is simply not the role of a conception of justice to pass judgements 
on how people should lead their lives. This is essential to justice as fairness as a 
liberal conception of justice. It is to be contrasted with other conceptions ‘in 
which people are not viewed as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.’40 
According to those illiberal views, the claims of members of a society would ‘have 
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no weight except insofar as they can be derived from the duties and obligations 
owed to society, or from their ascribed roles in a social hierarchy justified by 
religious or aristocratic values.’41 
According to Rawls, people have different conceptions of the good life, and 
citizens have the vital interests to exercise their moral powers, and to advance the 
determinate ways the life they find amenable.42 Indeed, the case of freedom is no 
different if one wants to be a monk who feels obliged to renounce worldly living, 
a political activist who fights for the insulted and injured, or an entrepreneur 
whose life pursuits are propelled by a passion for wealth.  
However, it is not obvious that the argument I just stated is sufficient to 
answer Cohen’s question, namely: why, from the viewpoint of justice, it is not 
even more desirable if citizens in a well-ordered society affirm a conception of the 
good life which is most congruent with the principles of justice that regulate the 
basic structure? Surely, it may be said, this argument does not render Cohen’s 
ethical solution implausible in any way? Why do we not try to cultivate the 
citizens of a liberal society with an appropriate ethos, so they would be motivated 
to further egalitarian justice by their personal conduct? 
This is a powerful question. Indeed, as I hinted above, the consideration of 
freedom does appear to be but a part of the answer to be drawn from justice as 
fairness. Now, I think the other part of the argument could be retrieved from the 
following passage, the importance of which I believe cannot be overstated: 
A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism 
of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these 
doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the 
foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be 
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affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for 
political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the 
framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.43 
The first point Rawls makes here is that in a well-ordered liberal democratic 
society citizens affirm, and will go on to affirm reasonable yet incompatible world 
views. That is to say, there is ‘a fact of reasonable pluralism’, which Rawls assumes 
‘to be a permanent condition of a democratic society.’44 Indeed, he thinks that ‘a 
continuing adherence to one comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by 
the oppressive use of state power’.45  
Moreover, it is essential to Rawls’s view, and this is the second point, that the 
fact of reasonable pluralism is ‘the normal result of the exercise of human reason’. 
This means that so long as citizens in a political society are free to reason for 
themselves, they will inevitably end up holding a variety of not fully compatible 
views about what a good life consists in, even if these views are all reasonable.  
The other part of Rawls’s argument we are looking for is therefore the further 
claim that if citizens freely plan, revise, and rationally pursue their conceptions of 
the good, as they must have the right to do so, it is impossible that they would 
invariably agree on one such conception as preferable to all others. That is to say, 
reasonable pluralism must be recognised as a permanent condition of a democratic 
society that cannot be eliminated or expected to disappear, so long as citizens are 
free to live their lives in their own ways. 
Accordingly, justice as fairness cannot regard itself as having the aim of 
inducing the citizens of a liberal democracy to converge on a view about how they 
should lead their lives. What it can aim for is instead only to accommodate these 
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diverse views about the good life appropriately. This, I shall argue, amounts to an 
answer to Cohen’s question. To repeat, the question is: why does justice as fairness 
not seek to cultivate the personal virtues that further egalitarian justice, rather 
than focusing exclusively on the basic structure of society? The answer we draw 
from Rawls’s remarks is: justice as fairness acknowledges its limits, not only, or 
even primarily on the grounds that it is incapable to change the recalcitrant nature 
of human reason, but that it prepares to accept, within a reasonable boundary, the 
result which the free exercise of human reason gives rise to, namely reasonable 
pluralism. In other words, Rawls need not, and perhaps would not deny that some 
people may find Cohen’s ethical solution attractive, but he would argue that it is 
neither practical nor reasonable to demand all democratic citizens in a liberal 
society to pursue any particular way of living a satisfactory life. 
I need to elaborate further on this point. It may seem like Rawls is just being 
concessive to people’s diverse world views. The fact that there is a plurality of 
reasonable conceptions of the good does not seem to imply that they are equally 
attractive or acceptable. So, even if it is admitted that it may be impractical to 
require everyone to be an egalitarian, one could still object that Rawls does not 
show that it is unjust to do so. Cohen, for example, might charge Rawls with 
making unnecessary concessions to those who wrongly intend to withstand the 
demands of justice. This, Cohen might say, shows that Rawls is not being faithful 
to his own egalitarian view about justice. 
I would argue, however, that Rawls is not really conceding to anything by 
saying that reasonable pluralism is an enduring fact of a liberal democratic society. 
He is not saying that we must stop trying if we cannot change people. What Rawls 
suggests is rather that, to the extent that they are reasonable outcomes of the free 
exercise of reason, the claims of free and equal citizens must be acknowledged by 
a political conception of justice as self-vindicating; and it cannot be denied that 
not every reasonable person believes in equality. 
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The upshot of the reply to Cohen’s challenge I draw from Rawls is that 
citizens have a most important interest, and a legitimate claim, to act in a way that 
is guided by their own conceptions of the good in light of their freedom, among 
which one informed by an egalitarian ethos should not enjoy any special status. 
Now, Cohen might still want to dispute this implication of Rawls’s view, that a 
conception of the good which is more in aligned with the egalitarian character of 
justice as fairness is not any more preferable to others from the standpoint of 
justice. He might claim that what is implied by the Rawlsian answer is absurd: for 
surely a life freely devoted to justice and equality is more praiseworthy than a life 
freely indulged in self-interest, just like a society consisting of virtuous citizens 
who strive for truth, goodness, and beauty is more just than a society of wantons? 
It is right that a society is more admirable when its citizens are virtuous, but 
this objection misses the target. The relevant question to ask here is whether a 
conception of justice is faulty if it does not ask citizens to do more than support 
just institutions; or, in other words, the question is whether a conception of justice 
is preferable if it contains guidance for individual conduct. It is not whether you 
and I should be one or another kind of good citizens if we long for a just society. 
To the latter question, Rawls’s answer might be, yes, it is of course plausible and 
desirable that some people may want to lead a life that is guided by worthy ends, 
such as the pursuit of an equal society.46 What he denies is that justice as fairness 
should incorporate, say, a principle for individuals which says that they have a 
natural duty to promote the well-being of the worst off as much as they can unless 
they have prerogatives not to do so. A proposal like this would be rejected on the 
ground that, again, it must be left for individuals themselves to freely decide which 
kind of life they want to live. 
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To lay down the point in another way, consider the following. Cohen asks, 
‘Why should we not seek a theory of justice that is more egalitarian than justice 
as fairness by including some egalitarian principles for individuals?’ To respond, 
it may be said that Rawls acknowledges that the freedom people have implies that 
its realization may compromise equality, but he maintains that freedom has a 
priority over equality in justice as fairness.  
In fact, this way of articulating Rawls’s answer to Cohen’s challenge amounts 
to both an endorsement of and a response to value pluralism. On the one hand, 
following Berlin, Rawls acknowledges that it is impossible to avoid the clash of 
values.47 On the other hand, however, Rawls accommodates the values of freedom 
and equality in justice as fairness by a lexical ordering of its two principles of 
justice which respectively honour both these values—that is, the principle which 
guarantees equal basic liberties has an absolute priority over the principle that 
regulate social and economic inequalities. Justice as fairness represents an attempt 
to achieve unity of principles, from the viewpoint of justice, that pays due regard 
to each of the values of freedom and equality.  
I shall make one more comment, namely that we may want to be careful not 
to misunderstand the primacy given to the idea of freedom in justice as fairness. 
We already see that justice as fairness assumes that freedom is indispensable for 
the cultivation and realization of our plans of the good life. Now, a conception of 
the good is a system of final ends. When the conflict of values is present in a 
person’s conception of the good, from the perspective of justice that person is 
entitled to adjudicate between them in order to achieve unity of the self, provided 
the resolution is constrained by the public conception of justice. It should be 
noted, however, that justice as fairness does not suggest that anything that follows 
from a reasonable conception of the good must be licenced by a theory of justice. 
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That is, although justice as fairness recognizes the reasonable final ends as self-
authenticating, it need not commit to the view that all ends and purposes included 
in a reasonable conception of the good are immune to the scrutiny of justice. As 
I understand the Rawlsian view, for a claim of freedom to trump equality, it must 
be shown that it is indispensable for the realization of a reasonable conception of 
the good (and, of course, that it is also compatible with the principles of justice 
that regulate the basic structure of society). In other words, as I interpret it, justice 
as fairness may reserve the right to regulate individual conduct when the latter 
does not play an indispensable role in the pursuits of one’s vital interests—
although it may of course be very difficult to make sure which plans and acts of 
an individual fulfil that role. 
So although Rawls does not articulate the principles for individuals, there is 
a logical space for justice as fairness to occupy, so that it may suggest that a range 
of individual acts are only permitted when they are indispensable for the 
fulfilment of citizens’ final ends. As far as I can see, this would not contradict 
Rawls’s view that people’s claims of final ends are self-authenticating and need no 
justification from the standpoint of justice. It is consistent for justice as fairness 
to uphold freedom whilst incorporating egalitarian principles for certain personal 
conduct when it cannot have any necessary connection with people’s reasonable 
final ends. The appeal of this position would be apparent especially when, in a 
rather fanciful situation, considerations of economic incentives and occupational 
choice play lesser roles in people’s fundamental plans of their good life. I shall not 
pursue this utopian possibility any further. 
Now, it should be no surprise that between Rawls’s sympathizers and critics 
there is much agreement that individuals do not get a free pass simply by claiming 
that something is what they want to do. For instance, to the question, ‘To what 
extent should individuals in [a society with a just basic structure] be motivated by 
economic self-interest?’, Scheffler’s answer is that ‘individual conduct should be 
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guided by the full range of applicable norms and values, and should not consist 
solely or primarily in the pursuit of economic self-interest.’48 As a general remark 
about how individual conduct is to be guided, Scheffler’s answer seems perfectly 
appropriate—although I maintain that it is so only if ‘the full range of applicable 
norms and values’ includes not only the limiting norms, but all that would be 
relevant within the purview of justice. Similarly, I think Rawlsians need not resist 
Cohen’s claim that ‘both the state … and the individual … must, in appropriately 
different fashions, show regard in economic matters both to impersonal justice 
and to the legitimate demands of the individual.’49 What must not be denied, I 
believe, is that it is reasonable to expect individuals to respond to all relevant 
norms and principles. What I have intended to show in the above discussion is 
effectively that ‘the legitimate demands of the individual’ in the sentence I cite 
from Cohen should be interpreted, by the Rawlsian light, as determined both by 
the principles of justice that regulate the basic structure, some open-ended 
principles for individual conduct, and citizens’ own reasonable conceptions of 
final ends, which are to be regarded as self-authenticating in a well-ordered society. 
Now, one might suspect that I agree, after all, with what Scheffler says about 
moral pluralism, the division of moral labour, and egalitarian liberalism. It may 
be asked, ‘Does it not seem that what have been said in the preceding discussion 
amounts to an endorsement of the claim that value pluralism motivates a division 
of moral labour between the values and norms of personal morality and political 
morality?’ Have I not been, in spite of many detours, rehearsing Scheffler’s view?’ 
The answer, I think, is no. To start with, there is a crucial difference between 
Scheffler’s response to Cohen’s challenge and the one I draw from Rawls: whereas 
Schefflerian moral pluralism responds to value pluralism by sharply separating 
two discontinuous domains of morality respectively concerning personal life and 
 
48 ‘The Division of Moral Labour’, 127. 
49 Rescuing Justice and Equality, 10. 
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political sphere, justice as fairness endorses and accommodates the fact of value 
pluralism from the standpoint of justice itself. 
To elaborate, let me first summarize Scheffler’s response to Cohen again. The 
first premise of Scheffler’s argument is the claim that when we are to consider the 
justifiability of individual conduct, we should only refer to the limiting norms, as 
he calls them, in light of the division of moral labour between personal and 
political morality. The second premise of Scheffler’s argument is that to a 
considerable extent the limiting norms permit people to pursue their self-interest. 
He therefore concludes that most of the time individuals are entitled to lead their 
lives without regard to the demands of egalitarian justice, for these demands, as a 
part of political morality, are not supposed to be made on individuals in the first 
place. But as I already said, I think Scheffler overstates the case of the division of 
moral labour, which has the consequence that in a well-ordered society the 
permissibility of individual conduct solely depends on the limiting norms that 
regulate personal life. As I suggested above, this should be counted as a reductio of 
Schefflerian moral pluralism.  
With respect to what I understand as the defensible Rawlsian position, I have 
argued that the argument from freedom and reasonable pluralism draws upon the 
idea that under realistic assumptions it is no business of a theory of justice to 
define personal morality by including egalitarian principles for individual conduct. 
Such an inclusion is rejected mainly on the ground that the free exercise of reason, 
which is an interest of utmost importance of free and equal citizens, may lead one 
to regard the pursuit of egalitarian justice as having less weight in their reasonable 
systems of final ends of life, and this is implied by the fact of reasonable pluralism 
which justice as fairness aims to accommodate. Alternatively put, I believe that 
justice as fairness is silent about egalitarian principles for individuals not because, 
as opposed to the norms of justice, the limiting norms has a sovereignty over our 
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personal life. It is because an individual is herself a small-scale sovereign, so to 
speak, from the viewpoint of justice.50 
As an aside, although I do think it is credible to interpret justice as fairness as 
a view that endorses value pluralism, I have also argued that it incorporates value 
pluralism within the purview of justice. In contrast with Scheffler’s reading, it is 
not an implication of my interpretation that justice and equality belong to one set 
of values to be assigned to political morality, and correspondingly there is another 
set of principles and norms that regulate personal life. In other words, I claim that 
what is visible in justice as fairness is an ordering of values and principles strictly 
restricted within a theory of justice, not a division of moral labour for principles 
that respectively apply to sharply separated spheres of the moral world.  
Furthermore, my interpretation of the Rawlsian position allows, plausibly in 
my view, that one value may have bearings on both personal life and political 
morality. For instance, it is clear that freedom is a value the realization of which 
necessitates both of the principles that regulate the basic structure and individual 
conduct. The principle that major institutions should secure equal basic liberties 
and the verdict that I may not violate another citizen’s basic liberties may typically 
be two sides of the same coin, and it must be emphasized that there appears to be 
no sharp discontinuity between these norms. So, for example, if a person illegally 
imprisons another person against the latter’s will, it is of course true that what the 
former does is wrong by the light of the legal system on the ground that it violates 
the latter’s freedom, but it is also true that the act is wrong for the same reason 
according to any reasonable view about personal morality.  
Scheffler may be correct that ‘it is legitimate, at least with certain broad limits, 
to pass up opportunities to assist those who are suffering in order to pursue one’s 
own aims and aspirations’;51 but I would argue that the truth of this claim does 
 
50 I borrow the phrase that an individual is a ‘small-scale sovereign’ from Hart, ‘Legal Rights’, 183. 
51 ‘The Division of Moral Labour’, 110. 
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not depend on the truth of Schefflerian moral pluralism. What makes the former 
true is the all things considered judgement that many of our personal pursuits are 
legitimate in view of our freedom, which is not only affirmed by what Scheffler 
coins as the limiting norms, but also by the principles of justice. Conversely, when 
a principle for institutions that guarantees basic equal liberties is justified, it is also 
justified in light of their values to individuals, whose realization of these values in 
a sense instantiates the principle itself. I believe that the same can be said about 
justice, equality, and many other values. 
To see the point more clearly, notice that value pluralism does not entail the 
division of moral labour. The latter, as it is construed by Scheffler, is the thesis 
that the best way to accommodate the plurality of values is to apply specific norms 
and principles to different subjects. But value pluralism, as introduced above, only 
rejects the claim that all genuine values are compatible with one another—or, 
according to another version of this view, that they can be reduced to one master 
value, hence all but that one are merely of derivative significance. In any case, 
value pluralism as such does not imply that any of these values cannot be 
honoured by both institutions and individuals. 
Nor does value pluralism entail the fact of reasonable pluralism. According 
to Rawls, reasonable pluralism is the fact that people would disagree with one 
another on many issues due to their respective religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines. Nowhere does Rawls imply that reasonable pluralism is an implication 
of the fact that there is a plurality of values in an objective moral world. In fact, 
he is perfectly aware that there may be reasonable doctrines which reject value 
pluralism, and he by no means thinks that a doctrine becomes unreasonable 
simply because it is committed to that view. What Rawls maintains is only that it 
is our best hope that all reasonable doctrines in a liberal democracy may converge 
on a set of principles of justice which regulate the basic structure of society; namely, 
If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You Want to be Free? 
 68 
that they arrive at an ‘overlapping consensus’.52 The claim I have made about 
Rawls’s acceptance of value pluralism does not contradict any of this. For the 
claim is not that reasonable pluralism is premised on value pluralism, but that the 
principles of justice in justice as fairness can be seen as incorporating a plurality 
of values with a proper ordering of their priorities. 
Scheffler is duly cautious when he writes that ‘the egalitarian liberal proposes 
what amounts to a division of moral labour’, as well as that ‘In effect … Rawls 
endorses a form of pluralism about moral values and principles.’53 What Scheffler 
offers are a reappraisal of egalitarian liberalism, along with an interpretation of 
Rawls’s theory of justice. Both of these can be contested—I have said nothing 
about egalitarian liberalism as such in this chapter, but I have argued that there is 
an alternative understanding of justice as fairness which does not rely on the idea 
of the division of moral labour, but which nonetheless has a satisfactory reply to 
Cohen’s forceful challenge to the basic structure restriction. 
 
52 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lect. IV. 
53 ‘The Division of Moral Labour’, 113, 115; emphases added. 
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Chapter 3.  
Fairness, Luck, and Equality:  
Reflections on Dworkin and Luck Egalitarianism 
Earlier in Chapter 1 I distinguished between two senses of fairness, and I 
argued that although Rawls apparently appeals to distributive fairness when he 
objects to social systems that fail to regulate the influences of arbitrary factors 
properly, he is not concerned to condemn all inequalities which are influenced by 
arbitrary factors; and I also argued that it is the notion of procedural fairness which 
plays a foundational justificatory role in justice as fairness. But someone might 
suggest that Rawls underestimates the weight of our considered judgements about 
distributive fairness. She will then want to argue that it is unfair and in that respect 
unjust to permit distributive shares to be influenced by morally arbitrary factors, 
and that all arbitrary advantages should be neutralized in order to correct that 
injustice. My primary goal in this chapter is to reflect upon this suggestion from 
various viewpoints. In particular, I consider the ways in which the ideas of 
procedural and distributive fairness are represented in Dworkin’s theory, equality 
of resources, as well as luck egalitarianism, a theory often seen as inheriting and 
developing some of Rawls’s and Dworkin’s important insights.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I argue that our concern for 
distributive fairness favours a presumption of equality on the condition that 
inequalities are caused by arbitrary factors, but does not do so when that condition 
fails to hold. Second, I argue that Dworkin’s famous ‘equal concern and respect’ 
slogan should also be understood as a roundabout way to explore the implications 
of procedural and distributive fairness. Third, in contrast with my endorsement 
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of the claim that arbitrary inequalities are unfair in the distributive sense, I explain 
why I have reservations about the claim that inequalities can be justified whenever 
they are caused by factors for which people are responsible. I conclude that the 
prospects for luck egalitarianism ultimately depend on whether there is a plausible 
way to incorporate its principles in a pluralistic account of justice. 
3.1. Distributive Fairness, Luck, and Equality 
According to the moral arbitrariness rationale, which I introduced in Chapter 
1, it is intuitively unfair, and therefore unjust, to treat members of a society in a 
way that allows some people to be worse off than others for no good reason. As 
the thought goes, one might suggest that equality should be preferred as a default 
on the ground of distributive fairness unless there are countervailing reasons that 
justify inequality. In my view, this is a straightforward and powerful argument 
from distributive fairness for a presumption of equality.  
I assume this is the argument that Cohen has in mind when he writes: ‘I take 
for granted that there is something which justice requires people to have equal 
amounts of, not no matter what, but to whatever extent is allowed by values which 
compete with distributive equality’.1 This presumption of distributive equality is 
endorsed by those who are now commonly called ‘luck egalitarians’—among 
whom Cohen is a prominent advocate—whose core commitments are, first, that 
unchosen inequalities are unjust; and second, that inequalities are justified only 
when they can be traced to people’s genuine choices, the consequences for which 
they are to be held responsible accordingly.  
Indeed, according to Larry Temkin’s well-known formulation of this view, 
‘it is bad—unjust and unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no 
 
1 ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, 3. 
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fault [or choice] of their own.’2 Temkin’s statement appears to hint that it is not 
unfair and unjust for some to be worse off than others through some fault or 
choice or their own, and it seems plausible to say so. It does not appear unfair or 
unjust if a lazy person ends up being worse off than a diligent person because the 
former has chosen to work less hard and enjoyed more of his leisure time. What 
this simple and familiar example shows is that the pursuit of distributive fairness 
can be consistent with inequality in outcome; and according to a major variant of 
luck egalitarianism, inequalities can be justified on the ground that people should 
bear personal responsibility for their choices. That is to say, although the idea of 
distributive fairness does lend support to a presumption of equality, it does so 
only under the assumption that no consideration of personal responsibility is 
involved. By contrast, if the grounds on which an equality obtains are only partly 
constituted by factors for which people are not responsible, namely luck, but also 
partly constituted by what they should be held responsible, then it is not true that 
our concern for distributive fairness dictates that we should leave things as they 
are. In other words, a consistent application of the principle of distributive fairness 
should on this view be sensitive to considerations of personal responsibility 
whether or not equality obtains.  
To illustrate, suppose that the diligent, who has been better off than the lazy 
in virtue of what was earned by her hard work, now contracts an illness and 
suddenly becomes as badly off as the lazy is. Insofar as distributive fairness is 
concerned, it seems that the diligent should be compensated for her misfortune, 
and the inequality between the diligent and the lazy should be restored. Indeed, I 
hold that equality can also be morally arbitrary in an invidious way that offends 
against distributive fairness. In my view, the presumption of equality does not 
have a privileged status as compared to inequality on this matter: the former is 
 
2 Inequality, 13. 
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presumed to be fair and just only in the sense that it is fair and just to distribute 
all arbitrary advantages equally. As Susan Hurley convincingly argues, if justice 
has this demand to neutralize all effects of luck—which is understood as the 
inverse correlate of responsibility—then equality can also be objectionable when 
it is brought about by luck.3 
Shlomi Segall disagrees. He claims that ‘egalitarians should not be bothered 
by equality’, or more specifically that ‘egalitarians qua egalitarians should not be 
bothered by’ equality, which ‘can never be unjust for reasons of egalitarian 
distributive justice.’4 He tries to motivate his view by introducing an account of 
interpersonal justification. On this account, a person has a duty to justify her 
holdings when she has more than another does, but it is never the case that she 
has to justify her holdings when what she has is equal to another’s. Segall writes: 
The reason equality does not, after all, require justification, is that since no one 
is better-off than anyone else, there is nobody who is under a duty to justify 
herself. Nor, perhaps more importantly, is there anyone who is in a position to 
demand a justification: everyone, after all, is equal.5 
I do not find Segall’s account persuasive at all. Again, consider a case where 
there are two students, one diligent and another lazy, both of whom submitted an 
essay for their assignment. Suppose that their instructor gave the two essays the 
same marks out of whim. This would be an arbitrary equality, and I believe that 
in this case the diligent student, who presumably submitted a better essay, has a 
legitimate complaint. Her hard work produced a better essay, and the marks she 
get should reflect her performance.6 Segall may well be correct that ‘In the case of 
 
3 See Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, ch. 6. 
4 Equality and Opportunity, 34–35; italics in original. 
5 Ibid., 26; emphasis in original. 
6 I assume that this is a pertinent example, not least because both the process of working on their 
essays and the experience of getting appropriate or inappropriate feedback have an impact on the 
students’ well-being; but I acknowledge that there may exist better examples. 
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equality it seems right that the burden of proof should lie with the person laying 
the charge.’7 But this remark does not really help, for we do not have good reason 
to hold on to a presumption of equality when there is a weighty consideration 
that counts against it.8 
Curiously, Segall does seem to acknowledge that we sometimes have reasons 
to object to equality. What he maintains, after scrutiny, appears to be only that 
when we object to equality, we do not do so for ‘egalitarian reasons’. He writes: 
‘Unchosen (or unmerited) equalities … might be bad for non-egalitarian reasons 
(such as efficiency, proportional justice, and desert, for example). But as far as 
egalitarianism is concerned, an equal outcome is never bad.’9 What Segall says is 
however extremely puzzling, for I think there exists no ‘egalitarian reason’ of the 
kind that Segall purports to elucidate. What we have are only reasons that count 
for or against a distribution. It is a non-starter to assume that qua egalitarians we 
have or must seek special access to ‘egalitarian reasons’. We are egalitarians only 
because most of the time there are decisive reasons for us to prefer equality to 
inequality, and we must be candid when the balance of reasons suggests otherwise. 
3.2. Fairness, Equal Concern, and Respect for Persons 
I now turn to Dworkin’s theory of equality. My aim is not to examine it in 
any detail, but to show that equality of resources, like Rawls’s justice as fairness, 
may also be plausibly understood in terms of our twin concerns for distributive 
and procedural fairness. 
Dworkin begins to explicate the idea of distributive equality with the help of 
a thought experiment.10 Among a number of people who are on a desert island, 
 
7 Ibid., 26–27. 
8 Cf. Arneson, ‘Justice is Not Equality’, 384. 
9 Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value, 65. 
10 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 2. 
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with no pre-established claims in respect of available resources which are valued 
as means for achieving whatever ends they have, Dworkin suggests giving each of 
them an equal amount of clamshells. These islanders then use them to bid for any 
combinations of a variety of resources in a retraceable and repeatable auction, until 
they are all content with what they have, in the sense that they do not prefer 
anyone’s bundle of resources to their own. This would be a result that satisfies 
what Dworkin calls the ‘envy test’. Dworkin’s idea is that distributive equality 
should be understood in terms of an equal satisfaction of people’s preferences over 
combinations of relevant resources. It is therefore not the case that distributive 
equality must require all relevant goods to be sorted and divided equally before 
they are distributed, so that everyone has an identical share. Instead, what counts 
as an equal distribution is in the first place defined by the result of an auction that 
successfully passes the envy test.  
Dworkin also imagines a second auction, in which people can choose among 
a comprehensive set of insurance policies, the premiums of which are established 
by market mechanisms. The hypothetical insurance scheme on the one hand helps 
people to mitigate the consequences of luck that they may be unwilling to bear, 
and on the other hand make them responsible for their own risk management. So 
it is not an affront to distributive equality if, say, one has less discretionary income 
than others do because he chooses to buy more insurance policies.  
Dworkin’s auctions nicely illustrate the point that the idea of distributive 
equality can accommodate a multiplicity of considerations, so it need not imply 
an identical distribution of relevant goods. As he puts it alternatively, we may 
distinguish between ‘equal treatment’ and ‘treating as equals’.11 With regard to 
distribution, to provide equal treatment merely means to distribute an identical 
bundle of resources equally to all, without considering what the recipients need 
 
11 See Dworkin, ‘Justice and Rights’, 180–183; ‘Liberalism’, 190–198; Sovereign Virtue, 1–3, 11–
12; Justice for Hedgehogs, 2–4, 351–363. 
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or prefer to have. By contrast, to treat people as equals is to acknowledge, among 
other things, that they differ in their personalities, talents, and ambitions; and 
whether a distribution of a particular good treats them as equals depends on their 
circumstances and preferences, the nature of the good, as well as the overall 
distributive scheme and its regulatory mechanisms.  
As I understand it, although what comes out of the first auction is not an 
equal distribution of literally identical resources for the participants, Dworkin’s 
thought experiment ingeniously illustrates the idea of distributive equality, for the 
reason that it depicts a procedure for distribution in which everyone’s claim to 
resources is treated fairly. As I said at the outset, we may plausibly understand 
equality of resources as involving the reference to the notion of procedural fairness 
in its explication of distributive equality. 
But I want to further stress that equality of resources also appears to commit 
itself to distributive fairness even before the auction begins, for the pre-auction 
equal distribution of the clamshells is itself an instantiation of that idea. As far as 
I can see, the assumption that an equal distribution is distributively fair is essential 
to Dworkin’s argument. Indeed, it seems to make sense to say that all bundles of 
resources are ‘equal’ to one another when the auction passes the envy test only 
because the clamshells are equally distributed in the first place. According to my 
reading, equality of resources is also committed to the twin ideas of distributive 
fairness and procedural fairness at the deepest level.  
Now, Dworkin further suggests that to treat people as equals is to treat them 
with ‘equal concern and respect’. He writes: ‘Equal concern is the sovereign virtue 
of political community’.12 As Dworkin indicates, this right to equal concern and 
respect ‘is a highly abstract right’, and in his analysis of justice as fairness Dworkin 
 
12 Sovereign Virtue, 1. It is not entirely clear whether ‘equal concern’ here is a shorthand for ‘equal 
concern and respect’, or only a part of it—Dworkin’s choice of terms has not been consistent over 
the years. I leave the exegetical questions aside. 
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claims that ‘the abstract right to equal concern and respect … must be understood 
to be the fundamental concept of Rawls’s deep theory.’13 In fact, Dworkin is of 
the view that all theories of equality (or justice) can be understood as explicitly or 
implicitly endorsing the following abstract egalitarian thesis, which can ‘be thought 
to provide a kind of plateau in political argument’:14 
From the standpoint of politics, the interests of the members of the community 
matter, and matter equally. I suggest that this proposition captures the concept 
of equality, taken to be at least an element in a theory of social justice, in such a 
way as to embrace various competing conceptions of equality.15 
According to Dworkin’s own conception or interpretation16 of the egalitarian 
thesis, equal concern and respect amounts to two basic principles, namely the 
principle that everyone’s life matters equally, and the principle that people should 
bear special responsibility for their own choices.17  
Now, for my purposes it is important to note that the idea of equal concern 
and respect is posited by Dworkin to be conceptualized or interpreted by theories 
of equality or justice. That is to say, Dworkin not only acknowledges that there 
exist various competing conceptions or interpretations of the abstract egalitarian 
thesis, with their different theoretical and practical implications; but also that all 
alternative theories can be understood as offering such interpretations.  
One might think, however, that it is unclear how to decide what counts as a 
most plausible interpretation of Dworkin’s egalitarian thesis, and wonder whether 
 
13 ‘Justice and Rights’, 180–181. Cf. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, 400–
401, n. 19; Rawls himself resists this analysis of his view. 
14 ‘Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality’, 25. See also Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, 3–5. 
15 Dworkin, ‘In Defense of Equality’, 24. 
16 Here I follow Dworkin himself, who appears to use the terms ‘interpretation’ and ‘conception’ 
interchangeably because they have the same function in this context. See ibid., 25. For Dworkin’s 
account of interpretation, see his Law’s Empire, ch. 2; Justice for Hedgehogs, pt. 2. 
17 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 5–7; Justice for Hedgehogs, 2. 
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the idea of equal concern and respect itself implies how it is to be conceptualized 
or suitably interpreted. Some people might think that it has to. George Sher writes: 
‘When Dworkin advances his theory of equality of resources as part of the best 
interpretation of equal concern, he implies that there is something about the idea 
of equal concern that makes the theory part of the best interpretation’.18  
But I wonder whether that is true—I am in fact inclined to think, on the 
contrary, that idea of equal concern itself does not help us to decide which theory 
best interprets it. I want to argue instead that this decision should be made on the 
ground that a candidate theory coheres best with our considered convictions, 
including most importantly our concerns for procedural and distributive fairness. 
Consider Dworkin’s remark that any conception of equality ‘must say what 
people’s interests are, viewed most comprehensively, and then what follows from 
supposing that these interests matter equally.’19 This amounts to an inquiry into 
the ‘equality of what?’ question, and it seems true that it is very important to 
inquire into the notion of people’s interests in order to understand what an equal 
distribution relative to those interests implies. I maintain, however, that answering 
the metric question does not help us to completely resolve Dworkin’s abstract 
egalitarian thesis, for we are in need of a further explanation of what makes a 
conception of interests part of the best interpretation of the idea of equal concern. 
Alternatively put, however the notion of people’s interests is explicated, there is a 
further question why equal concern for these interests implies one or another 
distributive principle; and this is exactly the question supposed to be answered by 
various interpretations of that thesis.  
I maintain, in other words, that Dworkin’s remark should be understood as 
suggesting that whether an interpretation of equal concern is adequate ultimately 
depends on whether it offers a most plausible set of distributive principles. So, to 
 
18 Equality for Inegalitarians, 72, n. 21. 
19 ‘In Defense of Equality’, 25. 
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follow Dworkin’s lead, we will first formulate a conception of people’s ultimate 
interests, and then see whether any particular set of distributive principles best 
expresses the thesis that these interests matter equally. In order to fulfil this latter 
task, we will test the candidate conceptions or interpretations of equal concern by 
considering whether our considered judgements favour any of them. But I hold 
that to consider whether any particular theory best interprets the notion of equal 
concern just is to consider whether it contains the most plausible principles of 
distribution. That is to say, I hold that any defence of an interpretation of equal 
concern simply amounts to an argument for any particular conception of equality. 
Indeed, it seems that what ultimately do the work are further arguments, 
utilising one or another moral or political ideal, which will show that a candidate 
theory is a most plausible interpretation of the idea of equal concern. In particular, 
my suggestion is that these arguments will have to be informed by our considered 
judgements concerning distributive and procedural fairness. 
To begin with, consider what Dworkin says in the following passage: 
Any defensible interpretation of equal concern supposes that no one in a political 
community is initially entitled to more resource than anyone else; it asks whether 
any reason consistent with that assumption justifies an economic system in 
which some prosper more than others. Utilitarians, Rawlsians, and other 
theorists offer such reasons: that treating people with equal concern requires 
maximizing their average welfare, or protecting the situation of the worst-off 
group, or something of the sort.20 
Dworkin makes two claims here. First, he indicates that the idea of equal 
concern implies at least one thing, namely that there is a presumption of equal 
distribution of resources. Second, as I already said, Dworkin suggests that this idea 
 
20 Justice for Hedgehogs, 479, n. 10; see also Dworkin, ‘Justice and Rights’, 180. 
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can be variously interpreted by different distributive conceptions, and it need not 
contradict an argument that purports to justify inequalities. 
Dworkin of course argues that his two principles of equal importance and 
special responsibility together offer the best interpretation of his egalitarian thesis. 
But as far as I can see, the intuitive appeal of these principles by no means derives 
from their being capable of offering an interpretation of that thesis. Instead of 
saying that these principles are justified qua an interpretation of equal concern, it 
seems more accurate to simply suggest that they are credible because there are 
considerations that count in favour of them. 
More specifically, why does the idea of equal concern assumes that ‘no one 
in a political community is initially entitled to more resource than anyone else’? 
Surely, this assumption cannot be premised on the idea of interests: it does not 
follow from that everyone has a most important interest to lead a good life that 
we must show equal concern for that interest in a particular way. So it might be 
said that the answer to our question must lie in the idea of equality. But then it 
appears that the only way to defend this assumption is simply to claim that it is 
unfair—that is, intuitively unfair according to our considered judgements—to 
distribute resources unequally among those who are initially no more entitled to 
anything than one another. This seems to be what the assumption in question, 
allegedly implied by the idea of equal concern, amounts to, and I can think of no 
other way to defend it. 
For another illustration, consider Dworkin’s following remarks: 
A laissez-faire political economy leaves unchanged the consequences of a free 
market in which people buy and sell their product and labor as they wish and 
can. That does not show equal concern for everyone. Anyone impoverished 
through that system is entitled to ask: ‘There are other, more regulatory and 
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redistributive, sets of laws that would put me in a better position. How can 
government claim that this system shows equal concern for me?’21 
Dworkin’s complaint against laissez-faire seems perfectly reasonable, but my 
question is why it is so. If it is asked, ‘What exactly makes a laissez-faire political 
economy fails to show equal concern?’, I think Dworkin’s answer must be that it 
has this tendency to condone inequalities that we simply cannot accept. For what 
Dworkin seems to find objectionable is clearly not the free market per se, but the 
institutional settlement which does not ever attempt to correct undesirable 
distributive outcomes. If what Dworkin found unacceptable was the market itself, 
he would have never proposed to explicate his theory of equality by an imagined 
auction of initially unowned resources, as well as a hypothetical insurance scheme 
that people may use to prevent themselves from being affected by risks that they 
are not willing to take. Indeed, he writes: ‘A free market is not equality’s enemy, 
as is often supposed, but indispensable to genuine equality.’22 
According to my reading, then, Dworkin effectively argues that a distribution 
can be unfair even though it results from seemingly fair market procedures, and 
his claim that a laissez-faire political economy fails to show equal concern can only 
be defended on the ground that there exist alternative arrangements which can be 
reasonably expected to give rise to preferable distributions, which are fairer in the 
sense that they are states of affairs in which the lives of the worse off fare better. 
Dworkin’s antagonism towards laissez-faire is therefore not in contradiction to his 
endorsement of the free market, which he appears to embrace because it is ideally 
a system of fair procedures. Instead, it is plausible to understand his objection to 
laissez-faire as premised on a commitment to distributive fairness: a government 
that upholds a laissez-faire political economy is unfair to its citizens in the sense 
 
21 Justice for Hedgehogs, 3. 
22 Justice for Hedgehogs, 357. 
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that it lets some of them perish without help. This, I believe, is the proposition 
that undergirds Dworkin’s swift rejection of the laissez-faire political economy. 
Now, let us consider one last case. On Dworkin’s view, there is a distinction 
to be made between brute luck and option luck. As Dworkin explains, option luck 
‘is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone 
gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated 
and might have declined’, whilst the instances of brute luck are understood as the 
contrary, in which ‘risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.’23 
According to Dworkin, people should be compensated for their bad brute luck, 
and they should take responsibility for the consequences of their deliberate choices 
that involve option luck.  
Now, one might be tempted to associate the distinction between brute luck 
and option luck with the idea of treating people as equals in the following way: in 
order for people to be treated as equals, they should be compensated for their bad 
brute luck, and be asked to bear responsibility for their choices even if they involve 
bad option luck. For if those who suffer from bad brute luck are not compensated, 
they are effectively treated as if having a lesser standing; and if those who make 
their own choices do not need to take relevant responsibility for them and bear 
the consequences when they do not turn out well, they are on the contrary treated 
as if they are of a privileged status. According to the proposal under consideration, 
the ways we cope with brute luck and option luck are informed by the idea that 
people are equals in a basic sense and have the right to equal concern and respect. 
This appears to be Kok-Chor Tan’s view. According to his luck egalitarian 
interpretation of the basic equality of moral agents, a presumption of distributive 
equality is justified on the ground that no one should be responsible for the effects 
of brute luck, and departures from equality are justified if and only if they are the 
 
23 Sovereign Virtue, 73. 
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results of agential choices. Tan suggests that ‘This distinction between luck and 
choice is basic to the luck egalitarian position’,24 and it would appear that on Tan’s 
account the notion of basic moral equality is to be understood as entailing a 
presumption of equality, as well as a principle according to which inequalities are 
justified when and only when they are the results of the exercise of moral agency. 
But there is a basic problem for Tan’s account, namely that it is hardly clear 
why the idea of basic equality of moral persons is supposed to entail the luck 
egalitarian interpretation. For what it is worth, Nagel already observes that other 
distributive doctrines may also be understood as offering interpretations of the 
notion of basic moral equality.25 So, a utilitarian might suggest that Bentham’s 
dictum, that everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one, should 
also be understood as an interpretation of that notion; and a libertarian might 
suggest that basic equality is best interpreted as bestowing moral agents a right to 
make their own choices without being interfered with, which in turn implies 
constraints on the actions of others. In light of the fact that these theories may 
also be seen as respectively offering their interpretations of the idea of basic moral 
equality, it is not reasonable to prefer the luck egalitarian account without further 
argument, and Tan should show why his luck egalitarian interpretation of basic 
moral equality is more plausible than its alternatives. 
Strikingly, Tan shirks this task—he plainly admits that he has ‘not provided 
any argument for’ his proposal—and instead he simply takes ‘this ideal of moral 
agency and its egalitarian entailment to be a basic and starting intuition common 
to most accounts of luck egalitarianism.’26 I do not want to challenge the assertion 
that many luck egalitarians share that intuition; what I want to point out is, again, 
that the fact that Tan presents his luck egalitarian principles as constituting an 
 
24 Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, 89. See also Stemplowska, 
‘Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions’, 130–131. 
25 See Nagel, ‘Equality’. 
26 Justice, Institutions, and Luck, 89–90; emphasis in original. 
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interpretation of the ideal of basic equality does not show that the plausibility of 
these principles drives from that ideal. As Tan himself writes: ‘The idea is not to 
defend luck egalitarianism from first principles, so to speak, but to begin with its 
basic assumptions and ideas, and to try to develop a persuasive account of equality 
from there.’27 According to the view submitted here, although it may well be true 
that luck egalitarians share Tan’s basic assumptions, since he gives no argument 
for the claim that luck egalitarianism as a distributive doctrine offers the best 
interpretation of the ideal of basic equality of moral agents, the reference to that 
ideal simply plays no substantive role in Tan’s defence of luck egalitarianism. In 
my view, such a defence will have to involve arguments which lend support to the 
conclusion that people are treated fairly if and only if the luck egalitarian 
principles are honoured.  
Indeed, I think these arguments are available to us. For example, with respect 
to our considered judgement that people should be compensated for brute bad 
luck, there exists a simple and convincing explanation, namely that we have the 
intuition that distributive unfairness is manifested in a distribution where some 
people are worse off than others for no good reason. By contrast, in explaining 
why we do not usually think that people should be compensated for bad option 
luck, it seems reasonable to say, on the one hand, that whatever proceeds from a 
fair procedure is also in that respect fair; and, on the other hand, that we do not 
have the intuition whatsoever that the outcome of a deliberate gamble is unfair in 
the distributive sense—unless one thinks, implausibly in my view, that even under 
normal circumstances an inequality that results from a fair procedure should still 
be considered as an unfair state of affairs.28 
In fact, I doubt not only that the idea of equal concern itself helps us to decide 
which theory best interprets it. I also doubt that egalitarians should appeal to the 
 
27 Ibid., 90. 
28 Cf. Cohen, ‘Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?’. 
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notion of respect for persons in order to defend any conceptions of egalitarian 
justice. Indeed, I am inclined to agree with Richard Arneson, who writes: 
More generally, I doubt that invocation of an ideal of respect for persons can do 
any work in selecting principles of justice or in determining that some candidate 
principles are driven by unseemly motives. If one wants to be fair and do what 
is just, and after full reflection one is convinced that some version of luck 
egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice, then one’s adoption of luck 
egalitarianism reflects one’s belief that this doctrine picks out what justice 
requires coupled with one’s desire to conform to the requirements of justice. 
One expresses due respect for persons and treats them respectfully by acting 
toward persons in accordance with the moral principles that are best supported 
by reasons. In this sense respect for persons looks to be an unobjectionable but 
purely formal idea, neither a clue to what principles are best supported by moral 
reasons nor a constraint on what principles might be chosen.29 
The idea is, again, that the notion of respect for persons does not itself 
determine which candidate principles are justified, and this can be only done by 
our reflection upon what is favoured by the balance of reasons. 
In response to Arneson, Mason claims that ‘in ordinary discourse “respect for 
persons” also has a narrower usage which does not presuppose that each and every 
failure to comply with the moral principles automatically counts as a failure of 
respect.’30 As I understand his view, Mason means to suggest that in our ordinary 
discourse the reference to the idea of respect for person only picks out a narrower 
category of considerations, rather than all principles which bear upon the ways we 
should regard and treat people. I am not sure whether that is true, but I shall let 
that pass. 
The real pressing question, however, is whether our ordinary parlance reflects 
something distinctive about the idea of respect for persons that helps us to decide 
 
29 ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, 344. 
30 Levelling the Playing Field, 64. 
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which relevant principles are justified. Curiously, Mason himself appears to thinks 
that it can do no such work. Arguing for the view that it is usually justified to 
select the best-qualified candidates when it comes to the realization of equality of 
opportunity, Mason writes: 
We should not understand it as appealing to some independent idea of respect 
for persons from which moral demands are derived. Rather we should see the 
relevant demands as expressing, in a constitutive way, what it is to respect 
persons.31 
I do not see why Mason thinks this is enough to deflect the charge that the 
idea of respect for persons is uninformative when we want to know which relevant 
demands are justified. The problem is that we need to know what counts as 
expressing that idea in a constitutive way, and if we should not seek help from it, 
then where? Mason’s disclaimer shows exactly that the idea of respect for persons 
is purely formal in the sense that what determines whether an interpretation of 
that idea is plausible is the balance of relevant reasons. 
3.3. The Prospects for Luck Egalitarianism 
I now go on to reflect on luck egalitarianism, with which Dworkin’s equality 
of resources is often associated as a forerunner. In a nutshell, luck egalitarianism 
can be understood as coupling a presumption of distributive equality with luckism, 
which has both a negative component and a positive component, respectively 
concerned with the conditions on which it is justified to restore or to depart from 
equality.32 On the one hand, developing Dworkin’s insights, luck egalitarians 
hold the view that brute luck’s differential impact on people’s lives, for which they 
are not responsible, should be redressed. They suggest, for example, that those 
 
31 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
32 See Arneson, ‘Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended’. 
Fairness, Luck, and Equality 
 86 
who are disabled by birth or accident should be compensated as victims of bad 
brute luck.  
On the other hand, luck egalitarians also follow Dworkin in holding that a 
departures from equality is permissible—or, many of them would say, required—
in light of their view about personal responsibility. As Dworkin puts it, ‘[any 
legitimate government] must respect fully the responsibility and right of each 
person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life.’ 33 
Dworkin and luck egalitarians hold that it does not offend egalitarian justice if 
inequalities are caused by people’s own choices, for which they are to be held 
responsible, and it is not a requirement of egalitarian justice to compensate for 
disadvantages which result from them. Indeed, Dworkin holds that the relevant 
considerations should be ‘ambition-sensitive’ and ‘endowment-insensitive’: 
On the one hand we must … allow the distribution of resources at any particular 
moment to be … ambition-sensitive[,] so that, for example, those who choose to 
invest rather than consume, or to consume less expensively rather than more, or 
to work in more rather than less profitable ways must be permitted to retain the 
gains that flow from these decisions … But on the other hand, we must not 
allow the distribution of resources at any moment to be endowment-sensitive, that 
is, to be affected by differences in ability … among people with the same 
ambitions.34 
Now, I find the negative component of luckism tremendously appealing. For 
it seems that we have a very strong intuition about distributive fairness, according 
to which it is unfair and therefore pro tanto unjust if a distribution obtains for no 
good reason. So if an inequality exists simply because of luck, there is no reason 
why we should leave it as it is. It follows from the luckist negative principle that 
it is unfair and for that matter unjust if inequalities brought about by luck are not 
 
33 Justice for Hedgehogs, 2. 
34 Sovereign Virtue, 89; emphases added. 
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corrected. Setting aside the situations in which equalities may also be found to be 
unfair, luck egalitarians seem well motivated to condemn inequalities in the name 
of distributive fairness. 
In contrast to my endorsement luckism’s negative component, however, I 
believe that it is much harder for us to accept its positive principle. For I think we 
do not have a firm conviction that people must always bear the full consequences 
of their choices even when they are responsible for their occurrence. As Scheffler 
rightly points out, our intuitions about the luckist’s positive component are at 
best unclear.35  
Now, one might reason as follows, and think that these luckist principles are 
really two sides of the same coin: with respect to any badly off person, it may be 
asked, ‘Whether the badly off person is responsible for the disadvantage she is 
affected by?’, and the answer can only be either negative or affirmative. If she is 
not responsible for the disadvantage, then the luckist negative principle suggests 
that her burden should be compensated for. If she is to be held responsible, then 
the luckist positive principle should prescribe no compensation. 
But this appearance is misleading. For one thing, it is not true that in most 
of the familiar cases we can easily distinguish between factors for which individuals 
are and are not responsible—for all we know, luck and choice are intricately 
intertwined. Suppose I grew up in a very poor neighbourhood, having no proper 
education and opportunities for livelihood. I have been selling drugs on the street 
and as it happened I got caught one day. Does the fact that I have chosen to break 
the law in order to survive show that any degree of punishment is justified? It 
surely does not. And if I had chosen not to engage in criminal activities and stayed 
unemployed and lived in squalor, it would also not follow that I have no 
complaint whatsoever. 
 
35 See Scheffler, ‘What is Egalitarianism?’; ‘Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality’. 
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Now, someone might say that we should treat my unsatisfactory upbringing 
as an instance of bad brute luck, thus eligible for compensation on the luckist 
grounds. He might go on to say, however, that this does not vitiate the point that 
people should bear full responsibility for the consequences of their acts when they 
do not suffer from brute luck disadvantages. Indeed, he might argue that this 
rebuttal is well supported by a concern for procedural fairness. As the thought 
goes, as far as it is reasonable to assume that brute luck has no impact on our 
decisions, what falls out from a deliberate choice is the choice-maker’s own 
business, because it should be seen as the result arising from a fair procedure; and 
as I said earlier, it seems quite implausible if one says that what comes out of a 
procedurally fair gamble could still be an unfair and unjust outcome. 
I concede that there is some truth in this rebuttal: it is indeed plausible to 
think that an outcome should be assumed to be fair when it results from a fair 
procedure. But the reply under consideration is not entirely effective, for the 
imagined case also shows that the cut between brute luck and option luck is not 
as obvious as it seems: the fact that I made a deliberate choice out of several 
options does not always make it reasonable to think that my choice only involves 
option luck.36 At any rate, we should maintain that the principle of procedural 
fairness only applies when appropriate conditions obtain. But again, for all we 
know, life is rarely, if ever, like a fair gamble. As we saw in Chapter 1, it is this 
line of thought that leads Rawls to indicate that a social system that merely secures 
formal equality of opportunity cannot be just, because it still permits distributive 
shares to be influenced by morally arbitrary factors, even though we might think 
that it does partially instantiate the idea of procedure fairness in its guarantee of 
equality before the law.  
 
36  See Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility’; Otsuka, ‘Luck, 
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Suffice it to say that unlike the negative luckist principle, which is concerned 
to compensate for what people cannot be held responsible, the positive luckist 
principle, supposedly grounded in a variety of considerations regarding choice and 
personal responsibility, needs to be defended separately.37 For instance, someone 
might plausibly argue that the attribution of personal responsibility has no bearing 
on how disadvantaged I should be, even if I am accountable for the actions that 
make myself badly off. She might then suggest that an appropriate defence of the 
positive luckist principle would at least involve, on the one hand, a determination 
of the scope of the things for which people should be held responsible, and on the 
other hand a theory of the burdens it is reasonable to ask them to bear when they 
are to take responsibility for their deliberate choices.38 
I shall not delve into these matters. Instead, I want to return to the general 
problem that option luck and brute luck are most commonly intertwined. Now, 
a striking instance of this problem is that people’s deliberative choices have 
consequences not only for themselves, but also others.39 So, if you choose to study 
harder than I do, and score better in the exam accordingly, can I complain that 
your choice constitutes a brute luck disadvantage for me? That does not seem 
right. But if you perform better than I do simply because our teacher enjoys 
spending some time reviewing the curriculum with you, can it also be said that I 
suffer from brute luck? Can I complain that it is unfair for her to do so and ask 
for compensation? In this case I think I can. It might be said that luck 
egalitarianism appears absurd if it implies that whenever someone is benefitted 
there is another who suffers from bad brute luck, but there do exist cases where 
we think it is cogent to make this judgement. 
 
37 See Stemplowska, ‘Luck Egalitarianism’. Cf. Sher, Equality for Inegalitarians, ch. 1. 
38 See Olsaretti, ‘Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice’; Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice 
Sensitive to Responsibility’. Cf. Elford, ‘When Is Inequality Fair?’. 
39 See Lazenby, ‘One Kiss Too Many?’; Miller, ‘The Incoherence of Luck Egalitarianism’; Lang, 
‘How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?’. 
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This problem goes deep. It not only challenges the positive luckist principle, 
but also makes one wonder, for example, whether Dworkin has a credible view 
about distributive equality at all.40 For as he proposes the thought experiment of 
the auction involving the distribution of resources, what one can bid for with 
one’s clamshells is in one sense determined by others’ preferences. One is in effect 
only able to bid for a smaller bundle of resources if one happens to want what 
others also want, since the price of a certain kind of resource will be higher if many 
people are willing to bid for them. Indeed, as Dworkin emphasizes, it is essential 
to his theory that the allocation of goods should be regulated by a market: 
The market character of the auction is not simply a convenient or ad hoc device 
for resolving technical problems that arise for equality of resources in very simple 
exercises like our desert island case. It is an institutional form of the process of 
discovery and adaptation that is at the center of the ethics of that ideal. Equality 
of resources supposes that the resources devoted to each person’s life should be 
equal. That goal needs a metric. The auction proposes what the envy test in fact 
assumes, that the true measure of the social resources devoted to the life of one 
person is fixed by asking how important, in fact, that resource is for others. It 
insists that the cost, measured in that way, figures in each person’s sense of what 
is rightly his and in each person’s judgment of what life he should lead, given 
that command of justice.41 
But I think we should have some reservations about the view that egalitarian 
justice should require that people’s holdings be decided by markets, even in their 
ideal forms. It is true that they are most impressively efficient with regard to the 
exchanges of supply and demand, but the fact that the free market is able to 
allocate goods efficiently, by minimizing the opportunity costs for all involved, 
does not show that it should be tasked with fixing the demands of justice.42 In my 
 
40 See Freeman, ‘Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism’, 128–132. 
41 Sovereign Virtue, 70. 
42 Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 276–280/244–247 rev. 
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view, we should not take Dworkin’s proposal to characterize distributive equality 
by market mechanisms without reservation, mainly on the ground that most of 
people’s tastes and preferences are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and 
should therefore have no authority with respect to the distribution of our 
entitlements.43 Whether one could possibly have the kind of talent like what Wilt 
Chamberlain has, so highly valued by basketball fans, is purely a contingent 
matter; and I hold the view that there is nothing fair about the state of affairs in 
which some people are very wealthy merely because they are fortunate enough to 
have highly marketable skills.44 What we therefore need to do is to substantiate 
the idea of distributive equality in a way that is to a great extent not held hostage 
to people’s tastes and preferences, for the reason that egalitarian justice should be 
largely immune to the vicissitudes of luck. 
In view of the above, one may be attracted to what is sometimes called the 
all-luck view.45 As Iwao Hirose puts it, this view holds that ‘almost all inequalities 
reflect the differential effects of brute luck, and hence that very few people can be 
held responsible for bad outcomes.’46 The all-luck view appears well motivated by 
the thought which I already rehearsed above, namely that it is harder to justify 
inequalities when we realize that there are immense complexities involved in all 
choices, and what appear to be deliberative choices may also be commonly tainted 
by brute luck. One should also immediately notice, however, that the all-luck 
view implies that the positive luckist principle hardly has any application; as 
Hirose also comments, this view ‘gets closer, or extensionally almost equivalent, 
to simple egalitarianism in outcome’.47 
 
43 Cf. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 479, n. 10. 
44 The well-known Wilt Chamberlain case is from Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 160–164. 
45 See, for example, Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice, ch. 3. 
46 Egalitarianism, 51. 
47 Ibid. 
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As some of my remarks may have already shown, I have much sympathy with 
the all-luck view, although I must acknowledge that it seems to contradict our 
common sense immensely. For one thing, we do not treat people as if they never 
make genuine choices. But I should note that the all-luck view does resonate well 
with some of our intuitions about fairness in light of the fact that barely any choice 
is immune to brute luck. I am therefore inclined to think that something very 
close to the all-luck view—which suggests that equality is to be preserved unless 
relevant inequalities result from genuine choices which somehow carry the weight 
that justifies them—is the most consistent formulation of luck egalitarianism.  
Before I leave this topic, I want to mention one last thing that Arneson and 
others have already noticed; namely that luck egalitarianism, as it is usually 
understood, seems to be concerned with two types of conditions, not one, that 
justify inequalities.48 
Consider again Temkin’s formulation of the luckist negative principle, on 
which inequalities are unjustified when some are worse off than others through 
no fault or choice of their own. One should then see that the clause ‘no fault or 
choice’ actually involves two kinds of considerations, one involving the thought 
that people do not deserve to be worse off, as a matter of morality, when they are 
not at fault; and the other that they should not be made worse off than others 
when they make no choice that brings about themselves being worse off as a 
matter of prudence.  
Now, it is obvious that, although morality and prudence both give guidance 
on how people should live their lives, they do not always coincide. We know that 
sometimes people act virtuously but imprudently—when they act altruistically, 
for instance—and therefore become worse off themselves. There are people who 
want to live their lives in, say, the model of Mother Teresa, and choose to give up 
 
48 See Arneson, ‘Luck and Equality’. 
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many valuable things for themselves in order to serve others. Although we are very 
familiar with this type of cases, one side of the problem is that it actually seems 
unclear what luck egalitarians should think about them. So, if those nice people 
end up being very badly off themselves, should the luck egalitarian avow to 
compensate for their choices? To sharpen our intuition, suppose that Adina is 
such a person, who has devoted her life to others, and she ends up as worse off as 
David, who has gambled away his fortune frivolously. I imagine luck egalitarians 
would say that if there are available resources to save only one of them from being 
very badly off, they should be given to Adina; but I think it is not entirely clear 
on what luck egalitarian ground this judgement can be made. 
At any rate, luck egalitarianism seems caught in a dilemma when morality 
and prudence conflict with each other. Since the idea of moral desert has some 
intuitive appeal, they would want to help the virtuous even if they should be held 
responsible for their supererogatory sacrifices. But this suggestion does not really 
accord with their luckist commitment to personal responsibility, according to 
which people should bear the consequences of their choices if they are made under 
appropriate conditions. 
Luck egalitarians may therefore want to reconsider the assumption that both 
morality and prudence bear on the conditions which make one forfeit the claim 
to compensation. On the one hand, some of them may suggest that people should 
be held responsible for whatever choices they make, irrespective of their moral 
credentials. But I believe that luck egalitarianism will lose much of its intuitive 
appeal if it is thus reformulated. For it seems that a major reason why we care 
about how people make their choices is that we want them to be justifiable from 
a moral point of view; and it would be at best unclear why an egalitarian theory 
of justice need put such emphasis on choice if it were entirely devoid of a moral 
character. On the other hand, if luck egalitarians think that people should only 
be responsible for their choices when they are morally questionable, their theory 
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will appear to collapse into some sort of desertist view, according to which, 
roughly, a distribution of goods and ills is just if and only if it appropriately tracks 
the virtues and vices of their holders.49 Now, there is of course nothing outright 
implausible if an egalitarian conception of justice also pays heed to the idea of 
moral desert, but it cannot be denied that considerations of equality and desert 
are by their nature distinct; and I shall not further inquire into the prospects for 
such a mixed conception. 
The problems we have discussed in this section suggest that it may not be an 
easy task to articulate luck egalitarianism as a coherent view. But I am inclined to 
think that one need not be too impressed by the fact that luck egalitarianism has 
a variety of commitments which do not always resonate well with one another. 
For a natural way to incorporate a plurality of components into a conception of 
justice is to devise a method for their reconciliation. This might be done, say, by 
assigning weights to each of them, or formulating priority rules in cases where 
they conflict. One may recall that Rawls’s conception of justice, consisting of a 
number of principles of justice and priority rules that order principles of justice 
lexically, is also pluralist in this sense. In my view, it is very sensible to articulate 
luck egalitarianism as a pluralist conception of justice.50 I, for one, do not find 
luck egalitarianism in any respect more problematic than its pluralist alternatives 
qua a pluralist view. For all that has been argued here, the prospects for luck 
egalitarianism as a pluralist conception of justice are an undecided matter. 
 
49 See Temkin, ‘Equality as Comparative Fairness’. Cf. Kagan, ‘Equality and Desert’; Olsaretti, 
‘Unmasking Equality? Kagan on Equality and Desert’. 
50 See Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice, ch. 3; Lippert-Rasmussen, Relational Egalitarianism: Living 
as Equals, ch. 7. Cf. Daniels, ‘Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism’, 255. 
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Chapter 4. 
The Relationalist Critique of Luck Egalitarianism 
My primary aim in this chapter is to show that a number of recent objections 
to luck egalitarianism, put forward by those who are now commonly called 
relational egalitarians, do not show that it is implausible in virtue of its concerns 
for procedural and distributive fairness. I argue as follows. First, I defend luck 
egalitarianism against a couple of objections, according to which its commitments 
to procedural and distributive fairness have severely undesirable implications, on 
the ground that luck egalitarians may plausibly suggest that their concerns for 
procedural and distributive fairness are only two among other commitments of 
theirs with respect to distributive justice. Second, I argue, for reasons already 
hinted at in the last chapter, that it does not make sense for the relationalist to 
claim that luck egalitarianism fails the Dworkinian injunction of equal concern 
and respect. Third, I argue that it is implausible for the relationalist to object to 
luck egalitarianism by claiming that it presupposes an allegedly dubious account 
of justification, for the reason that luck egalitarians are not forbidden from 
adopting whichever conception of justification that one may find appealing. 
4.1. The Harshness Objection and the Disrespect Objection 
When contemporary relational egalitarians put forward their challenges to 
the distributive conception of equality, they usually focus on luck egalitarianism 
as a paradigmatic distributive theory. Many relational egalitarians appear to 
believe that there are fatal objections to luck egalitarianism. In this section I 
discuss two of these, namely the harshness objection and the disrespect objection. 
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These are articulated, among other relationalists, by Anderson, who writes that 
luck egalitarianism ‘offers no aid to those it labels irresponsible, and humiliating 
aid to those it labels innately inferior.’1 I argue that these two objections fail. 
According to the harshness objection, luck egalitarianism is too harsh to the 
imprudent, and hence implausible, since it holds that those who make imprudent 
choices should themselves bear full responsibility of the consequences of these 
choices. A paradigmatic case suggested by Anderson involves a car accident, in 
which both a negligent driver and an innocent passer-by are severely injured. As 
the objection goes, luck egalitarianism appears to imply that the innocent victim 
should be treated with all available care, for the accident is just bad brute luck for 
her. But the driver, for it is his own imprudent driving which gives rise to his 
injury, must be left ‘to die by the side of the road.’2 Since the accident supposedly 
only involves bad option luck, not brute luck, for the reckless driver, there is no 
reason to rescue him according to luck egalitarianism. But surely, the objection 
continues, the fact that it has such implication, namely abandoning someone to 
die, counts as a reductio of that view.  
More specifically, Anderson claims that the reckless driver case shows why 
luck egalitarianism should be rejected from an egalitarian point of view. For 
according to Anderson, there is one thing that any egalitarian conception of justice 
should be committed to, namely to secure the conditions for people to be related 
as equals; and abandoning the reckless driver is exactly to deprive him of the access 
to resources that he may need so as to recover, which in turn is necessary for him 
to live again as an equal citizen among others. Anderson therefore charges luck 
egalitarianism with failing to express equal concern and respect for those who 
make imprudent choices. That is, she objects that the harsh attitude expressed by 
the abandonment is incompatible with the principle of basic human equality.  
 
1 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 308. 
2 Ibid., 295. 
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How should luck egalitarians respond to the harness objection? To begin 
with, they should maintain that luck egalitarianism is plausible insofar as it implies 
that in the imagined scenario the blameless pedestrian has a stronger claim to be 
taken care of. For it is clear that if there are only limited medical resources which 
cannot be provided for both the culpable driver and the innocent passer-by, it is 
fair to treat the latter first, and unfair not so. Assuming that basic equality between 
these two patients implies that fair treatment should be given, luck egalitarianism 
does not contradict that principle insofar as it indicates that rescuing the innocent 
pedestrian has a priority over saving the culpable driver. 
But it may be said that this reply is not sufficient to deflect the harshness 
objection, for this objection condemns luck egalitarianism as a theory which not 
only gives higher priority to the victim of bad brute luck, but is also committed 
to letting the negligent driver bear the terrible consequences. That is, it charges 
luck egalitarianism with holding too stringent a view about personal responsibility, 
which allegedly grounds the verdict that it is just to leave the driver unattended 
even if there are resources to rescue both two patients. 
Now, I think luck egalitarians should simply reply that apart from luckism 
they also have other commitments, which suggest to them reasons to rescue the 
negligent driver as well as the innocent pedestrian. As I said at the end of the last 
chapter, luck egalitarians can endorse pluralism about values and principles, and 
it therefore makes sense for them to allude to, for example, humanitarian concerns 
or the value of solidarity, so as to mitigate the criticized harsh implication of their 
view about personal responsibility.3 That is, luck egalitarians need not deny, say, 
that there is a requirement to cater for anybody’s urgent needs, as well as that it is 
good that members of a community display mutual concern unconditionally; and 
 
3 See Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice, 64–66; Cohen, ‘Luck and Equality’, 120; Cohen, Why Not 
Socialism?. 
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they should suggest that after taking all of the relevant considerations into account 
it is most likely that it is justified to rescue the reckless driver.  
In fact, they may add that complicated weighing seems unavoidable if the 
plurality of considerations is duly acknowledged, and that there might even exist 
situations in which not rescuing is entirely acceptable. Imagine a convicted serial 
killer who accidentally traps himself in a burning building whilst attempting to 
commit just another murder. A pluralist luck egalitarian may claim that all things 
considered it is not harsh and violates no requirement of basic equality to refuse 
to rescue him. For even if it is granted that the criminal does not deserve to die in 
a particularly miserable way, he is also unworthy of anyone else trying to mitigate 
the consequences of his mistake by putting themselves into jeopardy. 
Now, is the pluralist reply credible? Hirose challenges it on several grounds. 
First, he claims that the very idea of pluralism is unclear, and it invites the question 
how to reconcile values and principles which are supposed to exist simultaneously 
but conflict with each other. Second, Hirose suggests that the pluralist response 
does not appropriately engage with the harshness objection, for whether or not 
luck egalitarians also endorse other values is beside the point: 
[Luck egalitarians] are free to support as many principles as they wish. But the 
bottom line is that luck egalitarianism abandons the reckless driver. The 
abandonment objection is not aimed at people who support luck egalitarianism, 
but at luck egalitarianism itself. Thus, the force of the abandonment objection 
to luck egalitarianism remains intact. The appeal to non-luck-egalitarian 
principles does not rescue luck egalitarianism.4 
Third, Hirose emphasizes that when luck egalitarianism is accused of being 
implausible for its implication on the rescue case, it is said to fail as a theory of 
justice or a part therein. This means that tempering luck egalitarianism with other 
 
4 Egalitarianism, 60. 
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considerations would not make luck egalitarianism itself any more plausible as an 
either complete or partial theory of justice. He writes: 
The reckless driver case is a case of distributive justice. The question is whether 
we should allocate scarce resources to rescue the reckless driver even if he or she 
should be held responsible. This question is nothing if not one of distributive 
justice. However, luck egalitarianism itself cannot provide a justification for 
saving the reckless driver.5  
Hirose concludes that the pluralist reply does not save luck egalitarianism. At 
best it suggests that it is not incoherent for luck egalitarians to endorse some other 
principles. But luck egalitarianism itself still fails in face of the reckless driver case. 
As he puts it, ‘If other parts of a comprehensive theory of justice can serve to 
answer questions of distributive justice, then we should probably let them solve 
those questions and assign more marginal tasks to luck egalitarianism.’6 
In my view, Hirose’s rebuttals are unconvincing. To begin with, although the 
question regarding the reconciliation between a plurality of values and principles 
should be acknowledged as taxing by any pluralist, the commitment to pluralism 
hardly makes luck egalitarianism any more problematic than any alternative 
conceptions of justice which concede that there is an exception to every rule. 
Moreover, it also seems acceptable if luck egalitarians suggest that there is more 
than one principle of justice, and to acknowledge that other principles may be 
more suitable to tackle the reckless driver case. In other words, a pluralist luck-
egalitarian conception of justice can be understood as not only coupling 
egalitarianism with luckism, but also with other principles of justice, such as those 




7 For a proposal to conceive of social justice as consisting in principles of need, desert, and equality, 
see Miller, Principles of Social Justice, ch. 2. 
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that luck egalitarianism only identifies one important dimension of a pluralist 
conception of justice, so long as it has an explanation concerning how disparate 
principles are related. It is unfair to attribute to luck egalitarians the view that 
their commitment to luckism must range over all sorts of cases in which questions 
about distribution arise. It seems reasonable for luck egalitarians to confine 
themselves to a narrower focus, and they may sensibly think that when a case 
involves satisfying people’s urgent needs the luckist principles no longer applies.  
I hasten to add that this move would hardly vindicate Hirose’s claim that it 
should make luck egalitarianism a marginal part of a conception of justice. Indeed, 
I find it hard to accept the implication of Hirose’s remark that whether or not the 
negligent driver should be rescued constitutes a central sort of case of distributive 
justice. It is unclear why Hirose thinks the question whether we should use scarce 
resources to rescue the reckless driver is ‘nothing if not one of distributive justice’. 
The nub of Hirose’s critique appears to be that luck egalitarianism is inappropriate 
even as a partial theory of distributive justice if it does not give the right verdict 
for the right reasons. That is to say, Hirose suggests that luck egalitarianism should 
be rejected if it does not dictate that the negligent driver has a claim of justice to 
be rescued. But the force of this charge is by no means unquestionable. It does 
make sense to think that it is a question of distributive justice whether the reckless 
driver’s claim on scarce resources partly or wholly depends on considerations 
about his responsibility. But this thought does not imply that our judgement 
about whether to rescue the reckless driver only depends on norms of distributive 
justice. In short, I find it implausible to assume that it must be a matter of justice 
when allocation of scarce resources is involved, and I have suggested that there are 
other norms which provide guidance on our judgement of the negligent driver 
case. It is therefore unclear why Hirose maintains that we must use the negligent 
driver rescue case to test luck egalitarianism. I am myself inclined to the view that 
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if we do judge that all thing considered it is justified to rescue the reckless driver, 
it is not because this is what justice requires. There are other plausible explanations. 
At any rate, one may further respond with a ‘companions in guilt’ argument, 
that it is also unclear whether Rawls’s principles of justice have any definite 
implications for the neglectful driver case. But I imagine no one would question 
whether Rawls’s theory addresses to a central case of justice. I conclude that it is 
premature to reject luck egalitarianism in light of the harshness objection. 
I shall now turn to address a second familiar objection to luck egalitarianism, 
namely the disrespect objection, and argue that it also fails. According to this 
objection, luck egalitarianism fails to express equal respect even when it aims to 
stand by those who are worse off.  
How come? Jonathan Wolff argues that over-emphasizing concerns about 
fairness in a political community may be incongruous with an ‘egalitarian ethos’ 
constituted by norms of respect and equal standing. Of the shortcomings he 
suggests an implementation of luck egalitarianism may incur, what Wolff calls 
‘shameful revelation’ is illuminating for our discussion. It is the problem that even 
when luck egalitarianism purports to compensate people for their bad brute luck 
in the name of fairness, the fact that people are compensated for what they lack 
may be interpreted as implying that they are not as respected as others are: 
There can be cases where people are required to demean themselves: to behave 
in a way, or reveal things about themselves, which can rationally be expected to 
reduce their respect-standing. To put this another way, sometimes people are 
required, for whatever reason, to do things, or reveal things about themselves, 
that they find shameful. … In general, where a particular trait is valued within 
an agent’s culture, to admit that one does not have it can lead one to believe that 
one will, as a consequence, acquire a lower respect-standing.8 
 
8 Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos’, 109–110. 
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In other words, Wolff worries that there may be undesirable consequences 
that follow from luck egalitarianism’s undue fixation with luck and compensation. 
For this emphasis of the impact of luck may well be a reflection of people’s 
disrespectful attitudes towards those who suffer from bad brute luck, or even 
strengthen them. 
According to Wolff, the real-world welfare policies provide us a litmus test. 
In the process of claiming that welfare deficits do not result from their own fault, 
welfare claimants often need to reveal their weaknesses. But Wolff suggests that 
when a welfare state makes claims of subsidies conditional upon those who are in 
dire need being able to prove both their deficiencies and non-culpability, the 
alleged pursuit of fairness brings about disrespect. The crux of Wolff’s critique of 
luck egalitarianism is that its single-minded focus on considerations of fairness 
may not be consistent with other egalitarian commitments of ours. Alternatively 
put, luck egalitarianism might fail to express equal respect even when it purports 
to alleviate those who are burdened by bad brute luck. 
As Wolff acknowledges, luck egalitarians might want to retort that what they 
hold is an ‘ideal’ theory, whose main goal is to identify the values and norms that 
should be upheld in a well-ordered society. According to a version of the ideal 
theory approach, what is considered as having first priority in theorization of, say, 
justice, is to conceive of an ideal situation in which publicly recognized principles 
of justice are most commonly if not unanimously followed by members of society. 
This approach to political philosophy is influentially proposed by Rawls, although 
it has also been seriously contested in recent years.9 Luck egalitarians, among 
whom this approach appears well-received, are very likely to claim that, in a well-
 
9 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 8–9/8 rev. See also Simmons, ‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory’; 
Stemplowska and Swift, ‘Rawls on Ideal and Nonideal Theory’. Cf. Williams, ‘Realism and 
Moralism in Political Theory’; Sen, The Idea of Justice. 
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ordered society governed by their favoured principles, the kind of psychological 
and sociological problems that concern Wolff would not be serious.  
They might suggest, for instance, that the problem of shameful revelation 
should not arise where there is a more congenial moral or cultural code which 
holds that it is perfectly fine to reveal our traits, no matter whether they are highly 
valued. They might also suggest that in such a society people’s psychological 
profile would be very different, such that their self-respect should not be impaired 
even when they need to reveal something about themselves in order to claim 
compensation.10 It is conceivable that in an ideal society these claimants could 
well have an open attitude towards revealing themselves. One might add that there 
are numerous real-world instances where we do not necessarily find revealing 
ourselves shameful. Before I get a tax refund, I may need to file a report about 
some of my financial details. If I were falsely accused of murdering someone, it 
would be urgent for me to provide information of my whereabouts as an alibi to 
prove my innocence. These procedures seem perfectly acceptable, and I suppose 
that these should normally not to be seen as threatening to impair our self-respect. 
The reply just considered is premised on the possibility of envisioning an 
ideal situation where revelation does not necessitate shame and lowering of self-
respect. If that postulation is sensible, as I think it is, then luck egalitarians are 
justified to think that their commitments to fairness is not necessarily at variance 
with Wolff’s egalitarian ethos. Accordingly, it would be premature for their critics 
to claim that norms of fairness and equal respect are never reconcilable. 
Since the problem of shameful revelation is contingent on several ‘real-world’ 
assumptions, it is not surprising that many who find the disrespect objection 
powerful are ‘non-ideal’ theorists.11 Without engaging with the debate between 
 
10 See Firth, ‘What’s So Shameful about Shameful Revelations?’. 
11 See Wolff, ‘Political Philosophy and the Real World of the Welfare State’; Anderson, ‘Toward 
a Non-Ideal, Relational Methodology for Political Philosophy: Comments on Schwartzman’s 
Challenging Liberalism’. 
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ideal and non-ideal theorists, which would take us too far afield, suffice it to say 
that one worry people like Wolff have is whether it is feasible to transform our 
current society into the ideal society conceived by luck egalitarians, and that 
appears to be a sensible concern. So, Wolff maintains that even if luck egalitarians 
consider themselves as only trying to do ideal theory, they still need to show how 
their views are practically relevant and action-guiding for people who live in the 
real world. For ‘although they consider themselves engaged on a largely theoretical 
exercise, they do not conceive it to be a purely theoretical exercise either. They do 
hope to have some influence on political and economic policy.’12  But Wolff 
worries that endorsing and implementing luck egalitarianism in the real world is 
likely to amount to ratifying something quite the opposite of its ideal, and 
therefore that luck egalitarians would end up being the mentors of the anti-
egalitarian policies:  
If policy makers were to read Dworkin and others, what message might they 
come away with? That egalitarians, like conservatives, now favor highly 
conditional welfare benefits. But in the real world this does not give us 
egalitarianism. Rather, it gives us Thatcherism, in which the poor are singled out 
for insulting levels of scrutiny.13 
We might of course be on board with Wolff’s worries if his argument is ‘taken 
as a plea that ideal thinkers who want to have some impact on reality should pay 
more attention to issues of transition.’14 But so long as there is a distinction to be 
made between issues of transition and ideal theorization, in my view there is 
nothing to be frowned upon if luck egalitarians claim that how their theory is to 
be implemented is a separate matter that must await further treatment.  
 
12 Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos’, 112; emphasis in original. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 113. 
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The disrespect objection is also voiced by Anderson, who writes, rhetorically: 
‘If much recent academic work defending equality had been secretly penned by 
conservatives, could the results be any more embarrassing for egalitarians?’ 15 
Anderson caricatures a Dworkin-style-luck-egalitarianism-inspired letter from 
‘State Equality Board’, which is written in a discriminatory tone that indicates a 
wrong kind of attitude towards those who are disabled:  
To the disabled: Your defective native endowments or current disabilities, alas, 
make your life less worth living than the lives of normal people. To compensate 
for this misfortune, we, the able ones, will give you extra resources, enough to 
make the worth of living your life good enough that at least one person out there 
thinks it is comparable to someone else’s life.16 
According to Anderson, similar letters could be written and sent to the 
‘stupid and untalented’ and the ‘ugly and socially awkward’. The lesson Anderson 
wants us to learn is that the kind of compensation demanded by luck egalitarians 
is motivated by a condescending attitude, namely pity. This is to be contrasted 
with compassion, which is alleged to be a genuinely egalitarian disposition: 
Compassion is based on an awareness of suffering, an intrinsic condition of a 
person. Pity, by contrast, is aroused by a comparison of the observer’s condition 
with the condition of the object of pity. Its characteristic judgment is not ‘she is 
badly off’ but ‘she is worse off than me.’ When the conditions being compared 
are internal states in which people take pride, pity’s thought is ‘she is sadly 
inferior to me.’ Compassion and pity can both move a person to act benevolently, 
but only pity is condescending.17 
 
15 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 287. 
16 Ibid., 305. 
17 Ibid., 306–307. 
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In line with what she infers from the harshness objection, Anderson claims 
that the disrespect objection shows that luck egalitarianism fails to express equal 
respect and concern for whom it purports to compensate for their lack.  
It is hardly clear, however, why we need to take Anderson’s speculative 
diagnosis of luck egalitarianism seriously. Is there any reason to think that the 
endorsement of luck egalitarianism must go hand in hand with a condescending 
attitude towards those who have a claim to be compensated for their bad brute 
luck? I think not. It seems perfectly legitimate for luck egalitarians to say that they 
are motivated to compensate for those deficiencies exactly because in their view 
people are of equal moral worth whether or not they suffer from bad brute luck. 
Since I see no merit in the charge that luck egalitarianism must be motivated by 
pity in Anderson’s derogatory sense, I believe that her version of the disrespect 
objection also fails to defeat luck egalitarianism. 
It is worth noting one implication Anderson draws from her favoured view, 
which is supposedly not plagued by a vicious sense of pity—Anderson suggests 
that a compassion-motivated conception of relational equality would not include 
egalitarian principles of distribution: 
In virtue of their distinct cognitive bases, humanitarian compassion and pity 
motivate action on different principles. Compassion does not yield egalitarian 
principles of distribution: it aims to relieve suffering, not to equalize it. Once 
people have been relieved of suffering and neediness, compassion generates no 
further impetus toward equality of condition.18 
As I shall discuss further in the next chapter, Anderson’s remarks illustrate 
her rejection of distributive egalitarianism. According to her, when an egalitarian 
is motivated by compassion rather than pity towards the worse off, she would not 
seek an equal distribution of anything, but only aim to relieve people’s suffering 
 
18 Ibid., 307. 
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and satisfy their urgent needs. There is no further commitment to egalitarian 
distributive principles.  
4.2. Rethinking the Relationalist Argument from Equal Respect 
There is, I believe, one important lesson to be learned from our reflection 
upon the two objections we visited in the last section. As Anderson construes them, 
both the harshness objection and the disrespect objection aim to show that luck 
egalitarianism fails to express equal concern and respect. On her view, the 
harshness objection illustrates this by highlighting the allegedly implausible 
distributive implications of the luck egalitarian account of personal responsibility, 
and the disrespect objection does this by indicating that luck egalitarianism 
expresses the wrong kind of attitudes even when it correctly prescribes that people 
who suffer from bad brute luck should be thereby compensated.  
As I argued above, there is a natural way for luck egalitarians to get around 
the harshness objection, namely to identify their other commitments that mitigate 
the alleged harsh implications of luck egalitarianism. One might think that this is 
not enough to rebut Anderson’s claim that luck egalitarianism fails to meet the 
requirement of equal concern and respect. However, for two reasons I think luck 
egalitarianism does not fail to show equal concern and respect even if it does have 
harsh implications.  
First, people are still regarded and treated as equals if luck egalitarianism holds 
that not only those who happen to make imprudent choices, but everyone, should 
take full responsibility for their own choices. In my view, if a rule is severe but 
applies equally to everyone, it does not violate the injunction of equal concern and 
respect, unless Anderson means to suggest that the injunction is violated whenever 
a rule is too stringent, such that not enough concern and respect is shown to anyone. 
One can easily see, however, that the phrase ‘equal’ in this interpretation of the 
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injunction is redundant, and the charge of harshness at any rate does not imply 
failure of equal concern and respect. 
A second and more important reason to resist the argument that luck 
egalitarianism fails to express the idea of equal concern and respect is, to put it 
bluntly, that the idea does not itself set any substantive constraints on how 
distributive principles of justice are to be conceived—as I already made plain in 
Section 3.2., I am inclined to endorse Arneson’s claim that the notion of respect 
for persons ‘looks to be an unobjectionable but purely formal idea’,19 and I hold 
that this judgement should also apply to the Dworkinian notion of equal concern 
and respect. True, luck egalitarianism’s commitment to choice and responsibility 
may be seen as an interpretation of the idea of equal concern and respect, and that 
interpretation may well have distributive implications that some people find 
unacceptable. Nevertheless, I see no reason to think that the question whether 
these distributive implications are acceptable needs to be answered by reference to 
the idea of equal concern and respect. As I also discussed earlier in that section, 
Dworkin—who proposes to identify equal concern as the sovereign virtue of 
political community—himself admits that this idea is seemingly consistent with 
a variety of interpretations and conceptions of justice; and as far as I can see, this 
idea only entails that distributive principles must be applied indiscriminately, but 
not much else. 
On my view, luck egalitarians need not object to Andersons’s endorsement 
of the spirit of the ‘egalitarian political movements’, which ‘assert the equal moral 
worth of persons’.20 But they should claim that this assertion has no determinate 
bearing on whether or not their view about choice and responsibility is plausible. 
They should maintain that the idea of equal moral worth is substantiated in the 
domain of distributive justice by principles that specify just distributions of 
 
19 ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, 344. 
20 Anderson, ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 312. 
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benefits and burdens, and a principle of basic equality is justified when and only 
when distributive principles that offer interpretations of that idea are justified. So, 
for example, they might say that the idea of equal moral worth or basic human 
equality simply means three things according to their theory: that there is a 
presumption of equal distribution, that people should be compensated for bad 
brute luck, and that they should bear responsibility for their genuine choices.  
Now, luck egalitarians should of course admit that whether or not their 
luckist commitments are defensible is a debatable matter. Nonetheless, I think 
they should also insist that, when Anderson asserts that luck egalitarianism fails 
to express equal concern and respect, she just is claiming that luck egalitarianism 
is indefensible in view of its distributive implications. In my view, this rebuttal at 
least implies that Anderson misleads when she argues that luck egalitarianism fails 
to honour the injunction of equal concern and respect, because that assertion adds 
nothing over and above to her claim that luckism is indefensible.  
In fact, as I shall further elaborate in Chapter 6, it is Rawls who makes it very 
clear that introducing the idea of equal moral worth adds nothing substantive to 
a conception of egalitarian justice: 
The essential point is that the concept of moral worth does not provide a first 
principle of distributive justice. This is because it cannot be introduced until 
after the principles of justice and of natural duty and obligation have been 
acknowledged. Once these principles are on hand, moral worth can be defined 
as having a sense of justice; and … the virtues can be characterized as desires or 
tendencies to act upon the corresponding principles. Thus the concept of moral 
worth is secondary to those of right and justice, and it plays no role in the 
substantive definition of distributive shares.21 
I think we should say that whether luck egalitarianism includes justified 
egalitarian distributive principles is a question that is also to be primarily decided 
 
21 Theory, 312–3/275 rev. 
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by whether these can be plausibly seen as part of a coherent conception of justice. 
Luck egalitarians should therefore respond to Anderson by saying that her remark 
concerning equal moral worth is simply beside the point. 
What I just said should also apply to the disrespect objection. Again, luck 
egalitarians need not demur when Anderson suggests that ‘Egalitarians base claims 
to social and political equality on the fact of universal moral equality.’22 But they 
should maintain that it makes no clear sense when one asserts that one or another 
egalitarian conception of justice fails in the light of ‘the fact of universal moral 
equality’. For how to understand that fact is a moot point, and luck egalitarianism 
does offer one interpretation of what that fact involves, which is seemingly no less 
egalitarian than any alternatives. Instead of saying that luck egalitarianism ‘fails 
the most fundamental test any egalitarian theory must meet: that its principles 
express equal respect and concern for all citizens’,23 Anderson should acknowledge 
that what she really means is that luck egalitarianism fails this ‘most fundamental 
test’ according to the way her relational conception of equality interprets that test. 
I am here not only claiming, as I already argued above, that Anderson’s 
objections against luck egalitarianism fail. I am making the further point that 
when Anderson charges luck egalitarianism with failing to express equal respect 
and concern, she merely points out that it is inconsistent with her own conception 
of equality, nothing more, nothing less. 
Now it should be plain that what I am driving at is I think the rarely defended 
and unpopular view—albeit, as I said, I take it to be Rawls’s view—that the 
principle of basic human equality itself is incapable of determining whether or not 
one egalitarian theory is preferable to another. In so far as I can see, the principle 
of basic equality only entails that egalitarian distributive principles should be 
impartially applied. That is, it only rules out principles that selectively benefit or 
 
22 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 313. 
23 Ibid., 289. 
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burden people on arbitrary grounds—but is it not true that different theories have 
different standards of arbitrariness, according to what each of them deems relevant 
and irrelevant? 
According my Rawlsian view, the correct explanation of why the principle of 
basic equality rules out principles which imply arbitrary treatment is not that the 
former itself robustly arbitrate between alternative distributive principles; it is that 
no distributive principle which has the said feature can ever be justified. On my 
view, the principle that citizens in a democratic society are one another’s equals 
does not operate as a substantive criterion, as opposed to a merely formal one, for 
adjudicating one or another conception of equality, and so the very idea of ‘the 
most fundamental test’ that Anderson alludes to is misleading. 
4.3. Justifying Claims of Justice 
Anderson further argues, however, that as a paradigmatic distributive theory 
luck egalitarianism cannot even be construed as an appropriate conception of 
justice, because it is prone to an inappropriate view about justification for claims 
of justice. According to Anderson, luck egalitarianism is a theory that focuses ‘on 
correcting a supposed cosmic injustice’.24 She claims, on the contrary, that there 
is no such thing as a cosmic injustice, for it is a necessary truth that claims of 
justice can only be made against individual and institutional agents.25 That is to 
say, justice only makes demands on those who are able to take responsibility for 
their deeds. 
For example, Anderson suggests that when a massive natural disaster occurs, 
no claim of injustice can be made when all reasonable things are said and done: 
‘The world could be such that everyone is complying with all reasonable demands, 
 
24 Ibid., 288. 
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but people are miserable due to natural catastrophes that overcome their rescue 
capacity. Such a world would be deplorable, but not unjust.’26 Provided that all 
relevant agents do comply with the demands of justice, the harm done by natural 
catastrophes cannot be an injustice. Another example: what is also not a matter of 
justice, on Anderson’s view, is the distribution of talents, a natural fact which is 
neither just nor unjust. That is, Anderson appears to think that there is nothing 
unjust if the talented benefit from their places in the natural distribution of talents, 
for no one should be held accountable for the vicissitudes of luck. Mozart thereby 
had nothing to be sorry about for his success if Salieri was less talented than he is, 
and Salieri could not justifiably complain about Mozart’s success.27 
It might appear that luck egalitarians should dissent from Anderson’s 
judgements on these cases, since on their view natural catastrophes and the lack 
of natural talents both count for some people as caprices of bad brute luck, the 
effect of which should on their account be compensated for. Anderson’s claim 
that luck egalitarianism aims to correct cosmic injustice may therefore seem fair—
I would, however, dispute this diagnosis below. 
By contrast, Anderson’s relational conception of equality, which she calls 
‘democratic equality’, is said to ground the justification of claims of justice in the 
obligations citizens owe to each other. According to Anderson, as an articulation 
of the idea of basic moral equality, ‘democratic equality regards two people as 
equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by principles 
acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, 
and recognition for granted.’28 This appears to contrast with what luck egalitarians 
hold, that there is no inherent connection between interpersonal relationships and 
the justification of distributive principles.  
 
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 Ibid., 8–10. 
28 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 313. 
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Anderson therefore claims that there exists a ‘fundamental disagreement’ 
between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians with regard to ‘the standpoint 
from which principles of justice are justified.’29 On her view, relational egalitarians 
endorse a second-person conception justification, whilst luck egalitarians follow a 
third-person conception of justification.  
With respect to the latter, Anderson writes: 
In a third-person justification, someone presents a body of normative and factual 
premises as grounds for a policy conclusion. If the argument is valid and the 
premises are true, then the conclusion is justified. The identity of the person 
making the argument and the identity of her audience are irrelevant to the 
justification.30 
On the face of it, it is unclear why the third-person approach to justification 
is unacceptable. If it is unfair and so pro tanto unjust for one to be worse off than 
others for no choice or fault of her own, why does the identity of the person who 
is entitled to make a legitimate complaint, or the identity of the agent against 
whom the claimant makes the complaint, matter? I am not sure why it does.31 But 
apart from her comment that it is indifferent to the identities of the addresser and 
addressee when a justification is given, insofar as I can see, Anderson never says 
exactly why the third-person account of justification should be rejected. Although 
I find her rejection of the third-person approach unmotivated, I take it that this 
indifference is exactly what Anderson finds inappropriate in it. The idea may be 
that claims of justice can be justified if and only if they are made within a certain 
kind of relationship; for according to the relational view there is no obligation of 
egalitarian justice that is not grounded in the relationships people share with one 
another. This may be why according to the second-person account of justification 
 
29 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 2; see also Anderson, ‘Equality’, 44–45. 
30 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 2–3. 
31 Cf. Segall, Equality and Opportunity, 18–23.  
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requirements of justice only apply to those who are situated in these relationships: 
they are the speaker and the audience who make demands on one another.  
Indeed, Anderson indicates that if ‘there is no one who can be held 
responsible for correcting inequalities between’ those who ‘have no social or causal 
relation to each other’, then ‘It follows that this kind of equality cannot be cast as 
a second-person claim and so cannot be a demand of justice.’32 It appears that 
Anderson’s view on justification is typical among relational egalitarians. So, for 
instance, when Scanlon contrasts his view with luck egalitarianism, he also states 
that his objections to inequality ‘all presuppose some form of relationship or 
interaction between the unequal parties. … Once inequality is considered 
separately from all such relational and institutional factors, it is not clear that it is 
objectionable.’33  
I am not convinced, however, that claims of justice must be made within the 
context of social and political relationships. As I shall explain further in the next 
chapter, I hold that our distributive concerns do not always originate from 
considerations about how people should relate to one another. More specifically, 
I am inclined to think that claims of justice can be made whenever and wherever 
a moral relation obtains between individual beings. Since I also think that moral 
relations are universal and ubiquitous, what I want to suggest is effectively that 
any two individual beings have a moral relation, within which it makes sense to 
talk about duties and obligations they owe to each other. For example, it seems 
very reasonable to think that we have duties of justice to the global poor, even if 
they live half a world away and have no previous interaction with us.34  
What these reflections suggest to me is that luck egalitarianism is not defeated 
even if Anderson is correct that we should adopt the second-person conception of 
 
32 ‘Equality’, 54–55. 
33 Why Does Inequality Matter?, 9. 
34 See Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. 
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justification. For luck egalitarians may suggest that there is a moral context—the 
world—out of which individuals who are arbitrarily disadvantaged can make 
claims of justice against those who benefit from brute good luck. 
We may of course follow Rawls, whose inquiry about justice begins by 
restricting itself to a domestic context, within which individuals are related as 
democratic citizens, before it further probes into principles of justice appropriate 
for other contexts.35 But Rawls’s account, which involves stipulations about the 
site and scope of his inquiry, is essentially different from the view voiced by 
Anderson and Scanlon. According to the latter view, justification of claims of 
justice makes sense only if they are made within a social relationship. 
Now, Anderson cites Stephen Darwall’s work as articulating the second-
person conception of justification ‘in definitive form’.36 As Anderson interprets 
Darwall’s account, second-person justification is appropriate to the domain of 
moral rightness, and it is concerned with ‘claims that people make on each other’s 
“conduct and will”.’37 Anderson suggests that most relational egalitarians endorse 
the second-person conception of justification in virtue of their commitment to 
contractualism, which according to her ‘is the view that the principles of justice 
are whatever principles free, equal, and reasonable people would adopt to regulate 
the claims they make on one another.’38 
Importantly, Anderson claims that ‘Justice comprises that subset of the moral 
right tied to individual claim rights, which ground duties of others to pay due 
regard to individuals’ interests.’39 She outlines four constraints on judgments of 
injustice, which she indicates as entailed by the idea of interpersonal justification: 
 
35 See Rawls, Restatement, 11. 
36 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 4. 
37 Ibid., italics in original; citing Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability, 3. 
38 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 3. 
39 Ibid., 4; italics in original. 
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First, there can be no injustice without an injury to someone’s interests. Second, 
there can be no injustice without an agent who is (or was) substantively 
responsible for it—someone obligated to avoid, correct, or bear the costs of the 
injustice or of its correction or amelioration. Third, there can be no injustice 
without an agent who is (or was) entitled to complain to the responsible agent, 
to hold that agent to account and exact compliance with the demand. Fourth, 
there can be no injustice where all agents continuously and successfully comply 
with all the demands that everyone can reasonably make of them.40 
From these constraints Anderson derives the claim that justice is ultimately 
concerned with what is reasonable to demand on the conduct of agents: 
It follows that justice as an evaluation applied to states of affairs is entirely 
derivative of justice as an appraisal of the conduct of agents. Where all agents 
conduct themselves justly—where they successfully comply with all reasonable 
demands—the state of affairs resulting from their conduct is just. There is no 
other route to defining a just state of affairs except through the concept of agents’ 
compliance with reasonable claims people may make on each other.41 
Now, with regard to Anderson remarks, I want to make two observations. 
First, it is by no means clear why luck egalitarians—or distributive egalitarians in 
general—need to dispute the second-person idea of justification. Second, it seems 
that neither contractualism nor the second-person conception of justification 
motivates Anderson’s substantive characterization of justice. These observations 
lead me to think, pace Anderson, that there is no ‘fundamental disagreement’ 
between luck and relational egalitarians about justification.  
First, one should be doubtful about the alleged fundamental disagreement, 
because it does not seem fair to suggest that luck egalitarians must endorse the 
third-person conception of justification, no matter whether it is implausible. To 
begin with, there is the curious fact that when Anderson first introduced the idea 
 
40 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 5. 
41 Ibid., italics omitted. 
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of interpersonal justification in order to explain the implications of her relational-
egalitarian view, she cited and endorsed the account put forward by Cohen, who 
is arguably the luck egalitarian par excellence.42 Moreover, even in the piece where 
Anderson argues for the existence of the fundamental disagreement, she also 
effectively admits that one of Cohen’s objections against Rawls could be put in 
second-person terms, despite her thinking that the objection fails.43 According to 
Anderson, Cohen claims that that those who are disadvantaged in the distribution 
of natural talents have legitimate complaints to the advantaged, as a matter of 
justice, that the latter are unfairly advantaged. Understood as an internal critique 
of Rawls’s theory, the objection is that the legitimate complaint of the untalented 
would not be nullified, even if what is required by Rawls’s difference principle is 
satisfied, and so the untalented are as well off as they could possibly be. 
In response to Cohen, Anderson interprets Cohen’s objection as premised on 
‘the luck egalitarian principle’, on which ‘accidental inequality is unjust’.44 She 
then argues that ‘Cohen's internal critique fails because the luck egalitarian 
principle has no interpersonal rationale.’45 In line with the suggestion that justice 
is not about correcting cosmic injustice, Anderson rejects Cohen’s argument as 
incompatible with the interpersonal account of justification, as she claims that the 
distribution of natural endowments is neither just nor unjust, but merely a natural 
fact. According to her, it follows that the untalented do not have a legitimate 
complaint against the talented. This is supposed to be illustrated by the relation 
between Salieri and Mozart—it is not true that Mozart owes Salieri anything 
simply because he is better endowed. 
 
42 See ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 322, where Anderson cites Cohen, ‘Incentives, Inequality, 
and Community’. 
43 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 7. 
44 Ibid., 8; citing Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 8. 
45 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 8. 
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But I fail to see why Anderson’s characterization of Cohen’s objection is fair 
or accurate. For if the objection is understood as an immanent critique of justice 
as fairness, especially the difference principle, then what Cohen would claim is 
not that the talented owe anything particular to the untalented. His claim would 
instead be that the major institutions of the basic structure of society should be 
arranged in a way that mitigates, if not eliminates, accidental inequalities, for that 
is what these institutions ‘owe’ to the untalented. Alternatively put, in spite of the 
earlier discussion in Chapter 2, since Rawls is explicit that his principles of justice 
are devised to apply to the basic structure of society, it is reasonable to think that 
Cohen’s internal critique of Rawls’s theory could retain the institutional focus 
without losing its luck egalitarian character. Thus construed, Cohen’s major claim 
would then be that the untalented are entitled to complain against the major 
institutions of society—rather than the talented—which arbitrarily permit them 
to be worse off from a moral point of view. Anderson therefore does not establish 
the case that luck egalitarians must cast their arguments in third-person terms. 
Indeed, it appears that nothing should forbid luck egalitarians like Cohen from 
casting their arguments in second-person terms.46  
Moreover, there is also no principled explanation as to why luck egalitarians 
cannot develop their own versions of contractualist accounts.47 They may argue, 
for example, that on a contractualist construal of their view, those who are worse 
off can reasonably object to a principle that permits the basic structure of society 
to be arranged in a way that does not eliminate the advantages resulting from 
talents which are arbitrary from a moral point of view. To support their view, they 
may cite Scanlon, a prominent contractualist, who writes: ‘We have reason to 
object to principles simply because they arbitrarily favor the claims of some over 
 
46 See also Lippert-Rasmussen, Relational Egalitarianism, 110–116, 230–235. 
47 Cf. Vallentyne, ‘Justice, Interpersonal Morality, and Luck Egalitarianism’. 
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the identical claims of others: that is to say, because they are unfair.’48 According 
to luck egalitarianism, a principle that permits some to be favoured by luck 
amounts to arbitrarily favour their claims to benefits over those of others. I need 
not suggest that the contractualist formulation of luck egalitarianism makes it 
more plausible than alternative conceptions of justice; the intelligibility of this 
position already implies the falsity of Anderson’s claim. 
In short, it appears that nothing really hinges on the question of justification 
in the dispute between Anderson and Cohen. The real disagreement between 
them is not about whether luck egalitarians must cast their arguments in third-
person terms. What is involved is instead a substantive issue, not a justificatory 
one, about what legitimate claims or complaints people are entitled to make 
against the major institutions of their society. Anderson may well think that the 
untalented do not have a legitimate complaint against these institutions even if 
the latter make no attempt to neutralize the influences of morally arbitrary causes. 
This, however, involves a claim about how institutions should be arranged, and 
does not vindicate the existence of a disagreement between luck egalitarians and 
relational egalitarians about how claims of justice are to be justified. 
My second observation on Anderson’s account is that even if those who adopt 
the second-person account of justification do so in virtue of their contractualism, 
neither contractualism nor the second-person account of justification motivates a 
view about justice that is inconsistent with luck egalitarianism. 
The crux of Anderson’s account of justification about claims of justice is that 
justice is tied to individual claim rights of the wronged against the wrongdoer: 
Justice is a subset of the morally right. The right specifies our moral obligations 
or duties. Justice specifies what duties are owed to particular persons. The 
concept of injustice involves not simply the idea of ‘a wrong done’ (and hence a 
 
48 What We Owe to Each Other, 216; see also Tomlin, ‘What is the Point of Egalitarian Social 
Relationships?’, 177–179. Cf. James, ‘The Significance of Distribution’. 
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duty to avoid wrongdoing), but ‘some assignable person who is wronged.’ That 
involves ‘the idea of a personal right—a claim on the part of’ the wronged person 
against the wrongdoer that he stop and redress the wrong. The concept of ‘a 
person’s due’ thus belongs to the second-person standpoint. It essentially 
concerns what claims people are entitled to make on others’ conduct, with 
respect to how they treat claimants and their interests.49 
As Anderson characterizes them, moral rightness is concerned with general 
moral obligations, and justice is more specifically concerned with those owed by 
one to another particular person. It appears, however, that Anderson’s account 
does not capture one important aspect of the way contractualists such as Rawls 
characterize justice, namely that ‘the primary subject of justice is the basic structure 
of society’.50 I am therefore doubtful about whether Anderson is entitled to derive 
her view about justice from contractualism. Moreover, although she cites and 
endorses Darwall’s account of the second-person conception of justification, it 
seems that Darwall is also not committed to the view that justice is solely, or even 
primarily, concerned with individual claim rights.51 In fact, in line with what I 
just said, Darwall also appears to suggest that the major difference between moral 
rightness and justice, as contractualists characterize these ideas, has to do with 
their respective subjects, one individual conduct, and another the basic structure 
of society: 
Common to all contractualist theories is the idea that the content of the moral 
obligations we owe to one another as equal moral persons is to be explained as 
the result of a (hypothetical) agreement, choice, or ‘contract’ from some 
perspective that situates individuals equally as moral persons (and so expresses 
respect for persons as such). … Justice as fairness, as Rawls presents it in A Theory 
of Justice, is a contractualist theory of justice. And Rawls there suggests a theory 
of moral right, ‘rightness as fairness’, which can be developed along similar lines. 
 
49 ‘The Fundamental Disagreement’, 19. 
50 Rawls, Theory, 7/6 rev; see also Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 6. 
51 For a discussion of rights by Darwall, see The Second-Person Standpoint, 18–20. 
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Principles of right apply to individual conduct rather than to the basic structure 
of society, but otherwise rightness as fairness attempts to explicate such principles 
in a manner similar to the more familiar ‘derivation’ of principles of justice.52 
In this passage, Darwall first indicates that what the contractualist accounts 
of justice and moral rightness have in common is that they both make use of the 
idea of a hypothetical contract. But then Darwall appears to also endorse Rawls’s 
view that principles of right apply to individual conduct rather than to the basic 
structure of society, whereas principles of justice apply to the basic structure rather 
than to individual conduct.53  Now, it is true that Darwall would agree with 
Anderson that a contractualist theory of justice purports to explain a subset of our 
moral obligations and duties. As far as I can see, however, nowhere in his work on 
second-person conception of justification does Darwall indicate that justice is 
primarily concerned with individual claim rights, and we must therefore conclude 
that Anderson’s appropriation of Darwall is unwarranted. There is simply no sign 
that Darwall (or Rawls) holds a contractualist account of justification according 
to which justice is tied to individual claim rights.  
Taking her argument at its face value, Anderson invalidly infers from justice 
consisting in a subset of moral rightness that it being concerned with a particular 
kind of rightness, namely compliance with individual claim rights. As we have 
seen, contractualists themselves typically think that contractualism about justice 
is distinctive in being concerned with identifying principles which are to apply to 
the basic structure of society. Since contractualists need not hold the view that 
justice is primarily concerned to define the claim rights of the wronged against 
the wrongdoer, there is no reason to think that contractualism as such motivates 
an objection to luck egalitarianism.  
 
52 Ibid., 303. 
53 For Rawls’s own explication, see Theory, 108–111/93–96 rev. See also Weithman, ‘Relational 
Equality, Inherent Instability, and the Reach of Contractualism’. 
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What is more important is that luck egalitarianism is not defeated even if 
Anderson is able to justify the claim that justice is essentially concerned with 
individual claim rights. As we have also seen, luck egalitarians may well argue that 
individuals have a right to make claims on the major institutions of society that 
these should not permit people to be disadvantaged by morally arbitrary factors.  
I conclude that Anderson is incorrect in her suggestion that there is a basic 
disagreement between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians with regard to 
the justification of claims of justice. In my view, Anderson’s objection against luck 
egalitarianism has nothing to do with either contractualism, the second-person 
conception of justification, or even the view that justice is primarily concerned 
with individual claim rights. It is instead motivated by her conviction that those 
who are arbitrarily disadvantaged do not in light of this very fact have a legitimate 
complaint of unfairness.  
One last note. Although some luck egalitarians may insist that there is such 
a thing as cosmic injustice, I see no reason why they are at a disadvantage if they 
want to adopt an institutional view about justice—the view that institutions are 
the primary subject of justice.54 Some of them may even adopt a hybrid view, 
according to which different subjects can be unjust in different ways. In any case, 
I shall not dwell on the question whether it is appropriate to call something a 
cosmic injustice if it is not brought about by any agent.55 For it seems clear that 
what matters more is the substantive question whether inequalities which are 
influenced by natural contingencies can and should be appropriately addressed in 
 
54 The institutional luck egalitarian view is defended in Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck. 
55 For example, I see no conflict between Rawls’s comment that ‘[t]he natural distribution is 
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. 
These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these 
facts’ (Theory, 102/87 rev.); and Derek Parfit’s remark that ‘[a]n objection to natural inequality 
is … one of the foundations of Rawls’s theory’ (Equality or Partiality?, 121). 
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virtue of our concern for distributive fairness. Pace Anderson, who appears to 
answer in the negative, I think the answer to this latter question is clearly ‘Yes’. 
As far as I can see, it makes perfect sense for luck egalitarians who adopt the 
institutional approach to claim that an individual is wronged by an institution if 
the latter is able but fails to compensate the former for an arbitrary disadvantage 
it does not itself cause. Aside from the numerous objections against luckism, any 
reservation about this claim should be dispelled when we remind ourselves that 
principles for institutions are very different from those apply to individuals. For 
instance, it is reasonable to expect institutions to bear not only ‘positive’ but also 
‘negative’ responsibility. As Nagel comments, 
we do not have to feel responsible for everything that happens which we could 
have prevented. … But I believe that such restrictions on what is usually called 
negative responsibility do not apply in the same way to our relations to one 
another through our common social institutions, especially an involuntary 
institution such as the state, together with its economic structure. We are 
responsible, through the institutions which require our support, for the things 
they could have prevented as well as for the things they actively cause.56 
Nagel’s remarks indicate that in one sense individuals are to some extent 
responsible for one another’s situations through their shared institutions—as 
Rawls once puts it, they ‘share one another’s fate’.57 This implies that when a badly 
off individual is wronged by an institution because it fails to take responsibility 
for her plight, she is also wronged by, say, her fellow citizens. I believe that there 
is every reason for luck egalitarians to hold the view that their favoured principles 
of justice should apply first and foremost to the major institutions of society, 
whether or not they also apply to other subjects. For one thing, this would nicely 
bring out a relational dimension of their view. 
 
56 Equality and Partiality, 84. Cf. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’. 
57 Theory, 102. This memorable phrase is removed from the revised edition. 
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Chapter 5. 
The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 
Relational egalitarians not only criticize luck egalitarianism as a paradigmatic 
distributive theory of equality, but also challenge the very idea of distributive 
equality. On their view, it is a big mistake to understand equality as a self-standing 
distributive ideal. Indeed, they often make one or more of the following claims: 
that distributive egalitarian principles must be grounded in a relational ideal of 
equality; that these principles cannot fully capture the concerns for egalitarian 
social relations; and that there is no need for them when equality as a relational 
ideal is appropriately realized. 
In this chapter I defend the distributive view against the challenges suggested 
by relational egalitarians. First, I argue that it is justified to be concerned with 
distributive equality alongside relational equality with respect to egalitarian justice. 
Second, I argue that distributive egalitarians can appropriately accommodate the 
relationalist’s concerns within a distributivist framework by distributing some 
‘relational goods’ equally. Third, I argue that it is implausible for the relational 
egalitarians to side with distributive sufficientarianism, for there is no reason why 
they should be entirely indifferent to the distributive fairness or unfairness in 
distribution. Fourth, I argue that it is no refutation of the distributive view that 
equality may also be understood as a deliberative practice. 
5.1. What is the Point of Relational Equality? 
According to Anderson, egalitarians should be primarily concerned with 
egalitarian social relations. She suggests that her relational conception of equality, 
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democratic equality, ‘views equality as a social relationship.’1 As she puts it, the 
point of egalitarian justice is, construed negatively, ‘to end oppression, which by 
definition is socially imposed’; and positively, ‘to create a community in which 
people stand in relations of equality to others.’2 What unites the negative and 
positive aims of Anderson’s relational conception of equality is the opposition to 
all forms of social hierarchies—the ‘relations between superior and inferior 
persons’—which constitute the essence of inegalitarianism: 
Those of superior rank were thought entitled to inflict violence on inferiors, to 
exclude or segregate them from social life, to treat them with contempt, to force 
them to obey, work without reciprocation, and abandon their own cultures. 
These are what Iris Young has identified as the faces of oppression: 
marginalization, status hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and cultural 
imperialism. Such unequal social relations generate, and were thought to justify, 
inequalities in the distribution of freedoms, resources, and welfare. This is the 
core of inegalitarian ideologies of racism, sexism, nationalism, caste, class, and 
eugenics.3 
For relational egalitarians such as Anderson, it is very disappointing that 
distributive egalitarians—and in particular those who are committed to the luck 
egalitarian view—show no concern for the task of combating social hierarchies. 
Their discontent was voiced in Iris Marion Young’s influential critique of ‘the 
distributive paradigm’, which allegedly ‘defines social justice as the morally proper 
distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members.’4 Although 
Young concedes that those who endorse the distributive paradigm may also be 
concerned with ‘nonmaterial social goods such as rights, opportunity, power, and 
self-respect’, she holds that ‘What marks the distributive paradigm is a tendency 
 
1 ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, 313. 
2 Ibid., 288–289. 
3 Ibid., 312; citing Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
4 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 16. 
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to conceive social justice and distribution as coextensive concepts.’5 The problem 
of the distributive paradigm, which Young thinks is deep and symptomatic, is that 
it tends to neglect and obscure the real issues that pertain to social and political 
structures and processes, upon which questions concerning distribution supervene. 
According to Young, the distributivist loses focus on the true enemies of social 
justice, namely institutionalized oppression and domination. 
As the above long quote from Anderson indicates, Young’s critique of the 
distributive paradigm is an important source for relational egalitarians when they 
put forward their challenges to the distributive conception of equality, and they 
characteristically argue that distributive egalitarians are misguided in their way of 
accounting for the ideal of equality. For one thing, they object that rather than 
exploring the ways in which people are to be related as equals, and paying heed to 
problems of oppression and domination in inegalitarian social relations, for a long 
while distributive egalitarians have been mostly concerned to search for the right 
metric of egalitarian justice—that is, they have spent too much energy on trying 
to find the right way to specify the goods that should be distributed equally. 
Now, it does seem fair to say, as Scheffler suggests, that many contemporary 
egalitarians, and especially luck egalitarians, ‘conceive of equality as an essentially 
distributive ideal. They begin from the premise that there is some currency that 
should be distributed equally and then proceed to investigate what that currency 
might be.’6 It should be noted, however, that it is one thing to say that there is 
something regrettably absent from the distributivist agenda, namely an articulated 
consideration of relational equality; and it is another thing to say that distributive 
egalitarians have no way to make up for this lack. I believe that the distributivist 
can appropriately address the relationalist’s concerns, even though it might to 
some extent depend on how the very idea of relational equality is understood.  
 
5 Ibid. 
6 ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, 200. 
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As it seems, relational egalitarians have two ways to make the point that 
relational equality matters. On the one hand, a relationalist may claim, plausibly 
in my view, that there is a dimension of social relations that egalitarians should be 
concerned with, no matter whether they also intend to argue for other distributive 
principles. It is of course true that a concern for relational equality has distributive 
implications according to this view, but that would not imply that no egalitarian 
should ever be concerned with distributions in their own right. On the other hand, 
however, some other relationalists may hold a stronger view which does have that 
implication. In contrast with the first view, which acknowledges that there is a 
number of diverse but interrelated elements of equality, this second view holds 
that equality is a relational ideal, and that any distributive principles must be 
grounded in that ideal. 
I do not see the appeal of this second view, which I believe is in fact held by 
prominent relationalists such as Anderson and Scheffler; for, as I shall explain 
below, it seems pretty obvious to me that equality is at least as much a distributive 
ideal as a relational one. That is to say, I see no reason why egalitarians have to 
subsume their concerns for distribution entirely under the relational ideal. That 
said, I also want to argue that it is no refutation of distributive egalitarianism even 
if this view represents the right way to articulate the value of equality. 
I shall illustrate this last point with a brief discussion of Scheffler’s view. In 
his earlier writings on egalitarianism, Scheffler often contrasts Rawls’s theory of 
justice with Dworkin’s theory of equality and luck egalitarianism.7 Although he 
does not explicitly endorse it, it appears that Scheffler’s sympathy lies with justice 
as fairness. Apart from arguing that Rawls is not a half-hearted luck egalitarian, 
Scheffler is concerned to show that justice as fairness, despite the fact that it 
includes several distributive principles, can be plausibly interpreted as a relational 
 
7 See Scheffler, ‘What is Egalitarianism?’; ‘Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality’. 
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conception of justice. Indeed, Scheffler suggests that any egalitarian distributive 
principles are plausible if and only if they can be grounded in a relational ideal of 
equality, and he alludes to justice as fairness ‘to illustrate how a plausible form of 
distributive egalitarianism can be anchored in a more general conception of 
equality as a social and political ideal.’8 As he goes on to elaborate: 
For Rawls, people are conceived of as free and equal citizens, and the aim is to 
determine which principles of distributive justice are most appropriate for a 
modern democratic society whose members are so understood. … Equality is 
understood as a social and political ideal that governs the relations in which 
people stand to one another. The core of the value of equality does not, 
according to this understanding, consist in the idea that there is something that 
must be distributed or allocated equally, and so the interpretation of the value 
does not consist primarily in seeking to ascertain what that something is. Instead, 
the core of the value is a normative conception of human relations, and the 
relevant question, when interpreting the value, is what social, political, and 
economic arrangements are compatible with that conception.9  
In short, as Scheffler interprets it, justice as fairness is motivated by a vision 
of an egalitarian society between free and equal persons. It seems fair to say that 
this is an interpretation that fits well with some consensus view among Rawls’s 
several capable readers. For instance, Nagel also writes that justice as fairness 
should be understood ‘as a moral theory of interpersonal relations—specifically, a 
theory of the acceptable forms of interdependence among the lives and fates of 
persons engaged in a cooperative social enterprise.’10 As Rawls himself emphasizes, 
his theory of justice is foremost concerned to illustrate how democratic citizens 
can be related as fair and equal in a just society: ‘The most fundamental idea in 
this conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation 
 
8 ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, 199. 
9 Ibid., 199–200; italics in original. 
10 This is quoted from Nagel’s afterword to his ‘Rawls on Justice’, 122; emphasis in original. See 
also Cohen, ‘Democratic Equality’. 
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over time from one generation to the next.’11 On the relationalist interpretation, 
the primary role of Rawls’s principles of justice is to arrange the basic structure in 
a way that helps to create and maintain a society of equals, who cooperate with 
one another on fair terms; and that is why these principles, which determine how 
benefits and burdens are to be distributed among them, are justified. 
But it seems that many other distributive theories of equality can also be 
construed as motivated by a relational ideal of equality between members of a 
society. In my view, the truth is that most if not all distributive egalitarians are 
entitled to claim their right to anchor their principles of distribution in an ideal 
of how people are to be related as equals. 
For example, in a response to Scheffler’s critique, Dworkin also indicates that 
he meant by his theory to address ‘the question of what relationships among 
equals are like and goes on from there to consider what kinds of social and political 
institutions are appropriate to a society of equals.’12 He intends to do so ‘through 
an interpretive method that emphasizes interrelations and interdependencies 
among all the political values, supposing them to come together in an overall 
account of a society of equals.’13  
Similarly, alongside his endorsement of the luck egalitarian principle with 
regard to distributive issues, Cohen also upholds a ‘principle of community’, one 
central requirement of which is that ‘people care about, and, where necessary and 
possible, care for, one another, and, too, care that they care about one another.’14 
Despite the fact that Cohen does not elaborate on how these principles fit together 
in his vision of an egalitarian community, there is no doubt that he does intend 
to reconcile them appropriately. To meet Scheffler’s challenge, and explain how 
 
11 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 5. 
12 See Dworkin, ‘Equality, Luck, and Hierarchy’, 196. This is Dworkin’s quote from Scheffler, 
‘What is Egalitarianism?’, 205. 
13 ‘Equality, Luck, and Hierarchy’, 196–197. 
14 Why Not Socialism?, 34–35. 
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principles of distribution can be anchored in a relational ideal of equality, I think 
it is natural for Cohen and other luck egalitarians to emphasize that the fairness 
or unfairness of distribution of goods has an impact on the social and political 
relationships in which people are situated.15 Thus understood, their view is also 
consistent with Scheffler’s relational thesis, namely that ‘the core of the value [of 
equality] is a normative conception of human relations’.16 
I therefore conclude that it is no objection to a distributive conception of 
equality by suggesting that it should be further anchored in a relational ideal of 
equality. Indeed, as I characterize the distributive view, it is primarily concerned 
with the concerns that count in favour of a presumption of equal distribution, 
and those which justify departures from equality, and I see no reason to think that 
these twin commitments of distributive egalitarianism must be incompatible with 
Scheffler’s relational thesis. Moreover, distributive egalitarians also need not hold 
that considerations with regard to interpersonal relationships have no bearing on 
the justification of egalitarian distributive principles, or that an equal distribution 
is a state of affairs that is in itself valuable, or that the primary task of a distributive 
conception of equality is to specify one thing that must be distributed equally. 
None of these commitments are definitive of the distributive view.  
But as I already said, I do find the suggestion that all of the distributivist’s 
concerns must be grounded in a relational ideal of equality implausible. For 
although it is apparently very desirable and liberating for people to live in a society 
of equals where there is no oppression and domination, it is far from clear that 
this is the only thing that egalitarians should aim for. What I want to do presently 
is to argue that it is not misguided for egalitarians to be concerned with questions 
with respect to the distribution of goods that contribute to individuals’ well-being 
 
15  See Markovits, ‘Luck Egalitarianism and political solidarity’. Cf. Schemmel, ‘Luck 
Egalitarianism as Democratic Reciprocity? A Response to Tan’. 
16 ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, 200. 
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in their own right; and then I shall go on to argue that it does not seem plausible 
to understand equality as a relational value that arouses our concerns over and 
above those which have a bearing on what are good for individuals 
Imagine a community occupying a large area, in which villagers have fairly 
low level of interaction. Suppose they live dispersedly, so that oppression and 
domination do not arise among the villagers, but the distribution of resources is 
rather unequal. Now, even assuming that this community fulfils the relational 
requirements of equality, the distributivist should claim that there still appears to 
be something troubling about the inequalities in the villagers’ distributive shares. 
For I think when we notice that some of the villagers are substantially worse off 
than others, a concern for distributive fairness naturally suggests itself, regardless 
of how the villagers are related to each other. This observation indicates that the 
task of articulating the idea of distributive equality should itself be of our concern, 
independent of the relational ideal of equality. That is to say, it appears that we 
have distributive concerns which do not seem to be ones entailed by the relational 
ideal of equality. Our distributive concerns need not always refer to the relational 
ideal of equality because we also care about other things, and it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for all of our distributive concerns to be grounded in the aims of 
eliminating domination and creating an egalitarian community. 
Let us also consider the contrary scenario, where there is a community in 
which all villagers are fairly well off, but where oppression and domination do 
occur. Suppose that despite the inegalitarian relations that exist, the villagers still 
find their lives much worth living, not least because their material conditions are 
quite satisfying. Now, it must be conceded that the imagined state of affairs is not 
entirely satisfactory in light of the inegalitarian relations between the villagers; but 
I think one may still sensibly maintain that the realization of the relational ideal 
of equality is less pressing so long as people are living pretty decent lives. 
The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 
 132 
Why is it so? One straightforward explanation is that we care about the 
quality of people’s lives, and their well-being is only partly constituted by the 
social relations they share with one another. As the thought goes, the question 
then arises whether a deficit with respect to people’s interpersonal relationships 
can sometimes be outweighed by other gains.  
Indeed, it may even be claimed that considerations about the non-relational 
dimensions of our well-being are far more important than those which are covered 
by the relational ideal of equality.17 Now, consider a case where you have to choose 
between the offers from two university departments. Suppose there is a first new 
and developing department, in which the environment is of an egalitarian and 
congenial character. However, the pay from this first department is much less than 
a second more prestigious department, in which there is an unwelcome hierarchy 
of status among faculty members. This means that you will be considered as a 
‘junior’ researcher and not be given much respect and concern if you choose to be 
there. I take it that it is not entirely unreasonable for you to accept the offer from 
the second department, as you may think that you want the money and the plus 
on your resume. 
I myself do not know how to compare the importance of the relational and 
non-relational dimensions of our well-being, but for our purposes the important 
point is this: insofar as the aim is for people to maintain a decent level of well-
being, our distributive concerns are not necessarily misguided, nor should they be 
wholly subsumed under the relational ideal of equality.  
There is however an even more serious question for relational egalitarians to 
consider, namely whether we have reasons to care about social relations only 
because they are partly constitutive of people’s well-being. This does seem to be a 
natural thought, but I suppose the relationalist might be inclined to articulate the 
 
17 See Sher, ‘How Bad is it to be Dominated?’. 
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significance of egalitarian relationships in a way that does not refer to the idea of 
well-being, for it might be said that the value of egalitarian social relations is to be 
found over and above our concerns for people’s well-being. I shall on the contrary 
argue that this way of articulating the value of relational equality is puzzling.  
Now, it is indeed often desirable for people to have egalitarian relationships 
with one another, since they are typically good for them. We may follow Patrick 
Tomlin and say that these relationships are of personal value.18 Relationships such 
as marriage and friendship based on equal standing are cases in point, and we can 
plausibly assume that it is good for us to enter such relationships when they are of 
an egalitarian character. Similarly, relational egalitarians may reasonably suggest 
that living in an egalitarian political community, where there is no oppression and 
domination, is good for its citizens. So far, so good. 
However, some might further claim that an egalitarian society, where citizens 
stand on an equal footing, is also impersonally valuable. To articulate this idea, the 
relationalist might suggest that apart from the personal value it has for its members, 
the very existence of such a society is valuable in itself. On the contrary, just as 
marriages and friendships which lack an egalitarian character should immediately 
elicit our disapproval, an inegalitarian society is similarly repellent regardless of its 
impact on individuals who are related within.  
Indeed, Gideon Elford argues that ‘relational equality has a value that goes 
beyond its contribution to persons’ own good.’19 On Elford’s view, ‘what makes 
relational equality distinctively, and in that sense non-distributively, valuable is 
precisely that equal social relations have an impersonal value, even if it typically 
arises alongside things that are good for persons.’20 That is to say, equality as a 
relational value is not solely concerned with goods that contribute to individuals’ 
 
18 ‘What is the Point of Egalitarian Social Relationships?’. 
19 ‘Relational Equality and Distribution’, 4. 
20 Ibid., 5. 
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well-being; it is moreover in itself impersonally valuable. Elford writes: ‘The point 
is that distributive equality is an equality of things which are good for persons, 
whereas (an important aspect of) relational equality is an equality within things 
which are valuable for other reasons.’ 21  It follows from this view that when 
individuals are situated within an inegalitarian relationship, aside from its impact 
on their well-being, there ‘is a further, impersonal badness that would obtain even 
if all other negative effects on their wellbeing could be compensated in a way that 
would satisfy distributive equality.’22 In other words, Elford argues that relational 
equality has an impersonal value which is distinct from other personal goods that 
can be accommodated within a distributivist framework. To illustrate his point, 
Elford suggests that it is bad that someone is regarded as having an inferior 
standing by others, even if he is not himself aware of that fact, which presumably 
thereby has no bearing on his well-being. Elford notes: ‘There would be a residual 
badness, from a distinctively egalitarian perspective’, that someone is not being 
respected as an equal, ‘even where a wider distributive equality was realised’.23 
Now, Elford rightly foresees that there is an immediate objection to this 
argument, according to which the badness of someone not having egalitarian 
relations with others, or alternatively put not being respected as an equal, ‘need 
not be explained in terms of the impersonal badness of this lack of respect.’24 
Instead, to explain the residual badness which arouses our concern, one might 
argue that ‘being respected as an equal is a personal good, but one which cannot 
be compensated for by other goods.’25 In reply, Elford writes: 
I wonder, though, whether this view can make good sense of the putative 
distinctively egalitarian character of this badness. If there are a number of goods 
 
21 Ibid. 
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other than ‘being respected as an equal’ which are similarly non-substitutable, 
then in the instances in which we cannot compensate for their loss, there are in 
principle any number of different dimensions in which people will be 
distributively better or worse off than one another in this very same way. So not 
being respected as an equal will not in this regard be of special egalitarian concern 
as a dimension of personal disadvantage.26 
As Elford lays down the challenge, his opponent purports to make sense of 
the good of being respected as an equal by suggesting that it is a non-substitutable 
personal good which has a distinctively egalitarian character. He then argues that 
his opponent cannot claim that this good is distinctively egalitarian qua a non-
substitutable personal good, for there may exist other personal goods which also 
share the property of being non-substitutable. 
On my view, Elford’s response is implausible. For one thing, it is hard to see 
why the fact that there may exist numerous other non-substitutable personal 
goods undermines his opponent’s thesis. Given the diversity of human goods, it 
is just how it is. We certainly do not from this fact infer that having intimate 
personal relationships or a successful career is to be less of our concern simply 
because there are other things which are good for us in their unique ways. 
But more importantly, Elford’s argument appears to rely on an unwarranted 
assumption. He may of course plausibly claim that if the good of being respected 
as an equal is to be explained as a non-substitutable personal good, it must be so 
in virtue of its distinctively egalitarian character, which helps egalitarians to specify 
the dimension in which it is non-substitutable. This, however, is a requirement 
that his opponent can comply with. She would claim that what is distinctively 
egalitarian about the putative non-substitutable personal good of someone being 
respected as an equal is exactly that he is himself respected as an equal. The crucial 
assumption of Elford’s rebuttal is not that the good of being respected as an equal 
 
26 Ibid., italics added. 
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must be non-substitutable in view of its distinctively egalitarian character, but that 
it must be non-substitutable in a way that arouses special egalitarian concern.  
But that assumption is a non-starter. It is simply mistaken to presuppose that 
egalitarians qua egalitarians must find anything ‘of special egalitarian concern’. It 
is true that egalitarians believe that it is good that people are respected as equals, 
but there is no reason to think that they believe so just because they are egalitarians. 
For what it is worth, they should be concerned with all values there are, just like 
everybody else should. 
I therefore conclude that Elford’s proposal is implausible. At any rate, I think 
the claim that an egalitarian society is impersonally valuable appears susceptible 
to some fatal challenges. For one thing, Tomlin notes that the impersonal value 
of egalitarian society appears ‘mysterious’—it is hard to pin down what this 
impersonal value amounts to.27 It does appear that we have an intuition that it is 
desirable to have an egalitarian society established among its citizens, but I doubt 
whether one can say anything more informative than that. 
For another, the claim that egalitarian social relations have an impersonal 
value does not really help us to answer our earlier question: if there are situations 
where other valuable things can only be procured by sacrificing the benefit we 
gain from having egalitarian relationships, why can it not be the case that we have 
to make a trade-off between them? It may first appear that a natural way to justify 
relational egalitarianism is to show how valuable egalitarian relationships are, but 
that seems to be a moot point in light of the present discussion. 
So instead of focusing on the impact of these relationships on people’s well-
being, I think it is much more plausible to understand the relationalist’s project 
as primarily involving an attempt to identify the grounds of egalitarian justice, 
which is of a deontological character. Thus understood, the relational conception 
 
27 ‘What is the Point of Egalitarian Social Relationships?’, 166, 173–174. Tomlin credits Christian 
Schemmel for voicing this worry. 
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of equality is concerned with how people ought to be related as a matter of justice, 
and the relationalist need not refer to the goodness of egalitarian social relations 
in her justification of the relational view, let alone try to maximize its value. For 
instance, valuable or not for other purposes, a relational conception of equality 
must under no condition indicate that slavery is tolerable, for it is one of the most 
unjust forms of social hierarchy. In my view, rather than articulating the relational 
ideal of equality in a way that is open to the possibility of trade-offs of values, 
which are in this case difficult to articulate anyway, it is far more appropriate to 
put it as a view about justice.28 In a word, egalitarians should emphasize not that 
it is valuable, but that it is just for people to have egalitarian social relations.  
I argued above not only that it is no refutation of distributive egalitarianism 
if one argues that it must be grounded in the relational ideal of equality, but also 
that it is in any case unclear why distributive equality should be subsumed under 
the relational ideal; and I have now argued that, like the distributivist, relational 
egalitarians should also appeal to justice in order to motivate their view. If these 
claims are sound, what is effectively established is that both distributive and 
relational egalitarians should be concerned to specify the norms and principles of 
egalitarian justice. Note that I do not want to suggest that egalitarians cannot have 
concerns that go beyond the purview of justice. Indeed, I acknowledge that some 
relationalists might think that considerations of justice do not capture everything 
that is relevant to the relational egalitarian ideal.29 That being said, my comments 
on Elford’s argument should already make it clear that I am not enthusiastic about 
the prospects for such a view; and since I believe that justice should be the central 
concern of egalitarians, I shall leave aside dimensions of equality that supposedly 
have nothing to do with egalitarian justice. 
 
28 See Schemmel, ‘Social Equality—Or Just Justice?’. 
29 See Fourie, ‘What is Social Equality?’. 
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5.2. Distributing Relational Goods 
I shall now start to engage with a general objection to the distributive view 
put forward by Anderson. Recall that, according to Anderson’s relational view, 
the distributivist characteristically fails to engage with problems of oppression and 
domination that should trouble egalitarians. Holding that equality is to be 
understood as a social relation, as opposed to hierarchies which supervene upon 
differences of race, sex, and class, and which give rise to deep and pervasive issues 
that need to be addressed, Anderson complains that the task of combating forms 
of social and political hierarchy is conspicuously absent on the distributivist 
agenda. The distributive view is said to be very unsatisfactory in light of the fact 
that it simply has nothing relevant to say about these inegalitarian social relations. 
Anderson suggests, by contrast, that the relational conception of equality ‘aims to 
recover the rich insights of the history of egalitarian thought and contemporary 
egalitarian social movements.’30  
Now, Anderson further suggests that the realization of the relational ideal of 
equality has nothing to do with the idea of an equal distribution of a good: 
Feminists seek reproductive autonomy for women. There is no good that is being 
distributed equally when this egalitarian demand is met. In other cases, the equal 
distribution of a good does not satisfy the demand for equality. ‘Separate but 
equal’ bathroom facilities for members of different racial groups would still be 
unequal even if the quality of facilities were equal, because their function is to 
constitute despised racial groups as untouchables—as an inferior caste.31 
According to Anderson, the correct analysis of, say, why women do not enjoy 
reproductive autonomy is not that there is no proper distribution of a good called 
reproductive autonomy, but that there they are dominated in relationships that 
 
30 ‘Equality’, 40. 
31 Ibid., 41. 
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involve a variety of practices entrenched by the hierarchical structures of society, 
which fact results in their loss of reproductive autonomy. As the objection goes, 
since it is not at all obvious why distributing some stuff equally contributes to the 
creation and maintenance of a society of equals, the distributive conception of 
equality is to be discredited accordingly.  
Anderson rightly foresees a response that might be put forward by distributive 
egalitarians, namely that they can redescribe the aims and goals that she approves 
in distributive terms. That is to say, they might suggest that the distributive view 
can accommodate her concerns all right by reformulating the relational ideal of 
equality in terms of the equal distribution of ‘relational goods’. For example, when 
Zofia Stemplowska compares some variants of relational egalitarianism and luck 
egalitarianism (she calls them ‘social egalitarianism’ and ‘responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism’ respectively), she makes this comment: ‘Crudely speaking, social 
egalitarianism concerns itself exclusively with the distribution of relational goods 
and, specifically, the relational good of social status, while responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism insists that the distribution of (access to) non-relational goods is 
important in its own right.’32 Since the language of relational goods makes sense, 
the key to the distributivist proposal is then the articulation of an idea of ‘equal 
distribution’ of reproductive autonomy, or that of social status, and so forth, to 
the effect that distributive egalitarians may plausibly object to discriminatory 
treatment in a hierarchical social relationship on the ground that it fails to 
distribute one or more relational goods equally. 
We may follow Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in saying that such an attempt to 
redescribe the concerns of relational equality in terms of egalitarian distributive 
principles constitutes a ‘reductionist’ proposal, according to which ‘whenever 
people do not relate as equals, there is some good that is unequally distributed, 
 
32 ‘Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions’, 116. 
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and whatever is unjust about the former can be expressed in terms of a claim about 
what is unjust about the latter.’33 It seems clear that distributive egalitarians would 
find it natural to accommodate the relational concerns of equality within the 
reductionist framework, for it helps them to engage with the problems that 
concern relational egalitarians without giving up their focus on the distributive 
principles. The suggestion then is that distributive egalitarians should care about 
both of the relational and non-relational goods, and there is no reason for them 
to forsake each of these concerns. 
Take the good of basic social status for example, the distributivist may want 
to say that ‘equality of status’ should be understood as constituted by a complex 
distribution of various dimensions.34 Such an ‘equal distribution’ of the good of 
status may consist of, say, a scheme of basic rights and liberties, along with an 
arrangement of various institutions that fairly distribute powers, responsibilities 
and opportunities, as well as other goods which help to secure people’s social 
standing.35  As shown in this brief exposition, in order to make sense of the 
reductionist proposal, it is crucial to acknowledge its complex character: a 
definitive feature of this proposal is that it characterizes an equal distribution of a 
relational good as involving distributions of a multiplicity of other goods. 
Distributive egalitarians who adopt the reductionist schema would of course 
acknowledge that for an equal distribution of a relational good to obtain, it is 
often very difficult to identify the appropriate distributive configurations, and 
they might also admit that the answer varies from society to society. But our 
central concern is whether Anderson can plausibly reject the reductionist proposal. 
 
33 Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals, 192. 
34 Cf. Miller, ‘Equality and Justice’. 
35 Indeed, one may find it helpful to conceive of the conditions for equality of status in terms of 
Rawls’s list of primary goods, among which self-respect, a primary good that can only be secured 
with appropriate social bases, is said to be ‘perhaps the most important primary good’ (A Theory 
of Justice, 440/386 rev.). For Rawls’s treatment of the problem of status, see ibid., 544–546/477–
479 rev. See also Cordelli, ‘Justice as Fairness and Relational Resources’. 
The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 
 141 
Anderson appears to acknowledge that proposal when she imagines someone 
saying that ‘To be sure, we can describe relational egalitarian goals in terms that 
suggest such a picture: We can say that egalitarians seek a society in which people 
enjoy equal authority, status, or standing.’36 But she protests that the reductionist 
does not really address the concerns that motivate the relational view in an 
appropriate way. According to Anderson, the reductionist schema is redundant, 
because it only makes sense to talk about equality of standing, esteem, or authority 
when social relations themselves are put into perspective:  
It would be artificial and unilluminating to translate such issues into a 
distributive framework because, as noted above, the goods being ‘distributed’ in 
such cases are social relations of equal authority, esteem, and standing. They are 
not such that the ‘amount’ that one person ‘has’ is logically independent of what 
others ‘have’ or of the social relations in which each stands to the others. To put 
it another way, the goods of equal social relations are not ‘distributed’ separately 
to individuals because they are essentially shared by those who stand in such 
relations.37 
The key premise of Anderson’s rejection of the reductionist view then appears 
to be the claim that it is more straightforward and informative to foreground the 
social relations themselves, rather than talking about the distribution of relational 
goods. Since when people are socially related what one has is not logically 
independent of what others have, on Anderson’s view the real pressing question 
just is whether the relations people ‘share’ are praiseworthy or objectionable. This 
thought leads her to argue that it is ‘artificial and unilluminating’ to talk about 
‘distributions’ of relational goods, for these goods ‘essentially refer to types of 
interpersonal relations. To enjoy these goods is precisely to stand in certain social 
relations to others.’38 In other words, Anderson suggests that the reductionist 
 
36 ‘Equality’, 41. 
37 Ibid., 53; emphases in original. 
38 Ibid., 41. 
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schema does not make sense if we do not have the relevant social relations in view, 
and we had better simply enquire into them directly. 
Moreover, as Anderson understands the distributive conception of equality, 
it ultimately fails to capture the relational nature of these goods: ‘Equality in the 
distributive conception consists in the mere coincidence of what one person has 
with what others in the comparison class independently have’. 39  Anderson’s 
characterization of the distributive view purports to strengthen the claim that 
something important is missing in the distributivist agenda, namely an attention 
to social relations, which according to Anderson is the real subject matter of 
egalitarian justice.  
I shall argue, however, that the way Anderson contrasts the relational and 
distributive conceptions of equality is, despite its seeming appeal, ultimately 
misleading. For distributive egalitarians need neither deny that relational goods 
are inherently relational, nor suggest that what a person has is ‘typically logically 
independent of’ what others have; and it is certainly not regarded as a ‘mere 
coincidence’ when the distributivist claims that there are decisive reasons to 
distribute something equally. So the nub of the following discussion is that, pace 
Anderson, it is neither artificial nor unilluminating to look into social relations in 
distributive terms. 
As an example, let us reconsider the case of reproductive autonomy. Recall 
that, on Anderson’s view, in a state of affairs in which the conditions for women’s 
reproductive autonomy are secured, ‘There is no good that is being distributed 
equally when this egalitarian demand is met.’40 In order to respond to Anderson, 
what distributive egalitarians need to show is then that they can informatively talk 
about an equal distribution of reproductive autonomy. This would consist in 
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reproductive autonomy, to the effect that there is a good that is being distributed 
equally. In particular, they need to show that the reductionist schema can be 
substantiated in a way that duly registers the relational nature of women’s exercise 
of their reproductive autonomy—they are tasked to show that the reductionist 
framework is able to accommodate the concerns about, say, hierarchical social 
relations that contribute to women’s lack of reproductive autonomy, and that it 
is no ‘mere coincidence’ that whether this good is distributed equally between 
people has a bearing on their social relations. 
In my view, distributive egalitarians can fulfil these tasks. As hinted above, 
they would aim to empower women for their exercise of reductive autonomy in 
the following way. To begin with, they must be guaranteed a set of basic rights 
and liberties, including the basic right to bodily integrity and its accompanying 
liberties such as associational freedom. These rights and liberties plainly have a 
‘negative’ character, for they indicate the impermissibility of the infringement of 
reproductive autonomy. Moreover, since the vices that compromise women’s 
exercise of reproductive autonomy can take many subtle forms, there must also 
exist institutions that secure several ‘positive’ entitlements, including, say, an 
educational programme that informs people about the nature and consequences 
of sexual conduct, a medical care system which helps women to postpone or 
terminate pregnancy, and law enforcement to combat domestic violence when it 
occurs. Furthermore, women must also have access to obtain their economic 
independence, for otherwise they might have to enter marital relationship only in 
order to be provided for, and that seriously reduce their chance of maintaining 
substantive control of their body. These appear to be the goods, to name a few, 
that would have to be appropriately distributed so as to undergird women’s right 
to reproductive autonomy.  
The distributivist should further claim that these goods are to be properly 
distributed so that everyone’s reproductive autonomy is guaranteed both formally 
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and substantively. To put their aim In Rawls’s terms, it is necessary not only to 
institute a scheme of equal basic rights and liberties that include the right to 
reproductive autonomy, but also the conditions that guarantee the worth of these 
freedoms.41 Alternatively put, distributive egalitarians should claim that everyone 
is equally entitled to the right of reproductive autonomy, and that an adequate if 
not equal worth of this liberty must also be secured for all. To fulfil these aims, 
there needs to be in place a system of equal basic rights and liberties, as well as 
other institutions that work to guarantee that they can be effectively exercised. 
As it seems to me, it is not at all misleading to conceive of the protection of 
reproductive autonomy in distributive terms. For one thing, it makes perfect sense 
to talk about distributions of rights and liberties. Moreover, to say that in an 
adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties the right to reproductive autonomy 
is equally distributed is to say, negatively, that no one has the right to enforce 
another to reproduce, and positively that right-holders are free to reproduce in 
any way they prefer so long as they respect the rights and liberties of others. These 
observations, in my view, suggest an effective response to Anderson’s charge that 
distributive egalitarians cannot do justice to the relational nature of reproductive 
autonomy. For by the well-received correlativity thesis of rights and duties,42 
when one has a right to reproductive autonomy, others have the corresponding 
duties to refrain from infringing that right. Since there is no reason for distributive 
egalitarians to neglect the relation between rights and duties, they can say that the 
relational nature of the right of reproductive autonomy is duly acknowledged in 
their distributive framework. 
Finally, there is an advantage in considering the relational goods in the way I 
recommend. It is that the proposal of a distributive scheme of equal basic rights 
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and liberties, together with institutions that guarantee their fulfilment, helps 
egalitarians to articulate the way in which a variety of their commitments are 
integrated in a unifying system. It is a virtue of distributive principles that, in spite 
of their seeming simplicity, they can be applied to a diversity of cases. For instance, 
a principle of equal basic liberties may serve to secure not only an equal protection 
of reproductive autonomy, but also that of freedom of thought, of expression, of 
association, of privacy, and so on. This is of course not to suggest that there are 
no significant differences between the interests these rights and liberties are to 
protect. It is absolutely true that we should not over-simplify things by applying 
an egalitarian distributive principle indiscriminately. That said, it is congenial to 
an egalitarian view if basic rights and liberties are incorporated in a unified scheme, 
so that principles can be devised in a way that apply to them generally. 
In short, I have argued that it makes sense for the distributivist to analyse the 
conditions under which relational goods can be secured in terms of a variety of 
institutional arrangements. Indeed, as shown in the above discussion of the case 
of reproductive autonomy, this proposal stands in the face of Anderson’s objection, 
for it is not true that the intent to distribute liberties and their worth equally 
imparts no information about how the right to reproductive autonomy is to be 
secured in a liberal democratic society. In my view, it is not at all artificial to talk 
about an equal distribution of rights and liberties with respect to reproductive 
autonomy, and it is not unilluminating to say that this good should be distributed 
equally. For what it is worth, it means that everyone has this right. In light of the 
doctrine of correlativity between rights and duties, there is also nothing 
coincidental about a person’s right to reproduce autonomously and other people’s 
duties to refrain from infringing that right. Notwithstanding Anderson’s charge, 
the distributivist need not think that what one person has is typically independent 
of what others have. 
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As I would like to emphasize again, the crux of the preceding discussion is to 
show that egalitarian distributive principles are not artificial or unilluminating in 
tackling, say, the case of reproductive autonomy, and I believe that what I said 
about this case should also apply to other important issues that concern relational 
egalitarians. For in a distributivist framework, these principles have the function 
of determining how goods are to be distributed in a way that, among other things, 
helps to promote and honour egalitarian relationships of the sorts enjoined by the 
relational ideal of equality.  
I should also note that these distributive principles are unified within a 
distributivist framework that not only accommodates our concerns for egalitarian 
social relations, but also for those goods which are not strictly speaking of a 
relational nature, but the distribution of which nevertheless needs to be sensitive 
to what one has compared to what others have. For an illustration, we may think 
of the good of education, which is a characteristic ‘positional good’. As Harry 
Brighouse and Adam Swift explain:  
[Positional goods] are goods with the property that one’s relative place in the 
distribution of the good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value. 
The very fact that one is worse off than others with respect to a positional good 
means that one is worse off, in some respect, than one would be if that good 
were distributed equally.43 
To make the point in Anderson’s terms, since the value of the education a 
person has significantly depends on what others comparatively have, there is a 
‘social relation’ between them in view of that fact. This simple observation implies 
that the competitive advantage of one’s education, say, in the job market, is not 
logically independent of how other job seekers are educated. In a word, the idea 
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The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 
 147 
of positional goods also specifies an important sense in which people’s social 
relations are affected by the comparative amounts of goods they have.  
Now, the distributivist may plausibly argue that the idea of positional goods 
helps her to express her egalitarian commitments. For according to the principle 
of distributive fairness, it is unfair and therefore pro tanto unjust if, for example, 
the primary education a child receives is less good than what other children receive 
for no good reason, and it is so precisely because they are related as recipients in 
an educational system. So if some children are worse off than others in respect of 
their education simply because they enter schools that lack resources to equip 
them with abilities to compete with others on an equal footing, this state of affairs 
should be deemed as unfair and in that respect unjust. In the name of distributive 
fairness, the distributivist says that other things equal it is preferable to distribute 
equally good education for all children, and she might also say that this is why it 
appears to exist no other proposal that better expresses equal concern for them 
than a presumption of equal distribution of the good of education.  
What the distributivist is keen to point out is that we are perfectly familiar 
with these concerns for distributive fairness, or ‘comparative justice’ if one prefers 
the term.44 I would say that most of us have such intuitions when we are making 
judgements about distributions, and in fact I see no reason why distributive and 
relational egalitarians should disagree on this point. Indeed, what the distributivist 
holds on to appear to be what Scanlon, who considers himself a relationalist, calls 
‘egalitarian reasons’, which ‘are reasons for objecting to the difference between 
what some have and what others have, and for reducing this difference.’45 At any 
rate, the distributivist suggests that in the distribution of positional goods like 
education, political power, and health, it is typically the case that what one has is 
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45 Why Does Inequality Matter, 1. 
The Relationalist Critique of Distributive Equality 
 148 
not independent of what others have, and that it is not a coincidence that 
egalitarians have reasons to be concerned about unequal distribution of holdings. 
I have argued that distributive principles can be themselves informative and 
appropriately sensitive to our concerns for social relations. Now, to sustain her 
charge that the reductionist schema is redundant, Anderson might insist that it is 
unhelpful for egalitarians to cope with, for example, problems of sexual and racial 
oppression and domination in such an indirect manner. She may well concede 
that it is possible to identify the distributive mechanisms for achieving the aims 
and goals which she approves, but she might still maintain that they are not given 
their due emphasis in the reductionist proposal, or that they cannot be recovered 
from the distributivist’s reductionist apparatus. To repeat, the heart of Anderson’s 
complaint against the distributive principles is that they are too abstract and 
indirect. She objects that these features confer on them the tendency to go off the 
mark, and what we should be concerned with are concrete problems of oppression 
and domination embedded within diverse forms of hierarchical social relations.  
But one should really wonder whether relational egalitarians can plausibly 
complain that something is still missing in the distributive conception of equality, 
and whether they have a more straightforward and informative proposal to deal 
with problems they identify as urgent. For one thing, it is question-begging if one 
assumes that only the relationalist, but not the distributivist, is able to detect the 
problems of inegalitarian social relations. So we should instead assume that the 
relevant information is available to both the distributivist and the relationalist 
when we try to decide whether any of their views has an edge over another in 
dealing with these problems. Indeed, the distributive egalitarians should point out 
that the relationalist also need to face the difficulty of identifying the methods to 
address the problems that concern them, and they should argue that there is no 
reason to assume that their reductionist proposal is by default more suspicious 
than other solutions.  
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That is, we are led to ask, ‘How are relational egalitarians supposed to remedy 
the alleged deficiency of the distributive view? If they are so dissatisfied with the 
distributivist reductionist apparatus, what is their alternative?’ It might seem that 
the most effective, if not the only way of easing the relationalist’s discontent is to 
inscribe the concerns for egalitarian social relations directly and concretely on the 
principles of justice. For instance, one of these principles should perhaps read as 
‘we should combat and eliminate sexual domination and oppression’, and not just 
demand, in an allegedly abstract manner, that ‘every citizen should equally enjoy 
bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy’. The relationalist may claim that the 
injunction against, say, racial discrimination within inegalitarian social relations 
should also be similarly specified in a principle of justice, for otherwise there is no 
warrant that racial justice can be secured properly.46 
I see no force in the relationalist’s rebuttal if her alternative is presented in 
this way, for it does not point to a more straightforward and informative solution 
to the issues for which she claims to be of our concern. Distributive egalitarians 
may of course concede that they do not always clearly articulate the contexts in 
which problems of inequality arise; and they may also concede that if we reflect 
on, say, the basic liberties, they should be listed separately rather than subsumed 
under one broad category, so that each of the important interests that people 
should enjoy can be more clearly illustrated. But these observations do not show 
that distributive egalitarianism cannot be articulated appropriately to pinpoint the 
extent to which a citizen is entitled to be treated as an equal. They merely suggest 
that it is often the case that egalitarians should make it clear as to which goods are 
to be distributed equally, and on what grounds it is just to do so.  
One might think that the real objection against the distributive view is that 
it is not sensitive enough to the question regarding which types of goods call for 
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equal distributions in order to create and maintain egalitarian social relations. As 
Anderson expresses the worry, distributive egalitarians appear to be obsessed with 
the equal distribution of proxies of goods—‘resources, welfare, capabilities, and so 
on’—that have no bearing on how people are related.47 Thus understood, what is 
involved in this charge against the distributive conception of equality is not that 
egalitarian distributive principles have no proper application with respect to issues 
that concern the relationalist. It is that distributive egalitarians are misled by an 
assumption they make, namely that distributive justice consists in ‘one single good 
that, were it to be distributed equally, would comprehend the distributive goals 
of egalitarianism.’48 
I agree that it is not always helpful to talk about the distribution of resources, 
welfare, capabilities, or even primary goods. As Anderson rightly notes, one 
should worry that these metrics of distribution may sometimes be unhelpful for 
us to identify the problems that need to be addressed, or that the discussion may 
be conducted on a level that is too abstract and indirect, and off the track 
accordingly. This is exactly why, as shown in the above discussion of the case of 
reproductive autonomy, I recommend that distributive egalitarians engage with 
Anderson’s objection not by focusing on the distribution of resources or welfare, 
but primarily on the good of reproductive autonomy itself, and see whether they 
can come up with a schema that makes sense of an equal distribution of this good. 
What I want to emphasize again, however, is that the quest for a single metric is 
in my view not definitive of the distributive view—what distributivists must hold 
is that, for whatever goods that concern them, there is a presumption to distribute 
them equally, and justifications for their unequal distributions must be given.  
To conclude, our discussion in this section shows that although egalitarian 
distributive principles may sometimes seem abstract and indirect regarding the 
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goods they apply to, as well as suffer from misinterpretation or misapplication, 
nothing decisive hinges on these charges. It also shows that the distributivist need 
not be seen as neglectful of the underlying concerns that may be relational in 
nature when she inquire into egalitarian principles of distribution. 
5.3. Relational Equality and Distribution 
Earlier in Section 4.1. I mentioned a distinction Anderson makes between 
pity and compassion. She characterizes pity as a condescending attitude, and 
indicates that according to her relational view one should instead feel compassion 
for those who are in need. Anderson maintains that the distributive concerns 
motivated by compassion towards the needy do not lend support to distributive 
egalitarianism: ‘Compassion does not yield egalitarian principles of distribution: 
it aims to relieve suffering, not to equalize it. Once people have been relieved of 
suffering and neediness, compassion generates no further impetus toward equality 
of condition.’49 In fact, Anderson’s rejection of distributive egalitarianism appears 
to go hand in hand with her endorsement of distributive sufficientarianism, as 
shown in the following comment: ‘Democratic equality is egalitarian in its 
conception of just relationships among citizens, but sufficientarian in its 
conception of justice in the distribution of resources and opportunities.’50  
For our purposes, it may be helpful to start with a distinction between two 
basic variants of distributive sufficientarianism. On the one hand, according to a 
modest account of the sufficiency view, as a necessary requirement, justice partly 
consists in satisfying people’s essential needs.51 On the other hand, a strongest 
construal of the sufficiency view would suggest that this is the only requirement 
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of justice. 52  Both the modest and the uncompromising formulations of the 
doctrine of distributive sufficiency emphasize the primacy of catering to people’s 
basic needs, but they differ about whether there are other demands of justice that 
go beyond this requirement. 
When someone reflects on the sufficiency view, a question about threshold 
naturally suggests itself. Essentially, it concerns what counts as an adequate level 
of satisfaction of a person’s essential needs. Now, one might think that it is almost 
impossible to pinpoint such an exact threshold,53 but I do not find it to be a 
pressing problem, for I think we do have a rough and ready idea of what these 
needs consist of, and so we may simply assume that there is a list of essential goods, 
such as nutrition, education, and opportunities which are indispensable for a 
decent life.  
Anderson’s incorporation of the sufficiency view in democratic equality is 
understandable. As Gillian Brock explains, ‘Relational egalitarianism … provides 
at least one coherent way to embed our concern with sufficiency within an 
egalitarian framework.’54 According to Anderson-style sufficientarianism, justice 
in the domestic domain first and foremost requires the provision of these goods 
for all citizens in a democratic society. So, with regard to ‘the distribution of 
divisible resources’, democratic equality ‘requires that everyone have effective 
access to enough resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as 
an equal in civil society. What counts as “enough” varies with cultural norms, the 
natural environment, and individual circumstance.’ 55  Moreover, as Anderson 
grounds distributive sufficientarianism in her relational conception of equality, 
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‘democratic equality guarantees effective access to a package of capabilities 
sufficient for standing as an equal over the course of an entire life.’56  
The last remark I just quoted from Anderson also illustrates her sympathy 
with the capabilities approach, which has been influentially advanced by Amartya 
Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others.57 By her endorsement of the capabilities 
approach, Anderson means to suggest that the ‘freedom’ or ‘freedoms’ citizens 
enjoy should be understood as a set of capabilities, the ‘functionings’ of which 
enable them to lead their lives satisfactorily.  
It seems natural for Anderson to couple her distributive sufficientarianism 
with the capabilities approach. To begin with, it helps Anderson to explain how 
her view about distribution is grounded in her relational conception of equality. 
Anderson holds that distributions matter to relational egalitarians when and only 
when they provide people with effective access to an adequate level of functionings. 
Moreover, the question about the sufficiency threshold, which I mentioned in 
passing above, can also be regarded as settled by an articulation of an adequate set 
of capabilities which are necessary for people to function as democratic citizens. 
Another merit of the capabilities approach is that it pays proper attention to 
citizens’ access to the satisfaction of their needs. Compared to an approach that 
short-sightedly focuses on the distribution of material resources, Anderson rightly 
emphasizes that ‘One’s capabilities are a function not just of one’s fixed personal 
traits and divisible resources, but of one’s mutable traits, social relations and 
norms, and the structure of opportunities, public goods, and public spaces.’58 
Thus understood, deficiencies in capabilities often point to the problems that the 
relational conception of equality is most concerned to address. It therefore appears 
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that Anderson’s account is able to explain how questions about distribution are to 
be answered by reference to the relational ideal of equality, and it is also suitably 
sensitive to people’s essential needs, which are to be appropriately satisfied by the 
guarantee of an adequate set of relevant capabilities.  
But I am not convinced that what Anderson says is enough to undercut 
distributive egalitarianism. For one thing, as I already explained in the last section, 
distributive egalitarians may plausibly accommodate her relational concerns in a 
distributivist framework. For another, distributive egalitarians need not deny that 
the idea of capabilities is in certain respects illuminating; but they should also 
maintain that nothing forbids them from giving that idea due weight in a 
distributivist framework.59 
In my view, the real question is whether Anderson rejects distributive equality 
and subscribes to the sufficiency view on solid grounds. For it appears sensible to 
hold that we have distributive concerns over and above sufficiency, and that they 
may be characterized by the demands of distributive equality. That is to say, it 
seems that one may plausibly think that egalitarian distributive principles should 
still apply in cases where what people have is already enough.60 This challenge, 
presented most sharply, is not premised on the very debatable claim that when 
principles of sufficiency and equality conflict with each other the latter must 
prevail. Instead, it is motivated by the thought that even when what people have 
is enough for them to lead a decent life, social and economic inequalities that exist 
between them do not entirely cease to be vexing. For I think an egalitarian may 
reasonably insist that to permit them to exist for no good reason is just unfair. Of 
course, what I just said should not worry one who holds the uncompromising 
version of the sufficiency view. But I for one believe that view is simply untenable, 
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for it is hard to see why absolutely no weight should be given to the concern for 
distributive fairness or comparative justice.  
A much more reasonable account is proposed by Nussbaum, who is clearly 
open to the suggestion that there may be further demands of justice that go 
beyond the satisfaction of sufficiency for capabilities. As she puts it, the version of 
the capabilities approach she defends ‘is a partial theory of social justice’: 
[I]t does not purport to solve all distributional problems; it just specifies a rather 
ample social minimum. Delivering … capabilities to all citizens is a necessary 
condition of social justice. Justice may well require more: for example, the 
approach as developed thus far does not make any commitment about how 
inequalities above the minimum ought to be handled. Many approaches to social 
justice hold that an ample threshold is not sufficient. John Rawls insists that 
inequalities can be justified only where they raise the level of the worst-off. The 
Capabilities Approach does not claim to have answered these questions, although 
it might tackle them in the future.61 
As acknowledged by Nussbaum, it should be an open question among 
moderate distributive sufficientarians with respect to what distributive principles 
are to apply when the requirement of sufficiency, which presupposes the idea of a 
threshold, is appropriately met. Roger Crisp, for example, indicates that ‘the 
threshold is tied to the notion of a lack. Where the individual in question has 
enough, special concern seems to give out’.62 According to Crisp, besides the 
requirement of sufficiency, an ‘act-utilitarian account of distribution’ should be 
the default view, ‘so above the threshold goods and bads should be distributed so 
as to maximize well-being impartially.’63  
Now, in order to pin down Anderson’s position on this matter, let us have a 
look at a passage where she compares her relational account with the difference 
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principle with regard to their dealings with economic inequality. Uncharitably in 
my view, Anderson describes Rawls’s principle as being ‘wage-squeezing’, because 
its implementation ‘would forbid all income inequalities that do not improve the 
incomes of the worst off.’64 By contrast, Anderson recommends her own view as 
being both consistent and flexible: 
Once all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an 
equal in society, income inequalities beyond that point do not seem so troubling 
in themselves. The degree of acceptable income inequality would depend in part 
on how easy it was to convert income into status inequality—differences in the 
social bases of self-respect, influence over elections, and the like. The stronger 
the barriers against commodifying social status, political influence, and the like, 
the more acceptable are significant income inequalities. The moral status of free 
market allocations is strengthened the more carefully defined is the domain in 
which these allocations have free rein.65  
With respect to this passage, I want to note two things. First, aside from 
maintaining that the questions concerning distributive matters depend on how 
economic inequalities bear on relational equality, Anderson appears to think that 
the allocations of goods should by default be decided by free markets, so long as 
they are consistent with the maintenance of egalitarian relationships. Provided the 
demands imposed by relational equality are satisfied, she is happy to claim that 
the market, which presumably is the most efficient mechanism for interpersonal 
exchanges, has a ‘moral status’.66 Moreover, Anderson’s remark appears to imply 
that, apart from the distributive implications that can be drawn from the relational 
ideal of equality, other egalitarian distributive principles are excluded from having 
any application. 
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A second point, even more important for our purposes, is that Anderson’s 
comment—that income inequalities ‘do not seem so troubling in themselves’ 
when all citizens enjoy a sufficient level of capabilities—does not really explain 
why relational egalitarians should reject distributive egalitarianism. It may well be 
true that inequalities appear much less troubling when principles of sufficiency, 
grounded in the relational ideal of equality, is satisfied. But this is not a sufficient 
reason to reject distributive egalitarianism; for as far as there is anything troubling 
about social and economic inequalities, it is appropriate for one to ponder over 
whether one or another distributive principle should also apply. It is unclear why 
distributive egalitarians are at a disadvantage if they argue that their favoured 
distributive principles are suitable for dealing with inequalities beyond sufficiency 
of capabilities. Our question is whether Anderson indicates any good reason for 
thinking that, as a matter of justice, it does not make sense to be concerned with 
distributive equality when sufficiency of capabilities is secured for all democratic 
citizens on the ground of relational equality. That is, we want from Anderson an 
explanation of why there is no such thing as egalitarian justice beyond sufficiency. 
I think Anderson does have an argument in mind, which can be recovered by 
reflecting upon her following claim: ‘In general, a distribution is objectionable 
from an egalitarian point of view if it causes, embodies, or is a specific consequence 
of unjust social hierarchy.’67 Now, in light of the fact that relational equality has 
different distributive implications in different contexts, depending on the forms 
of hierarchy to be challenged, it follows that no single distributive principle can 
accommodate its various distributive demands: 
Where distributions are causally connected to social relations, one should not 
expect any simple distributive formula focused on a single core good to 
encapsulate the demands of relational equality. This is because the causes of 
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different types of social hierarchy are various, and various distributive strategies 
can be employed to undermine or remedy the effect of any given cause.68 
According to Anderson, whether a distribution is appropriate depends upon 
the social relations it gives arise to, results from, or is constitutive of; and since 
different distributive goals and requirements are appropriate to combat different 
forms of social hierarchy, it is futile to seek one distributive principle that best 
realizes the relational ideal of equality. In short, a distributive formula is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to solve all problems resulting from social hierarchies.  
Relatedly, as I mentioned earlier, Anderson makes the further claim that it is 
not worthwhile to search for a single currency of egalitarian justice. The fact that 
there are various types of hierarchy implies that there exists no single rule which 
by itself represent all of the demands of relational equality. It is therefore fruitless 
for the distributivist to dispute whether egalitarian justice should be conceived as 
requiring an equal distribution of this or that dimension. For it all depends on 
which social relation is under scrutiny, and the standard that determines how a 
good should be distributed ‘also varies with the problem to be solved.’69  
The key to Anderson’s argument against distributive equality is therefore the 
claim that the way a good should be distributed is solely determined by the relation 
between the nature of that good and the relational ideal of equality. She writes: 
‘Within the relational view, distributive concerns appear as but one part of the 
egalitarian agenda.’70 It is this claim which has the implication that distributive 
principles proposed by the distributivist are excluded from having any application 
if they are disconnected from the demands of relational equality. In contrast with 
distributive egalitarians, whose justification of distributive principles often appeals 
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to, say, the idea of distributive fairness, on Anderson’s view no such principles can 
be justified if they do not refer to the idea of relational equality.  
As I argued in Section 5.1., I believe that distributive egalitarians should 
dispute the claim that distributions matter only when they bear on the sustenance 
of egalitarian social relations, and should argue that distributive equality matters 
in its own right. I also argued there, however, that it would be no refutation of 
distributive egalitarianism even if one were able to establish that it must be 
grounded in the relational ideal of equality.  
So what distributive egalitarians want to argue is either that Anderson’s 
account is implausible because distributive equality matters independently of our 
concerns for relational equality; or that it is implausible as an interpretation of 
relational equality because one should be concerned with distributive equality 
even within a relationalist framework. That is to say, what distributive egalitarians 
must challenge is either Anderson’s claim that distributive principles must be 
grounded in relational equality, or her claim that relational equality only entails 
principles of distributive sufficiency but not those of distributive equality. 
But we can simplify the matter, and focus on an assumption that Anderson 
makes—which, I believe is commonly shared by sufficientarians—namely that we 
only have reasons to care about the distribution of things as a means for the 
realization of ends which are indifferent to the interpersonal comparisons of 
holdings. According to Anderson, the end to be realized is the relational ideal of 
equality, which allegedly does not have a commitment to distributive equality. 
It may be helpful to compare Anderson’s account with that of Joseph Raz’s, 
who also powerfully expresses the assumption under scrutiny. According to Raz, 
‘we only have reason to care about inequalities in the distributions of goods and ills, 
that is of what is of value or disvalue for independent reasons.’ 71  The main 
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difference between Anderson’s and Raz’s views is that, whilst the former indicates 
that distributions only matter when they bear on the relational ideal of equality, 
the latter appears to suggest that they only matter when they are concerned with 
things which are good or bad for individuals.  
As Raz’s argument goes, an analysis of the nature of the relevant goods and 
ills should deliver all of their essentially non-comparative distributive implications, 
which are to be built into principles of entitlement. Raz’s account is sufficientarian 
because he thinks that our needs are all satiable, and the notion of well-being itself 
already contains all of the criteria of their satisfaction. This is why he denies the 
relevance of any principles of distribution which take interpersonal comparisons 
to be informative in their application. In light of the assumption that Anderson’s 
account also shares, the conclusion of Raz’s argument is that the principle of 
distributive equality has no relevance at all to what we should care about in the 
distribution of values: 
[W]hat makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality but the 
concern identified by the underlying principle. It is the hunger of the hungry, 
the need of the needy, the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are 
worse off in the relevant respect than their neighbours is relevant. But it is 
relevant not as an independent evil of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that 
their hunger is greater, their need more pressing, their suffering more hurtful, 
and therefore our concern for the hungry, the needy, the suffering, and not our 
concern for equality, makes us give them the priority.72 
I maintain that Raz’s and Anderson’s sufficientarian arguments both fail for 
the same reason, namely that they implausibly assume that distributions can only 
matter as means to ends which have no regard for comparative justice. In one case, 
what is forcefully articulated by Raz is the view that we are concerned with the 
distributions of good and ills because they contribute to our well-being. But that 
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view is not entirely correct, or so I claim. For we are not only concerned with 
what is good for us, but also other things, such as distributive fairness.73 In another 
case, Anderson is clearly correct to say that we should be concerned with social 
relations that we share, and that these concerns have distributive implications. But 
her account is implausible insofar as it suggests that egalitarians have no reason to 
care about distributive fairness, which I believe usually favours the application of 
egalitarian distributive principles. 
To be sure, Anderson rightly considers herself as an opponent of distributive 
egalitarianism even when she indicates that there are cases in which it is justified 
to distribute a good equally: 
In some cases, social hierarchy is directly embodied in the unequal distribution 
of a good—for example, if some groups but not others have the right to vote, or 
some groups enjoy privileges and exemptions from general laws due to their 
superior standing or esteem. … In such cases an equal distribution of benefits 
and burdens is required. All adult citizens are entitled to vote and to have their 
vote count equally with all others. All should be equally subject to the criminal 
laws.74 
As we have seen, on Anderson’s view the equal distribution of a good is 
justified only because it is required by relational equality. But in cases where 
comparative advantage and disadvantage do not constitute hierarchical social 
relations, Anderson is happy to stand by her version of the sufficiency view. She 
suggests, for instance, that an unequal distribution of the good of education is 
acceptable insofar as it is consistent with the relational ideal of equality.75 Again, 
she holds this view because she thinks that receiving an adequate education—even 
if it is arbitrarily inferior to what others receive—is sufficient for someone to stand 
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in relations of equality to others. But since there is no reason to think that nothing 
about distribution matters from a moral point of view unless it has something to 
do with the relational ideal of equality, and more generally it is unwarranted to 
assume that distributions only matter as means for ends which have no regard for 
distributive fairness or comparative justice, it is a mistake for egalitarians to side 
with Anderson and endorse distributive sufficientarianism. Among many other 
things, egalitarians should care about distributive equality. 
5.4. Equality as a Deliberative Practice 
In a recent contribution, Scheffler explores the thesis that egalitarian public 
and private relationships are ongoing practices among participants who are related 
on an equal footing. According to this practice-focused view, for individuals to be 
situated in an egalitarian relationship is for them to have reciprocal attitudes, 
motives, and dispositions to participate in interpersonal practices, to the effect 
that each of them is regarded and treated as an equal. According to Scheffler, 
understanding equality as a practice between those who are related as equals means 
that it is an open question how practical tasks with regard to distribution are to 
be addressed and resolved by participants themselves. Since it is not sensible to 
deny that it is those who are related as equals are to regard and treat one another 
as equals, Scheffler’s account importantly implies that there is no need for the 
practice of equality to be guided by any simple distributive formula. Scheffler’s 
new way to articulate relational equality therefore presents another challenge to 
distributive egalitarianism, in that it is now incumbent upon the distributivist to 
explain the relevance of egalitarian distributive principles. I shall argue that the 
distributivist can fulfil this task even if they are to a large extent sympathetic with 
Scheffler’s practice-focused account. 
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We should again start with Scheffler’s basic contrast between the distributive 
and relational conceptions of equality. On the one hand, continuous with his 
earlier characterization, Scheffler suggests that the ‘most important task’ of the 
distributivist ‘is to identify the proper “currency” of “egalitarian justice.” That is, 
the task is to identify the thing that justice requires us to equalize’.76 On the other 
hand, Scheffler characterizes the relational view as holding that ‘equality is an ideal 
governing certain kinds of interpersonal relationships.’77  
Now, in contrast to the distributivist’s single-minded attention to the task of 
identifying the currency of egalitarian justice, which Scheffler suggests is the 
definitive feature of the distributive view, he emphasizes that his practice-focused 
account conceives of relational equality as a complex ideal, which is sensitive to a 
multiplicity of considerations other than itself. For instance, he indicates that an 
egalitarian practice ‘draws on values such as reciprocity and mutual respect, and 
on a conception of the rights and responsibilities of agents.’ 78  Scheffler also 
suggests, however, that the fact that relational equality is now characterized as a 
complex ideal that draws upon other values does not make it fall short of having 
an egalitarian character. Scheffler attempts to make good his claim by arguing that 
there still exist distinctively egalitarian elements in his understanding of relational 
equality, among which he highlights what he calls the ‘egalitarian deliberative 
constraint’. The basic idea is that in an egalitarian relationship each person should 
have an effective disposition to treat one another’s interests as having an equally 
important role in influencing the decisions made within that relationship. So, the 
egalitarian deliberative constraint is one of the conditions the satisfaction of which 
make a decision arrived at within an interpersonal relationship qualify as a practice 
of equality that Scheffler purports to elucidate: 
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In a relationship that is conducted on a footing of equality, each person accepts 
that the other person’s equally important interests—understood broadly to 
include the person’s needs, values, and preferences—should play an equally 
significant role in influencing decisions made within the context of the 
relationship. Moreover, each person has a normally effective disposition to treat 
the other’s interests accordingly … This means that each of our equally 
important interests constrains our joint decisions to the same extent. We can call 
this the egalitarian deliberative constraint. It is a distinctively egalitarian element 
in the complex ideal of an egalitarian relationship.79 
Now, I see no reason for the distributivist to resist the idea of the egalitarian 
deliberative constraint if it is understood as a necessary condition for a decision 
about distribution to be justified. For she would surely have no qualms about the 
requirement that each person’s interests should be regarded as equally important. 
She might suggest, for example, that this requirement coheres very well with the 
Dworkinian injunction of equal concern and respect, and she might think that an 
equal distribution of some good is implied by a principle of equal consideration 
of interests. She would also have no problem in accepting the requirement that 
people who are situated in an egalitarian relationship should have a certain kind 
of effective disposition towards others in order for a reciprocal egalitarian practice 
to be possible. It may well be true that the requirement of this disposition is not 
well-articulated by the distributivist, but that hardly shows that the distributive 
view is incompatible with a relational ideal of equality which articulates a demand 
on people’s attitudes and dispositions when joint decisions are to be made. What 
it seems to show is only that distributive principles and constraints on dispositions 
are complementary elements that should be incorporated into an egalitarian 
conception of justice.80 
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But I believe that Scheffler’s practice-focused account does imply a genuine 
challenge for distributive egalitarianism. For it appears to suggest that there is to 
be no role for a principle of distribution to determine whether decisions resulting 
from practical deliberations within egalitarian relationships are just. Scheffler’s 
view seems to be that if a decision is made by participants who deliberate on an 
equal footing, draw upon the right kinds of considerations, and abide by the 
egalitarian deliberative constraint, it should automatically be considered as just. 
Otherwise put in Scheffler’s terms, he seems to think that it makes no sense to 
seek one or another ‘external’ distributive criterion for the egalitarian deliberative 
practice. Instead, it only makes sense to ask questions about distribution from an 
‘internal’ point of view within the practice by participants themselves.81  The 
challenge faced by the distributivist, as I mentioned at the outset, is to articulate 
the sense in which egalitarian distributive principles are relevant to the relational 
practice of equality. 
Importantly, Scheffler argues that ‘the egalitarian deliberative constraint does 
not, in general, require the parties to make decisions that will leave them equally 
well-off either in respect of their immediately affected interests or overall.’82 That 
is, although people sometimes jointly decide to aim for an equal satisfaction of 
interests, ‘there is no general reason to expect that the egalitarian constraint will 
require decisions that leave the parties equally well-off with respect to preference-
satisfaction or anything else.’83 Scheffler’s observation appears to strengthen the 
point that it is unclear why a distributive principle is able to provide any guidance 
for an egalitarian deliberative practice. For we might then think that whatever 
decision that results from an appropriately conducted deliberative practice—that 
is, one that results from a fair procedure—should be considered as just even if it 
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involves an unequal distribution of well-being, and there is no need to refer to any 
external distributive criteria for that matter. 
Scheffler rightly reminds us that in an egalitarian deliberation there may exist 
a variety of equally acceptable options to be chosen. For instance, if my partner 
Wendy and I have different wishes for our vacation, we could settle the plan in 
many ways. We may spend half of the holidays at the place I prefer, and the other 
half at the place Wendy wants to go; we may take turns in the decisions about 
whose wishes are to be satisfied in this and future vacations; and we may decide, 
since our interests are irreconcilable at the moment, to give up going abroad this 
time, saving our money for another occasion; and so on.84 We may therefore want 
to take Scheffler’s suggestion seriously, namely that it should not be assumed that 
there exists only one correct result for a deliberative practice that honours the 
egalitarian deliberative constraint and other values.  
Now, Scheffler’s illustration of the practice-focused account appears to imply 
that, for an egalitarian practice to be just, it is not only necessary but also sufficient 
for the participants to comply with the egalitarian deliberative constraint as well 
as draw on any number of relevant considerations. What is rejected by Scheffler’s 
account is then the possibility that there is any indispensable role for an egalitarian 
distributive principle to play in the practice of equality. In Scheffler’s words, 
‘There is no general formula or algorithm for determining how best to engage in 
the practice.’85 This does not mean that nothing can go wrong in an egalitarian 
deliberation, as Scheffler duly notes that ‘even the sincere efforts of the parties are 
no guarantee of success’.86 It is easy to see that the actual decisions people make 
together after joint deliberation can very often be less than ideal. Scheffler also 
appears to hold, however, that the fact that a deliberative practice is conducted by 
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participants who have the right attitudes, dispositions and commitments, and 
draw upon the appropriate sorts of values and considerations, is ideally speaking 
sufficient to guarantee the justice of their joint decision. For otherwise it is no 
longer clear why he thinks that there is no role for distributive principles as an 
external criteria to determine whether a decision is just. 
Scheffler himself concludes with the suggestion that there are deep differences 
between his practice-focused relational account of equality and the distributive 
conception of equality. According to his relational account, equality as a value is 
neither normatively autonomous nor distributively self-sufficient. To say that the 
relational conception of equality is not normatively autonomous is to say that it 
‘is a complex ideal whose distinctively egalitarian aspects cannot be identified, nor 
their appeal appreciated, independently of their connections with the other values 
such as reciprocity and respect, that also help to define the ideal.’87 To say that 
equality is not distributively self-sufficient is to say that it ‘need not by itself yield 
any fully determinate principle for regulating the distribution of resources, not 
even a presumptive or prima facie one.’88 By contrast, the distributive view is 
rejected by Scheffler because it is said to conceive of equality as a normatively 
autonomous and distributively self-sufficient value. That is to say, according to 
Scheffler’s interpretation it takes ‘the normative content of the concept of equality 
to be exhausted by the idea of a division of some “currency” into equal amounts’, 
and ‘equality is capable all on its own of generating a presumptively authoritative 
principle of distribution’.89 
In my view, distributive egalitarians may adopt two strategies in response to 
Scheffler’s challenge.90 According to the first strategy, they could argue that we 
have an independent interest in principles of distribution because deliberative 
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practices with respect to distributive questions may not always deliver acceptable 
answers; according to the second, they could argue that egalitarian distributive 
principles may also be seen as one among other considerations that should be 
drawn upon in the egalitarian practice. What these options share is the view that 
we have an interest in looking for distributive principles so as to inform our 
deliberative practices, but they understand that role differently. As an external 
challenge, distributive egalitarians who adopt the first strategy will attempt to 
show that we need to have distributive principles at hand as criteria which are to 
be used to judge whether the results of egalitarian deliberative practices are indeed 
acceptable. For one thing, they might argue that it cannot be guaranteed that the 
outcomes of these practices must be just. Distributive egalitarians who adopt the 
second strategy will want to show, instead, that it is congenial to a deliberative 
practice if its participants have the option to allude to distributive principles as 
internal resources for their joint deliberation. It can be seen as motivated by the 
thought that participants in an egalitarian practice may also draw upon an 
egalitarian distributive principle to help them to make decisions in a way that 
satisfy the egalitarian deliberative constraint. Of course, these two strategies are 
compatible with each other. 
Now, an analogy may be helpful for us to see how the first of these strategies 
work. Suppose that a number of supreme court judges are to deliberate about 
whether the equal protection clause of their constitution is compatible with an 
affirmative action programme that gives some citizens preferential treatment if 
they belong to a hitherto neglected minority group. The two things I want to note 
are, first, that so long as the law has no explicit directive on the case under their 
consideration, it needs interpretation, which in turn requires the joint deliberative 
practice of the judges; and second, that it also seems plausible to say that the judges 
are still constrained by the letter of the law. In my view, this imagined case hence 
illustrates the point that the existence of external criteria is not incompatible with 
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the exercise of deliberative practices. As I depicts the case, what the law does is 
among other things to determine the scope of the judges’ interpretative options, 
but the fact that it has this function does not imply that no substantive work is to 
be done by their joint deliberation. 
I would suggest that an egalitarian principle of distribution may be seen to 
have a similar function. As I said, the first strategy I allude to might be motivated 
by the idea that there is no guarantee that the decision made after a deliberative 
practice is necessarily just or legitimate, for one might think that it is implausible 
to say that all possible decisions resulting from an egalitarian deliberative practice 
are equally acceptable. As the thought goes, as the deliberative practice of the 
judges with respect to affirmative action is constrained by the pre-established law, 
distributive egalitarians might similarly suggest that deliberative practices with 
respect to distributive issues should be constrained by an independently justified 
distributive principle as well. 
One might reply that the law is also the product of an ongoing practice by 
the legislature, legal officers, judges, and scholars who offer various interpretations. 
This is correct, but this does not invalidate my point. It only shows that different 
kinds and levels of practices are often intertwined in a complex system. Scheffler 
is therefore correct when he indicates that ‘one important task is to consider what 
kinds of institutions and practices a society must put in place if it is to count as a 
society of equals.’91 But what I argue is exactly that the endeavour to search for 
appropriate egalitarian distributive principles is consistent with the practice within 
egalitarian relationships that Scheffler purports to articulate. At any rate, in the 
case of the judges’ deliberative practice, it is usually the case that there exists a 
range of options open to them. I think the distributivist may plausibly suggest 
that egalitarian distributive principles can also be similarly flexible, but maintain 
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in the meanwhile that these principles are needed when it is reasonable to further 
probe into the results of deliberative practices. 
We may remind ourselves that Rawls’s difference principle also leaves it as an 
open question concerning which institutional arrangement is most appropriate to 
benefit all members of society. Indeed, one lesson distributive egalitarians should 
draw from Rawls is that distributive principles need not and should not be seen 
as normatively autonomous and distributively self-sufficient in a derogatory sense. 
For, on the one hand, the justification of the difference principle does involve a 
variety of considerations, not least those of fairness, reciprocity, and efficiency. 
Distributive egalitarians should maintain that they also want to take proper notice 
of all the relevant considerations in their justification of distributive principles. 
On the other hand, as Rawls writes, ‘the difference principle not only assumes the 
operation of other principles, but it presupposes as well a certain theory of social 
institutions.’92 Again, distributive egalitarians should similarly maintain that their 
favoured distributive principles also presuppose an account of the institutions 
which are suitable for their implementation.  
In a word, the distributivist should regard her preferred set of egalitarian 
distributive principles as a summary conception of the general directives with 
respect to distributive issues. Thus understood, principles of distribution have the 
function of guiding our institutional design, especially when deliberate practices 
go astray. They are in this way apt to be seen as, say, constitutional essentials for 
a democratic society, and the distributivist may plausibly suggest that they are in 
this sense normatively autonomous, as well as distributively self-sufficient in the 
sense that they should give us suitably determinate instructions.  
My alternative understanding of egalitarian distributive principles does not 
contradict Scheffler’s suggestion that equality can also be understood as a practice 
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within the context of egalitarian relationships, as the attempt to derive distributive 
principles from a diversity of considerations is consistent with Scheffler’s practice-
focused account. It is so because distributive egalitarians can and should agree that 
distributive principles also have a complex character, which make them sensitive 
to a variety of values, norms, and principles. But drawing on the analogy of the 
law, distributive egalitarians may further maintain that distributive principles have 
a priority over practices, and this priority is what is at stake when these principles 
are claimed to be normatively autonomous and distributively self-sufficient.  
Now, let me try to make the point in another way. Earlier I suggested that 
distributive egalitarians need not take any issue with the distinctively egalitarian 
element Scheffler indicates, namely the egalitarian deliberative constraint. There 
is no problem for the distributivist in accepting that it is important for participants 
in an egalitarian practice to have the right kind of attitudes and dispositions, as 
well as that each person’s interests should play an equally important role in 
influencing the outcome of the practice. But I also voiced a reservation about the 
practice-focused view which arises from the worry that the outcomes of egalitarian 
deliberative practices may not always be entirely satisfactory. For the distributivist, 
this worry points to a rationale for seeking independently justified principles of 
distribution—insofar as we acknowledge that we sometimes have reasons to 
double-check the result of a deliberative practice with respect to distributive issues, 
egalitarian distributive principles should play the role of guiding our practices. 
Again, this is not to deny that egalitarian deliberative practices can and even 
should often take place in the way Scheffler indicates. But one should immediately 
notice that it is hard to think of any large-scale joint deliberative practice that is 
ever done in that manner. As Scheffler himself concedes, face-to-face relationships 
are rare in the public domain, and conditions such as anonymity make it the case 
that public deliberations in a modern society are very unlikely to abide by 
adequate constraints. He hence suggests that, in articulating his practice-focused 
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account, ‘a crucial task will be to determine how the participatory requirement 
should be modified to apply to the large-scale deliberative processes that are 
needed in a society whose members are largely anonymous to one another.’93 But 
if that is the issue, distributive egalitarians may plausibly argue that principles of 
distribution are most likely needed, and some practical roles should at least be 
assigned to them. 
Now, facing the difficulties in explaining how large-scale practices are to be 
conceived in an equal society, Scheffler appears to acknowledge that distributive 
principles may be assigned to play some pragmatic roles:  
[F]or the members of a society of equals, who lack the kind of direct deliberative 
access that the participants in an egalitarian personal relationship have, an 
‘output measure’ like a distributive formula, indirect though it is, may be the 
best way of judging whether the egalitarian deliberative constraint has been 
satisfied.94  
Moreover, because of ‘the anonymity of the relations among the members of 
society’, they ‘need a clear public standard governing distribution: a standard they 
can all accept as an appropriate basis for judging whether … their shared 
egalitarian aspirations have been satisfied.’ 95  As it seems, Scheffler ultimately 
concedes what the distributivist ever needs, namely that in a society of equals 
distributive principles may still have to play certain parametric roles over and 
above their deliberative practices.  
I shall now turn to the second strategy that distributive egalitarians may adopt 
so as to respond to Scheffler’s challenge. According to this proposal, distributive 
egalitarians should recommend one or another distributive principle as one of the 
considerations that participants in an egalitarian practice may allude to. 
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The analogy between the law and distributive principles should help us again 
here. In my imagined case, the judges should remind themselves what the equal 
protection clause actually says when they deliberate. Now, what the law says is 
informative, for it at least reminds them that other similar cases should also be 
decided in accordance with it. But then again, the fact that the letter of the law 
should be taken into account does not make the judges’ deliberative practice 
pointless. For it is consistent to think, on the one hand, that the law itself sheds 
light on how the case is to be decided, and on the other hand that the deliberative 
practice of the jurors is also indispensable for their joint decision to be legitimate.  
How does this work in the case of distributive principles? I shall again allude 
to Rawls’s theory as a point of reference. On my view, distributive egalitarians 
should want to follow Rawls, to begin with, in thinking that a presumption of 
equal distribution helps people to deliberate about distributive matters, for it is a 
benchmark of comparison that is fair among conflicting claims. Notwithstanding 
Scheffler’s observation that an egalitarian practice need not always lead to an equal 
satisfaction of interests, the distributivist should maintain that it counts against 
an inequality if it does not in any sense represent an improvement compared to a 
benchmark of equality.  
Distributive egalitarians should further argue that their favoured distributive 
principles can be seen as interpretations of the clause in the egalitarian deliberative 
constraint that ‘equally important interests should play an equally significant role 
in influencing decisions made within the context of the relationship’.96 The idea 
is that by further articulating this clause as a principle of equal distribution, the 
requirements of the egalitarian deliberative constraint can be made more specific 
in order to select one among other distributions.  
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Now, Scheffler seems to foresee the replies I have suggested when he states 
that ‘the egalitarian deliberative constraint seems to underdetermine the choice 
among candidate distributive principles.’97 In any case, if we probe into matters 
of distribution within a larger societal context, ‘it is not clear that the deliberative 
constraint provides a basis for selecting among the different egalitarian distributive 
principles that have been proposed.’98 Of the two replies I suggest in support of 
the distributive view, the first points out that, in Scheffler’s words, a society of 
equals ‘needs a principled public standard to regulate distribution and provide a 
shared basis for the justification of decisions made on behalf of the society as a 
whole.’99 Moreover, the second strategy further recommends that we identify a 
suitable egalitarian distributive principle as one of the resources that participants 
in an egalitarian practice may draw upon. Both of these strategies suggest that it 
is congenial and legitimate to inquire into egalitarian distributive principles, even 
if equality, as Scheffler suggests, can also be understood as a relational ideal that 
involves a variety of public and private practices. 
Scheffler, however, appears to resist my contention: 
I draw a different conclusion from the fact that the deliberative constraint 
underdetermines the choice among candidate distributive principles. Recall that 
the deliberative constraint is only one dimension of the broader relational ideal, 
the ideal of a relationship among equals. If it is unclear whether a given principle 
is compatible with the deliberative constraint, then the next question is whether 
the principle is consistent with the broader ideal. And if two different distributive 
principles both seem compatible with the deliberative constraint, then the 
question is whether either of them coheres better than the other with the idea of 
living together as equals. These are practical questions in the sense that, in order 
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to answer them, we must consider what it would actually be like to carry on 
human relationships on the terms specified in the proposed principles.100  
On Scheffler’s view, then, to make the choice between distributive principles 
more determinate, we have to consider which of them best coheres with the 
relational ideal of equality. This is the core thesis of relational egalitarianism, 
which is endorsed by Scheffler along with other relational egalitarians. As I have 
already argued, however, the appeal of this thesis does not conversely undermine 
the distributive conception of equality. For one thing, I hold that distributive 
egalitarianism is preferable to alternative distributive views for the creation and 






Justice and Basic Equality 
My aim in this last chapter is to make sense of the idea that democratic 
citizens are one another’s equals in a liberal democratic society. As I understand 
it, we have an interest to inquire into the principle of basic political equality 
primarily because we want to know to whom principles of justice apply; and in 
the following I argue that they at least apply to all potential and actual participants 
in a fair system of social cooperation. More specifically, I defend a Rawlsian 
account of basic equality, the central theses of which are, first, that principles of 
justice apply to all who have a potential to develop the capacity for a sense of 
justice, namely the capacity to fully understand and act in accordance with the 
fair terms of social cooperation; and second, that justice has no interest in 
assigning differential degrees of basic status among those who have a sense of 
justice. 
6.1. The Problem of Variation 
Although most of us may be sympathetic to the idea of basic equality, namely 
the idea that each of us is an equal to others, it is not obvious why and in what 
basic sense citizens in a political society are justified in conceiving of themselves 
as equals. An account of basic political equality appears indispensable for theories 
which go beyond understanding equality in the merely formal sense in which 
similar cases are to be treated similarly. That is, insofar as a theory holds that some 
sort of substantive equal treatment, such as the vindication of equal basic rights, 
is owed to all democratic citizen, it has to specify, on the one hand, the grounds 
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on which egalitarian principles are justified, and on the other hand the essential 
features shared by these citizens, which make it the case that those principles 
should apply to them equitably.  
It might seem natural for one to endorse the principle of basic equality on 
the ground that we all possess to the same degree some morally significant and 
empirically verifiable set of base properties. The requirement that the basis of 
equality should be morally significant immediately rules out the relevance of 
species memberships, as well as attributes such as gender and race. To suggest 
otherwise is to at least implicitly commit to discrimination which could have no 
rational justification. In thinking about this matter, what strikes us as plainly more 
plausible candidates are several capacities, some of which distinctly human, such 
as sentience, intelligence, reflective self-awareness, and reason. 
It is however all too apparent that there are variations among people with 
respect to the realization of any of these dimensions; that is to say, the natural 
capacities which presumably ground the basic standing of individual beings are 
most likely constituted by scalar properties that vary in degrees.1 As it is widely 
acknowledged, any account of basic equality must have a satisfactory response to 
this problem of variation. 
For my purposes, a distinction needs to be made between two kinds of cases 
which manifest this central problem concerning basic equality. There is, to begin 
with, a question concerning how to regard and treat a range of individual beings 
who have no potential to possess the relevant capacities; but I shall be silent about 
this topic. In fact, given the intricacies involved and their very controversial nature, 
 
1 For discussions on this issue, see Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 88–94; Arneson, ‘What, if Anything, 
Renders All Humans Morally Equal?’; Carter, ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’; Sher, Equality 
for Inegalitarians, ch. 5; Husi, ‘Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals’; Waldron, One 
Another’s Equals: The Basis of Human Equality, ch.1; Parr and Slavny, ‘Rescuing Basic Equality’. 
For more general discussions, see Arneson, ‘Basic Equality: Neither Acceptable nor Rejectable’; 
Sangiovanni, Humanity Without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights, pt. 1; 
Rozeboom, ‘The Anti-Inflammatory Basis of Equality’. 
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I shall remain agnostic, as Rawls himself does, about whether possessing the base 
property favoured by the Rawlsian account is a necessary condition for one to be 
regarded and treated as an equal in a political society. Instead, I am only concerned 
to argue for a sufficient condition for basic equality with regard to another range 
of cases, in which the relevant variations are less extreme, but still troubling—I 
have in mind the cases where a relevant property, supposedly identified as the 
basis of equality, is unmistakably instantiated by a multitude of human beings, 
but in different degrees. 
Based on a reappraisal of Rawls’s account of basic equality, the potential of 
which to my mind has been largely underestimated, I shall submit, among other 
things, an answer to the question why it is not a problem for their basic equality 
that people instantiate their various properties in different degrees. According to 
this proposal, the justification for the principle of basic political equality appeals 
to our considered convictions about justice, and it identifies a non-scalar property 
which most of us possess, namely the capacity for a sense of justice, as the basis of 
equality. Briefly, this is the capacity to fully understand, abide by, and act from 
publicly recognized principles of justice.  
My defence of the Rawlsian account of basic equality involves the following 
two theses. First, I argue that justice requires that human beings with the potential 
to develop a sense of justice have their potential realized. Second, I further argue 
that justice has no interest in assigning differential degrees of basic status among 
those who have a sense of justice. I shall call them the enhancement thesis and the 
non-differentiation thesis respectively. 
6.2. The Enhancement Thesis 
To repeat what I just said, according to the enhancement thesis, we have the 
considered judgement that justice requires that human beings with the potential 
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to develop a sense of justice have their potential realised. This thesis is, I think, 
quite uncontroversial.2 Since the capacity for a sense of justice is a basic capacity 
that enables human beings to participate in social cooperation, which in turn 
helps them to lead decent lives, the truth of the enhancement thesis follows from 
the claim that justice has this minimal commitment to secure a range of basic 
capacities for those whose possession falls below a satisfactory level.3 
To illustrate, imagine a person whose mental disability makes it the case that 
he needs considerable medical treatment to function properly in workplace. His 
condition implies that without treatment he cannot work as others normally do; 
but there would be no relevant difference between him and others who have no 
such need if he has adequate access to medication. According to the enhancement 
thesis, justice demands that treatment be given.  
This thesis is further motivated by the thought that to an indeterminate but 
significant extent the distribution of our mental and physical capacities is strongly 
influenced by factors for which people cannot be held responsible, but whose 
existence makes it evident that much of their burdens are avoidable or remediable. 
The truth is that people are in part products of their social environment, and 
many of them suffer from deep-rooted wrongs such as oppression, domination, 
 
2 Some might demur that there are many cases in which those who realize elementary capacities 
to a lesser degree are themselves responsible for their deficiencies. But let us simplify the matter 
and suppose that we are thinking about a relatively early stage of people’s lives, in which nobody 
deserves to be very badly off. In any case, the enhancement thesis at least suggests that all human 
beings are to be secured an adequate range of basic capacities, including the capacity for a sense of 
justice, on the condition that the relevant considerations of people’s own responsibilities with 
respect to their well-being do not make it unreasonable to be exercised by the demands of justice. 
3 Cf. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 118–119. Nagel reserves the name ‘justice’, as he 
thinks it is ‘ordinarily understood’, to the concerns about ‘the relations between the conditions of 
different classes of people and the causes of inequality between them.’ However, Nagel also 
assumes that ‘there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with 
starvation or severe malnutrition and early death from easily preventable diseases’, which he links 
to the duties of ‘humanitarian assistance’. Although I agree with Nagel that there is a distinction 
to be drawn, I am also inclined to think that the duties of humanitarian assistance can be seen as 
a subset of the duties of justice. 
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and discrimination. They can not only deprive their victims of the opportunities 
to exercise their capacities, but can even stifle their will, and prevent them from 
having the sense that they have a claim of justice to cultivate and exercise their 
essential abilities.4 Again, think of a school child who comes from a marginalized 
group which is burdened with poverty and discrimination. Due to unfavourable 
circumstances the child is devoid of adequate resources, her learning abilities are 
under-developed, and she lacks a sense of self-esteem, which, if present, would 
have effectively motivated her to refine and exercise her various capacities. I doubt 
that anyone would deny that the plight of the child needs to be redressed and her 
relevant potentialities be realised. 
I have been arguing that justice demands that anyone’s basic needs be satisfied, 
and I have suggested that this thesis is well supported by the commonplace that 
those who are deficient are very often not responsible for their lack. Now, it is 
important to see that the enhancement thesis involves a shift of attitude, or a new 
look, at the problem of variation: from the viewpoint of justice, what appears 
relevant and urgent about interpersonal variations is in the first place that they 
point to needs and deficiencies which should be regarded as practical tasks to be 
addressed in the name of justice. Indeed, the first impression that the justifiability 
of basic equality is held hostage to the problem of variation is very questionable, 
for I believe that our considered judgements suggest that justice itself tends to 
advance the conditions for the realization of basic human equality. 
We can go further. It appears to betray a sign of schizophrenia if one who 
says that ‘people who are relatively deficient in their basic capacities have a claim 
of justice in virtue of their deficiencies’, also says that ‘people who are relatively 
deficient in their basic capacities are of an inferior basic standing in virtue of their 
deficiencies’. For it is deeply implausible, if not incoherent, to think that the very 
 
4 See Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’, 103. 
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same statement about a correctable or at least remediable deficiency entails both 
a claim of justice and the claimant’s inferior basic standing. According to the 
enhancement thesis, basic deficiencies are to be seen, from the viewpoint of justice, 
as burdens that call for rectification or mitigation; as shown by my two examples, 
they should not be seen as evidence that vindicates their bearer’s lesser basic status. 
The fact about interpersonal variations, if it ever hints at a problem, would be one 
to be resolved first and foremost within the purview of justice. 
I am of course not arguing for the impossible claim that justice demands all 
deficiencies be corrected or neutralized, but only that it is required by justice that 
they are to some considerable extent be addressed and mitigated; or, in other 
words, that a wide range of human beings who are deficient in essential capacities 
are owed substantial support to achieve their proper functionings and to maintain 
them. It should be observed, however, that it makes no clear sense to conjecture 
how people would vary if the demands of justice were completely fulfilled. As 
Bernard Williams aptly points out, ‘to an indeterminate degree’ people have the 
capacity to live a fully human life, and the fact that they are partly the product of 
their circumstances suggests that their capacity ‘may be enhanced or diminished 
by their social condition.’5  
As this thought goes, we have no determinate answer about the distribution 
of relevant abilities if our circumstances are ideal. Again, I am not saying that there 
could possibly be no scalar differences among people if perfect justice were to 
prevail; it is reasonable to think the contrary. However, the idea that our fate is 
underdetermined and in good part dependent upon the demands of justice being 
satisfied is important. It rebuts any suggestions of natural hierarchies supposedly 
basing on the fact that in the current state of affairs people are not equally capable 
of anything. 
 
5 Ibid., 104. 
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6.3. The Non-Differentiation Thesis 
According to the second thesis I want to defend in this chapter, justice has 
no interest in assigning differential degrees of basic status among those who have 
a sense of justice. That is to say, for all who have a sense of justice, there are no 
relevant differences that impinge upon their basic status as far as our considered 
judgements of justice are concerned, and basic political equality holds among 
members of society who have a sense of justice, even if their possession of that 
capacity varies in degrees. To defend this non-differentiation thesis, what I want 
to do in this section is to delineate an interpretation of Rawls’s account of basic 
equality, which is embedded within his conception of justice, justice as fairness; 
and I shall explain in the next section how the Rawlsian account of basic equality 
is supported by the principles of justice included in justice as fairness. 
As Rawls sees it, justice as fairness aims to articulate systematically a body of 
fundamental ideas latent in a liberal democratic society. His crucial assumption, 
or what he calls the ‘most fundamental idea’ in justice as fairness, is about the way 
we are to conceive of a society: it is a ‘system of social cooperation’, the fair terms 
of which are to be specified by the principles of justice.6 These principles are the 
publicly recognized background rules and procedures which should be reasonably 
acceptable by all participants in social cooperation. As I explained in Chapter 1, 
Rawls suggests that they specify an idea of reciprocity, according to which all who 
abide by the fair terms of social cooperation are to benefit from their participation. 
On Rawls’s view, justice is primarily a virtue of the cooperative venture between 
free and equal members of society. 
By Rawls’s assumption, a conception of social justice must determine who 
those free and equal participants in social cooperation are. In justice as fairness 
this is the basic sense in which democratic citizens are one another’s equals. More 
 
6 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 5–8.  
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specifically, they are equal in the sense that they are equally governed by the 
principles of justice. In Rawls words, ‘they are to be treated in accordance with 
the principles of justice’ and ‘entitled to equal justice’.7 Moreover, this equality of 
standing—that is, equality before the principles of justice—is basic in the sense 
that democratic citizens are related as equals in one most important reciprocal 
practice, namely social cooperation, that the principles of justice are to govern.  
According to Rawls himself, basic political equality holds among free and 
equal citizens, who are to be regarded as ‘moral persons’ in virtue of their ‘two 
moral powers’. These include the capacity for a conception of their good, ‘the 
capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational 
advantage or good’; as well as a sense of justice, ‘the capacity to understand, to 
apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair 
terms of social cooperation.’8 As Rawls puts it, these citizens ‘are regarded as equal 
in that they are all regarded as having to the essential minimum degree the moral 
powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a complete life and to take 
part in society as equal citizens.’9 
My reconstruction of Rawls’s account of the basis of equality only hinges on 
the assumption that individual beings who are of equal basic status possess the 
capacity for a sense of justice. One main reason that motivates this simplification 
is that, on the Rawlsian view, it does not really make sense to talk about variations 
in people’s capacities for the realization of their own good. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that citizens in a liberal democracy may acquire a wide variety 
of conceptions of the good, and justice as fairness alleges no authority to pass 
judgements on them insofar as they do not seriously and unreasonably contradict 
the public conception of justice. Indeed, there is no sense in which justice as 
 
7 A Theory of Justice, 504–505/441–442 rev. 
8 Political Liberalism, 19. 
9 Restatement, 20. 
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fairness could measure their diverse conceptions of the good on the same scale, as 
if it could appropriately measure scalar variations of people’s capacities in terms 
of the good; instead, it only makes sense to talk about people’s abilities in respect 
of their conceptions of the good. 
On the other hand, justice as fairness does not regard variations in people’s 
abilities in terms of their respective plans of the good life, for it rejects the view 
that people’s claims of justice should be relative to their own conceptions of the 
good. As Rawls understands that proposal, ‘equal justice means that society is to 
make the same proportionate contribution to each person’s realizing the best life 
which he is capable of.’10 This idea is rejected by Rawls mainly on the ground of 
fairness. As he explains, under this conception of justice, ‘the greater abilities of 
some may give them a stronger claim on social resources’, since it ‘must assume 
that variations in natural assets will affect what is necessary to provide equal 
proportionate assistance to those with different plans of life.’11 This assumption, 
according to Rawls, is unacceptable, for it effectively ‘means that the strength of 
men’s claims is directly influenced by the distribution of natural abilities, and 
therefore by contingencies that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.’12 
In emphasizing that people’s claims of justice should not be contingent upon 
their greater or lesser abilities to realize the best lives they are capable of, Rawls 
emphasizes that in justice as fairness, ‘The only contingency which is decisive is 
that of having or not having the capacity for a sense of justice.’13 Rawls’s remark 
appears to affirm my interpretation, which identifies the capacity for a sense of 
justice as the crucial base property in his account of basic equality; for this is the 
 
10 Theory, 510/446 rev. 
11 Ibid., 510/447 rev. 
12 Ibid., 510–511/447 rev. 
13 Ibid., 511/447 rev. 
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property the equal possession of which secures the sufficient condition on which 
a fair system of social cooperation is realistically possible.14 
Now, focusing on the capacity for a sense of justice also shows why it is 
natural for the Rawlsian account to identify a threshold, above which variations 
in that capacity have no troubling implication for basic political equality among 
democratic citizens. Although it is perfectly reasonable to assume that members 
of a society possess that power in different degrees, what is important for justice 
as fairness, and hence for an account of basic equality embedded within, is only 
to determine an essential level of that power sufficient for a fair system of social 
cooperation to exist over time. In Rawls’s terms, we search only for a minimum 
degree of a sense of justice which secures strict compliance of the participants; and 
insofar as ‘Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just 
institutions’,15 justice has no further interest in assigning differential degrees of 
basic status.  
This importantly explains how the problem of variation is resolved in justice 
as fairness; for on the Rawlsian view, when members of a society do have the 
minimum degree of a sense of justice, there is no further question concerning 
basic equality within the purview of social justice. Instead, according to justice as 
fairness, all sorts of residual variations are assigned to be governed by the principles 
of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation.16 As I interpret it, the Rawlsian 
account of basic equality indicates that all who have a sense of justice, namely the 
capacity to fully understand, comply with, and act from the principles of justice, 
 
14 For other suggestive remarks, see ibid., 510, 512/446, 448 rev., and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
80. For similar interpretations, see Singer, Practical Ethics, 17–19; Daniels, ‘Democratic Equality’, 
246–247; Waldron, One Another’s Equals, 103–105. 
15 Theory, 8/8 rev. 
16 See Lang, ‘Book Review: One Another’s Equals, by Jeremy Waldron’, 251–254. 
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are entitled to equal justice. Indeed, as Rawls himself puts it pithily: ‘Those who 
can give justice are owed justice.’17 
What we have gone through so far equips us to cope with two prevalent 
objections to the Rawlsian account of basic equality. According to Ian Carter, who 
puts forward a version of the first line of objection recently, the Rawlsian account 
is to be rejected on two related grounds. To begin with, Carter objects that it is 
unclear why we should focus on moral personality as the basis of equality, instead 
of the base properties upon which it supervenes.18 Carter argues that Rawls offers 
no good explanation of why moral personality is what is relevant to the search for 
the basis of equality, whilst it is not the case of the base properties that constitute 
it. Moreover, Carter argues that even if Rawls is correct that moral personality is 
relevant to the question of the basis of equality, this still does not demonstrate the 
irrelevance of the base properties upon which that property supervenes. On the 
contrary, Carter argues that they should appear relevant, and need to be taken 
into account, exactly when the supervening property is, ex hypothesi, relevant. 
Since Rawls himself identifies moral personality as the basis of equality, Carter 
challenges him to explain away the relevance of whatever scalar properties which 
are supposed to constitute or ground moral personality. He maintains that Rawls 
fails in this task.19 
According to my interpretation, the Rawlsian account does have a principled 
way to meet Carter’s challenges. On the one hand, it suggests that the property of 
moral personality is crucial to the basic equality between democratic citizens, for 
the reason that one of its main constituents, namely a minimum degree of a sense 
of justice, is essential to the fair social cooperation between them. On the other 
hand, it considers the scalar properties upon which moral personality supervenes 
 
17 Theory, 510/446 rev. 
18 Carter, ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’, 549. 
19 Ibid., 550. 
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as irrelevant on the ground that it is appropriate to regulate all residual variations 
among free and equal citizens by the principles of justice. 
According to the second common objection, when Rawls tries to justify his 
account of basic equality, he already presupposes that it is to be embedded within 
his favoured conception of justice, which includes certain principles of justice. 
This, according to his critics, is unacceptable. As D. A. Lloyd Thomas expresses 
the worry, ‘it is assumed from the start that variations in degree of rational nature 
above this minimum are irrelevant to the choice and application of the principles 
of justice.’20 Alternatively put, the feature of the Rawlsian account that is alleged 
to be implausible is that its justification is supposed to appeal to our considered 
convictions about justice. Rawls’s critics suggest, by contrast, that the justification 
of basic equality should precede the justification of the principles of justice, and 
Rawls simply gets the order of justification wrong. Indeed, Jeremy Waldron also 
appears to worry that Rawls’s argument for his account of the basis of equality, if 
there is any, is circular, since it is specified by his own conception of justice, the 
justification of which already assumes it all along. Waldron instead suggests that 
a sense of justice need not be identified with any particular conception or set of 
principles (like Rawls own two principles of justice as fairness). The relevant 
sense of justice must mean something like a desire to apply and act on principles 
of justice, whatever these turn out to be.21 
In short, Rawls’s critics assume that we should in the first place look for an 
account of basic equality which alone explains why a range of individual beings 
are to be regarded and treated as equals, and is therefore supposed to be credible 
independent of our considered judgements about the principles that govern those 
who are to be regarded and related as equals; and some of them may therefore 
 
20 Lloyd Thomas, ‘Equality Within the Limits of Reason Alone’, 550. See also Waldron, One 
Another’s Equals, 104–105. 
21 Waldron, One Another’s Equals, 163. 
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further suppose that it should be capable of determining, at least partly, the 
selection of these principles.22  
But the Rawlsian view rejects that assumption. On the one hand, Rawls’s 
method of justification is of course of a holist character, and there is no sign that 
he accepts the view that the principle of basic equality should by itself constrain 
principles of justice. What Rawls is most concerned to show is instead that his 
account of basic equality coheres well with any number of other considerations 
that count in favour of his conception of justice. Indeed, he suggests that ‘A 
conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions 
on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of mutual support of many 
considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.’23  
On the other hand, it is unclear why one should assume that the question 
‘Who are to be regarded and treated as equals?’ should be answered independent 
of and prior to our answer to the question ‘How to regard and treat those who are 
equals?’, and that our answer to the former question should constrain our answer 
to the latter question. In fact, there is no clear reason to suppose that our 
understanding of the idea of basic equality cannot be informed by our substantive 
beliefs. So, for instance, it also seems to make a lot of sense if one suggests that we 
should not discriminate against anybody in light of our basic moral commitments, 
and that everyone is to be regarded and treated as an equal exactly in that sense—
namely, insofar as the principle against discrimination is concerned, everyone is 
equal.24 On the Rawlsian view, the sense in which democratic citizens are regarded 
and treated as equals is informed by their very important interest in upholding a 
fair system of social cooperation, namely a society well-ordered by the principles 
of justice; and, as we have already seen, these principles are tasked to deal with 
 
22 For an illustration of this view, see Carter, ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’. 
23 Theory, 21/19 rev. 
24 See Sangiovanni, Humanity Without Dignity, ch. 2, for an argument that adopts this strategy.  
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interpersonal variations without ever implying that any of these citizens are of a 
higher or lower basic standing when they have a sense of justice to participate in 
a fair system of social cooperation. This is why Rawls indicates that ‘the respect 
in which human beings are to be counted equal is settled by the conception of 
justice … and the principles of justice assure that any variations in ability are to 
be regarded as any other natural asset.’25  
All in all, we may say that justice as fairness assigns different and mutually 
supportive functions to his account of basic equality and the principles of justice: 
the former indicates the sense in which members of a society are regarded and 
treated as equals; and the latter specify the fair terms on which they relate and live 
as equals. This schema, for one thing, helps us to make sense of the idea that there 
is really no deep problem about interpersonal variations insofar as basic equality 
among democratic citizens is concerned; for according to justice as fairness, 
variations in people’s sense of justice, as well as abilities to realize their conceptions 
of the good, are all assigned to be governed by the principles of justice. 
The idea that Rawls’s account of basic equality and his principles of justice 
are mutually supportive is worth emphasizing, not least because, as quoted above, 
Rawls himself invites us to inquire whether a variety of components fit together 
well in his conception of justice. The feature of mutual support is a virtue of 
coherence. It means that one component of a theory is made more plausible by 
another, and vice versa. When integral parts of a theory are mutually supportive, 
each of them appears more plausible when others are taken into account. Now, I 
would suggest that Rawls’s account of basic equality is strengthened by his 
characterization of the principles of justice in justice as fairness for the following 
reason: since variations besides the essential capacity for a sense of justice are all 
governed by these principles, Rawls’s account of basic equality acquires the virtue 
 
25 Theory, 508/444–445 rev.  
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of simplicity by being concerned only with the conditions that make fair social 
cooperation realistically possible.26 Conversely, his minimalist conception of basic 
equality implicates the widest range of applicability for the principles of justice in 
justice as fairness, hence the virtue of utmost practical relevance—irrespective of 
the variations among free and equal citizens, benefits and burdens accompanying 
social cooperation between them are to the greatest extent assigned to be regulated 
by these principles.  
6.4. Equal Opportunity, Equal Respect, and Reciprocity 
Now, it should be clear that my defence of the Rawlsian account of basic 
equality ultimately hinges on the claim that the principles of justice in justice as 
fairness have an appropriate way to cope with interpersonal variations. We are 
therefore led back to several topics that I already dealt with in Chapter 1; but I 
shall now approach them from a different angle, by tracing a line of thought that 
brings Williams and Rawls together.27 
It starts with Williams’s observation that equality is referred to not only as a 
matter of fact, but also as an ideal to be realized: 
The idea of equality is used in political discussion both in statements of fact, or 
what purport to be statements of fact—that people are equal—and in statements 
of political principles or aims: that people should be equal, as at present they are 
not. The two can be, and often are, combined: the aim is then described as that 
 
26 See also ibid., 510/446 rev. 
27 There is a curious exegetical question which I am unable to explore here, namely to what extent 
Rawls’s thoughts should be considered as deriving from Williams. Rawls cited Williams’s ‘The 
Idea of Equality’, first published in 1962, seven times in A Theory of Justice, originally published 
in 1971 (only five of them are registered in the index of Theory), and to my knowledge not in his 
other published works. The discussion in this section will illustrate the strong affinity between 
Williams’s and Rawls’s views on several topics; but given the well-known fact that A Theory of 
Justice went through a long period of preparation, it would be premature for me to suggest more 
than that Rawls agreed with much of what Williams wrote in his classic essay. 
 Justice and Basic Equality  
 191 
of securing a state of affairs in which people are treated as the equal beings which 
they in fact already are, but are not already treated as being.28 
One of the egalitarian’s tasks is to specify the conditions on which equality 
obtains. On this score, Williams and Rawls both think that it is helpful to reflect 
on the idea of equality of opportunity.29  
To begin with, they both think that equality of opportunity should not be 
interpreted merely as a formal requirement of institutional impartiality, as in 
equality before the law. The idea is that to distribute opportunities according to 
people’s de facto merits is also questionable, for the obvious but very important 
reason that, with no exception, their mental and physical abilities are all strongly 
influenced by their social backgrounds. In light of the fact that they typically 
cannot justify their greater opportunities simply by referring to the advantage for 
which they could ultimately claim no credit, it follows that formal equality of 
opportunity falls short of the egalitarian ideal. A superior interpretation of the 
idea of equal opportunity is what Rawls calls fair equality of opportunity, 
according to which members of a society should get hold of the access to necessary 
enabling resources, such as nutrition, education and training; so that despite their 
different social backgrounds, all who have the same natural talents and willingness 
to pursue certain careers, positions, or offices should have equal chances to fulfil 
their ambitions.30 
However, as Williams and Rawls both emphasize, the thought that one’s 
social condition is strongly influenced by factors for which one is not responsible 
and can claim no credit also suggests that the distribution of natural talents is 
equally problematic upon reflection: it is similarly a contingent fact that people 
are endowed with different natural assets which are valued variously in a society. 
 
28 ‘The Idea of Equality’, 97; emphases in original. 
29 See ibid., 105–114; Theory, 65–75, 511–512/57–65, 447–448 rev. 
30 Theory, 73/63 rev. 
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As Williams asks, rhetorically: ‘But does not the criterion of ability excludes a 
priori a certain section of people—viz. those that are not able—just as the 
[criterion of wealth] excludes a priori those who are not wealthy?’31  Echoing 
Williams, Rawls suggests that  
once we are troubled by the influence of either social contingencies or natural 
chance on the determination of distributive shares, we are bound, on reflection, 
to be bothered by the influence of the other. From a moral standpoint the two 
seem equally arbitrary.32  
Williams and Rawls’s point is that the ideal of equality, interpreted as equality 
of opportunity, is threatened by factors which are arbitrary from a moral point of 
view; and they both appear to endorse what I call the moral arbitrariness rationale, 
according to which it is unfair, and therefore unjust, to permit distributive shares 
to be improperly influenced by morally arbitrary factors. They therefore suggest, 
in the name of equality, that the influences of morally arbitrary factors should be 
regulated in a reasonable way. But how? To see their answers, we need to look 
closer at Williams’s and Rawls’s critiques of equality of opportunity. 
Now, Williams points out that there could be a serious problem involved in 
the attempt to push the idea of equal opportunity to its extreme—that is, to 
eliminate all unfair advantages in opportunities. The worry is that one might be 
led to think that many attributes of ours, such as sensibility, intelligence and 
physical characteristics, are no longer in an appropriate sense constitutive parts of 
ourselves, but those of the circumstances which are corrigible, and should be 
changed by all means if equal opportunity is to be honoured. Suppose, however 
unrealistically that may be, that this goal could be perfectly realized. But according 
 
31 Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’, 109. 
32 Theory, 74–75/64–65 rev. 
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to Williams, this state of affairs would show exactly why the realization of equality 
of opportunity has a tendency to involve a worrisome attitude towards individuals:  
[They] would be regarded as in all respects equal in themselves—for in 
themselves they would be, as it were, pure subjects or bearers of predicates, 
everything else about them, including their genetic inheritance, being regarded 
as a fortuitous and changeable characteristics.33 
As Williams himself emphasizes, his concern is of a moral rather than 
metaphysical nature: he fears that ‘far too much emphasis was being placed on 
achieving high ability’, and that persons are ‘just being regarded as locations of 
abilities.’34 The recognition of moral agents is wanting in this gloomy picture of 
equality of opportunity, since it implies that people’s attributes are no longer 
strictly speaking considered to be theirs, but instead are parts of the circumstances 
contingently bestowed upon them. At any rate, Williams supposes that ‘those very 
concerned with producing the ability would probably also be over-concerned with 
success.’35 Indeed, if the only way to realize the ideal of equality is to achieve this 
state of affairs, then we may be required to change people’s ‘circumstances’, in a 
highly revisionist sense of this term, at all costs by every distributive measure 
within our power. 
Williams worries about this over-emphasis of equality of opportunity, for it 
appears at odds with a humanistic attitude towards people, which he appeals to as 
a naturalistic interpretation of the Kantian idea of equality of respect for persons.36 
According to Williams, to respect persons is partly to regard and treat them, from 
a ‘human point of view’, as self-reflective beings who are conscious of themselves 
and their circumstances—this human viewpoint ‘is concerned primarily with 
 
33 ‘The Idea of Equality’, 112. 
34 Ibid. 113. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 113–114. 
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what it is for that person to live that life and do those actions in that character.’37 
From this perspective, what is distinctive of the beings who have the capacity for 
reflective self-awareness is that they are able to intend to do something meaningful, 
to make something happen in their lives; and this is why they are worthy of respect.  
Williams imagines an inventor, who has spent his whole career trying to come 
up with an impossible machine, and so to no avail; but Williams suggests that this 
person, although ends up as a failed inventor, is still worthy of respect. According 
to Williams’s interpretation of the Kantian view, people should not be subsumed 
wholly under the ‘aesthetic or technical’ viewpoint, from which they are regarded 
as solely falling under their professional, social, or technical ‘titles’ that presuppose 
a structure of distinctions—from the technical point of view, that person would 
be reckoned as a failure whose efforts were useless and irrelevant. Indeed, Williams 
claims that these titles ‘are the conspicuous bearers of social, political, and 
technical inequality, whether they refer to achievement … or to social roles’.38 For 
this reason, the idea of respect for persons, interpreted as a humanistic attitude, 
has something very important to do with the idea of basic equality: it enjoins us 
not to regard people from a viewpoint that takes a structure of inequality as given. 
Williams’s worry, to repeat, is that the austere attitude expressed by the idea 
of equal opportunity is too much concerned with success and distinction, and it 
therefore appears to be in conflict with our commitment to equality of respect. 
But he offers no clear solution. Williams thinks that these two ideas both represent 
important aspects of the ideal of equality, and his final note is just that a salutary 
and invigorating political conception of equality must reconcile our concerns for 
both of these: we should treasure the idea of equal respect for persons, and ward 
off the inhumane tendencies when we pursue equality of opportunity; but it is 
also unwise to hang on to the idea of equal respect at the cost of being indifferent 
 
37 Ibid. 103; emphasis in original. 
38 Ibid., 104; emphasis in original. 
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to the distribution of natural and social conditions, which must be of our concern 
if equal opportunity is to be realized.  
Now, Rawls takes Williams’s concerns on board. To begin with, he endorses 
Williams’s interpretation and diagnosis of equality of opportunity.39 Moreover, 
Rawls also suggests that we have a natural duty of mutual respect, as the notion is 
interpreted by Williams’s humanistic approach.40  
But going beyond Williams’s view, Rawls further suggests that justice as 
fairness represents a reconciliation of the two ideas of equality which Williams 
finds both important. According to Rawls’s theory, the notion of equality that is 
concerned with the distribution of opportunities is defined by the second 
principle of justice that regulates social and economic inequalities, whilst the 
notion of equality of respect for persons ‘is defined by the first principle of justice 
and by such natural duties as that of equal respect; it is owed to human beings as 
moral persons.’41 Thus understood, each of the two principles of justice in justice 
as fairness expresses an aspect of the ideal of equality, and the priority of the first 
principle over the second further substantiates the idea that our concern for the 
realization of equal opportunity should never threaten to undermine our equal 
respect for persons. 
Indeed, Rawls is less troubled by the fact that ‘the consistent application of 
the principle of fair opportunity requires us to view persons independently from 
the influences of their social position.’42 For he thinks that ‘within the context of 
[justice as fairness] as a whole, there is much less urgency to take this course.’43 At 
any rate, Rawls claims that however important that principle is, ‘It is impossible 
 
39 See Theory, 73, 511–512/63, 447–448 rev. 
40 Ibid., 337/297 rev. Rawls also agrees with Williams that doctrines which presuppose arbitrary 
distinctions between people, such as racism, are not only unjust but irrational; see ibid., 149–
150/129–130 rev. 
41 Ibid., 511/447 rev. 
42 Ibid., 511/447–448 rev. 
43 Ibid., 511/448 rev. 
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in practice’ to neutralize all arbitrary advantages resulting from people’s natural 
talents and dispositions cultivated by ‘happy family and social circumstances.’44 
He therefore suggests that our understanding of egalitarian justice should reach 
beyond the idea of equality of opportunity. According to Rawls, our task is to  
try to find a rendering of [the principles of justice] which treats everyone equally 
as a moral person, and which does not weight men’s share in the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation according to their social fortune or their luck in 
the natural lottery.45  
We should therefore see that Rawls is clearly aware of the inhumane tendency 
of the idea of equality of opportunity, but his humanistic attitude towards the 
vicissitudes of fortune is expressed quite differently. On the one hand, the notion 
of equal respect for persons is substantiated in justice as fairness primarily as the 
principle of justice that guarantees equal basic rights and liberties for every citizen 
who has the two moral powers, namely the capacity for a sense of justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good. On the other hand, Rawls does not regard 
the strokes of luck cast upon free and equal citizens as necessarily inimical to a 
just human society. Instead, he suggests that ‘we may reject the contention that 
the ordering of institutions is always defective because the distribution of natural 
talents and the contingencies of social circumstances are unjust, and this injustice 
must inevitably carry over to human arrangements.’46 For it is an open question 
whether there is an appropriate way for a human society, consisting of free and 
equal members, to tackle the influences of natural and social contingencies: 
 
44 Ibid., 74/64 rev. 
45 Ibid., 75/65 rev. 
46 Ibid., 102/87 rev. 
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The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. 
What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.47  
Rawls believes that what we seek is an egalitarian conception of justice which 
is able ‘to identify the idea of equality most appropriate to citizens viewed as free 
and equal, and as normally and fully cooperating members of society over a 
complete life.’48 He holds that justice as fairness is capable of fulfilling this task 
because it includes the difference principle. 
To defend his view, Rawls constantly appeals to the idea of reciprocity, which 
is said to be ‘a relation between citizens expressed by principles of justice that 
regulate a social world in which everyone benefits’.49 As I explained in Section 1.4., 
Rawls argues that the idea of reciprocity is most appropriate to define the relation 
between free and equal citizens, and that this idea finds its natural expression in 
the difference principle; for assuming that when the least advantaged members of 
society benefit from inequalities, others benefit even more,50 it ‘represents an 
agreement to regard the distribution of native endowments as a common asset 
and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.’51  
In sum, justice as fairness represents an ideal of equality that includes an 
account of basic equality. The Rawlsian account of basic equality ensures that 
having the capacity for a sense of justice suffices for an individual being to be 
entitled to equal justice; and the principles of justice in justice as fairness are 
charged with the task to distribute the benefits and burdens in a way that honours 
the relation of reciprocity between free and equal citizens in a democratic society. 
According to justice as fairness, when the benefits and burdens due to differences 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Restatement, 49. 
49 Political Liberalism, 17. See also Theory, 102–105, 510–511/88–90, 446–447 rev.; Political 
Liberalism, 49–50, 54; Restatement, 6, 59, 64, 76–77, 123–124, 126, 130, 133. 
50 For this assumption of ‘chain connection’, see Theory, 80–82/69–72 rev. 
51 Restatement, 75. 
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in people’s natural and social endowments and other fortuitous influences are all 
assigned to be governed by the principles of justice, ‘reciprocity is fulfilled at the 
highest level’.52 I submit that these are some most important considerations that 
lend support to both the Rawlsian account of basic equality and the principles of 
justice in justice as fairness, unify them in Rawls’s egalitarian conception of justice, 
and further vindicate the non-differentiation thesis about basic equality. 
6.5. A Defence of the Relational Conception of Basic Equality 
According to the two theses I defend in this chapter, justice demands, on the 
one hand, that the capacity for a sense of justice be possessed by a most inclusive 
set of democratic citizens, so that they are capable of fully understanding and 
acting in accordance with the fair terms of social cooperation; and on the other 
hand that basic political equality holds among the widest range of free and equal 
citizens who possess that power. 
Now, one might worry that the Rawlsian argument for basic political equality 
begs an important question: namely, why should the reciprocal practice of social 
cooperation be taken as the circumstance of basic equality? Indeed, one may insist 
on knowing why the idea of basic equality needs to be articulated by reference to 
the idea of social cooperation.  
There are several ways to respond to this perfectly sensible query, among 
which I think the most straightforward is to claim that the reciprocal practice of 
social cooperation does appear to be one basic and important context where it 
matters whether individual beings are regarded and treated as equals. It is no 
 
52 Theory, 511/447 rev. 
 Justice and Basic Equality  
 199 
accident that Rawls assumes that the primary role of the principles of justice is to 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation between free and equal citizens.53 
To be sure, I need not and do not mean to suggest that individuals can make 
claims of justice on one another only when there is a certain kind of reciprocal 
relationship between them; indeed, that suggestion contradicts the enhancement 
thesis. Suppose it has been recently discovered that there is a previously unknown 
political community, currently besieged with civil strife that has led to serious 
plight of its members. On my view, although ex hypothesi other peoples have no 
previous contact with them, as a matter of justice they have no right to disregard 
the basic interests of the members of this political community. If there are agents 
capable of securing these interests, they have prima facie duties to do so, even if 
there is no previous or even present interaction between them and those who are 
in dire need. Thus illustrated, my view about justice is not, to say the least, directly 
prejudiced against so-called non-relational conceptions of justice.54  
In any case, my defence of the Rawlsian account of basic political equality 
does not assume that there can exist no other justification for basic equality, nor 
does it assume that we may never be concerned with other types of basic equality. 
In this chapter I argue only that by appealing to our considered judgments about 
justice we are justified in holding on to basic political equality among all who have 
a sense of justice. This political conception of basic equality may be compatible 
with other senses of basic equality on offer.55 
 
53 As witnessed by the still fast-growing literature on global justice, the idea of social cooperation 
as a reciprocal practice may even be understood in an extended sense to cover not only the 
domestic but also the international domain. If so, the notion of basic political equality would be 
global in its scope. 
54 That being said, I also agree that the demands of justice should be more stringent when they 
are made between those who are related as citizens in a political society. See above n. 3. 
55 Cf. Waldron, One Another’s Equals, ch. 3. 
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For instance, one may think of a structurally similar account of basic equality 
that appeals to morality.56 According to a version of this view, basic moral equality 
holds among all who have a sense of morality, however that capacity is articulated. 
Under the assumption that the political is part of the moral, this account would 
include an even more basic sense of equal standing between all who are capable of 
being a moral agent. Now, it is not my intention to argue for or against such a 
possibility, but I do want to note that there is a question whether it can plausibly 
draw upon and vindicate some enhancement and non-differentiation theses 
parallel to what I defend in this chapter. I suspect that the answer is negative: it is 
much less straightforward what the path would be. To start with, it is unclear 
whether there is a ‘minimal morality’ which itself demands all who have the 
potential to acquire a sense of morality to be thus empowered. Is it true that 
morality requires anyone and everyone who has such potential to become a moral 
agent? If so, who is responsible for fulfilling that task? As we know, there is 
apparently no corresponding problem for an account of basic political equality 
that appeals to justice: it is reasonable to assume that there always exist some 
institutional agents, such as states, which are responsible for fulfilling the minimal 
requirements of justice. The nature of morality seems much more controversial in 
this regard than that of justice. If this worry makes sense, then the enhancement 
thesis of the parallel account would be questionable. In addition, it is also not very 
clear whether a robust interplay between this basic moral equality and a suitable 
set of moral principles is conceivable. Although I do not claim that one form or 
another of the two theses I elucidate in this chapter are necessary for any defences 
of basic equality, it appears that the Rawlsian argument I put forward in this 
chapter may not always be available to other proposals.  
 
56 See, for example, Wallace, The Moral Nexus, ch. 5. 
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But I want to emphasise that even if the hypothesized account of basic moral 
equality were coherent, it would still be a relational view. Its critical idea would 
be that people are basic moral equals in that they possess the capacity which makes 
their reciprocal moral practice realistically possible; and that would the context 
out of which such a conception of basic moral equality is articulated. 
Now, I suspect that this relational account of basic moral equality, even if its 
details could be appropriately fleshed out, would still not seem satisfactory to all. 
More specifically, I think a general worry about my exposition may be that it fails 
to deliver an explication of a belief, held by some people deeply, that every human 
being is one another’s equal, in a most fundamental sense, no matter whether 
there is a system of social cooperation, or a web of moral interaction, or whatever. 
As I construe it, the Rawlsian conception of basic political equality is informed by 
the context out of which the relevant ideas are articulated; but some people might 
find it unilluminating, and accuse it of effectively abandoning the aspiration for a 
categorical recognition of equal human worth. I think this is what is often meant 
when people say they hang on to an idea of ‘basic moral equality’, full stop.  
For example, one might think that the Kantian ideal of respect for persons, 
suitably interpreted, grounds this most basic sense of moral equality; indeed, this 
may be one natural way to read Williams’s proposal, which I outlined above.57 At 
a most fundamental level, it would be an account of basic moral equality the 
justification of which does not refer to any interpersonal context. Individual 
beings are respected as equals simply in virtue of their one or more features which 
make them, say, moral agents whom it is fitting to respect. The question is then 
whether we can make sense of this non-relational idea of basic moral equality—
and if so, one may surely add that much of a relational conception of morality can 
be built upon it.  
 
57 See also Carter, ‘Respect and the Basis of Equality’. 
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Again, for all I have said in this chapter there is no attempt to exclude this 
possibility, but I shall not explore it further. For it remains the case that there are 
reasons to focus on the justification of basic equality in relational contexts. As 
Williams reflects on the idea of respect for persons as a humanistic attitude, ‘while 
it has a good deal to do with politics, and a certain amount to do with equality, 
has nothing specially to do with political equality.’58 Similarly, Rawls insists that 
‘the notion of respect or of the inherent worth of persons is not a suitable basis 
for arriving at [the principles of justice].’59 As I understand his view, Rawls thinks 
that in the circumstances of justice the notion of respect lacks definite content if 
it is construed as a practice-independent ideal, and we can make full sense of the 
idea of basic political equality only if we make reference to the reciprocal practice 
that involves considerations of justice. For what it is worth, this reference helps us 
to specify the fair terms which are to be reasonably acceptable to all who are 
involved in social cooperation as equals. Then, we may of course offer a suitable 
interpretation of the idea of respect for persons in those terms. As Rawls writes: 
Once the conception of justice is on hand … the ideas of respect and of human 
dignity can be given a more definite meaning. Among other things, respect for 
persons is shown by treating them in ways that they can see to be justified.60  
The fact that we are by our nature social creatures lends considerable support 
to the thought that a relational account of basic political equality is indispensable 
for a specification of our identities when we interact and cooperate in a shared 
common world. 
 
58 Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’, 104. 





In the Introduction I mentioned that there was a time when Rawls’s theory 
was seen as a paradigmatic distributive conception of justice. This assessment is, I 
believe, fair, for justice as fairness does include a number of egalitarian distributive 
principles; but I also believe that it is inappropriate to criticize it in virtue of this 
feature. For the possession of it is, on my view, essential to any plausible egalitarian 
theories, which must include elements of distributive equality, relational equality, 
and basic equality. According to the main thesis of this work, we should think 
that distributive principles help an egalitarian conception of justice to articulate a 
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